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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I present an ethnographic exploration of how a post-migration 
community—the Persian community in Israel—constructs its identity. Drawing on cultural 
and postcolonial theories, I discuss the ways in which the community preserves, 
negotiates, and resists cultural structures in the Israeli ethnic and national contexts. 
Through a multi-sited ethnographic exploration, I follow members of the Persian 
community in Israel, a marginalized ethnic minority, as they construct their national-ethnic 
identity. Embodying the discord between their two perceived homelands, Israelis of 
Iranian descent carve themselves an idealized homeland online. In it, they simultaneously 
resist and re-affirm social structures within and between the two nations and cultures.  
I focus this exploration on the use of social media, mobile-phone applications, and 
internet radio for post-migration identity formation. Through this study, I aim to answer a 
set of questions. Primarily, I attend the question - what is the role of online media 
platforms in the process of constructing Persian identities in Israel? Some other 
secondary questions studied in this dissertation are: a) How do community members 
communicate and articulate the ethnic and national layers of the Persian identity? b) 
What are the transnational and transcultural aspects of the Persian community and 
identity as communicated by community members? and c) What is the place of online 
platforms usage in challenging mainstream notions of ethnicity, nationality, homelands, 
and host lands?  
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Through this dissertation, I develop three concepts that contribute to the 
discussions of new media, culture, identity, migration, and ethnicity. First, I develop the 
idea of “lived ethnicity,” portraying ethnicity as an evolving and dynamic rather than a 
static or given identity marker. Looking at practices of “lived ethnicity” within different 
minority groups (language, collective memory, cuisine, etc.)  can allow us a comparative 
perspective, discussing similarities and differences within specific societies in different 
times, or between different societies at the same time. 
 A second concept I coin in this dissertation is “affirmative opposition.” Through 
this concept, I stress that while some cultural oppositional calls negate negative 
misconceptions about an oppressed group, they can, in fact, repeat and confirm the 
social narrative that established the very same oppression. Thus, affirmative opposition 
is a cultural act that simultaneously opposes and reaffirms existing social structures. The 
term allows us to critically engage with cultural practices as complex systems of 
negotiation, looking at the possible oppositional and liberating aspects of oppressive 
structures, and vice versa, identifying oppressive practices embodied in oppositional 
acts.  
Finally, contributing to new media studies, I coin the third term, “online 
homeland,” which expands previous notions of media usage in diaspora into digital 
realms. The online homeland is a notional space that allows communities to negotiate 
identities and cultures, becoming visible as a community away from the oppressing 
cultural gaze. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: STUDYING THE PERSIAN COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL 
 
An Iranian Jew received an emigration visa in order to migrate to Israel. Arriving at the 
airport of Tehran, on his way to Israel, security guards went through his luggage and 
found a statue of Khomeini. They asked him: "What is this?" The man replied: "You 
should ask who this is, and not what this is. This man brought the message of Islam to 
our country. He brought prosperity and success to the Iranian people, and I take it with 
me as a souvenir." The security guards let the man pass. When he arrived at TLV airport 
in Israel, security guards went through his luggage and found the statue. They asked 
him: "What is this?" The man replied: "You should ask who this is, and not what this is. 
This man is the reason for which I left Iran, after he made millions in his country 
miserable. I brought it with me so I can curse it every time I come across difficulties.” 
The security guards let the man pass. When he got home, he placed the figurine on a 
shelf in his library. A few days after arriving, some family members held a welcome 
party for him at his new home. One of his grandsons saw the statue and asked: 
"Grandpa, who is this?" He replied: "You should ask what this is and not who this is. 
These are 10 pounds of pure gold…” 
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The above quotation is taken from “It means you are Persian”1 Facebook group, a group 
of Jewish Israelis of Iranian origin. It was written as a joke and shared by a group 
member. This anecdote symbolizes the complex and conflicting layers of identity held 
by Jewish Israelis of Iranian descent. It combines the many aspects that make up the 
Persian identity of post-migration Jewish Israelis of Iranian origin–religion, ethnicity, 
and nationality—and reveals that there is more than just one way of framing a specific 
identity in a specific culture.  
In this dissertation, I conduct an ethnographic study that explores how a post-
migration community uses online and offline settings to preserve, construct, negotiate and 
resist their ethnic and national identities. This is done through a multi-sited exploration 
focused on different online platforms used by members of the Persian community in Israel. 
I conduct this research aiming to answer a set of questions. Primarily, I attend the question 
- what is the role of online media platforms in the process of constructing Persian 
identities in Israel? Some other secondary questions studied in this dissertation are: a) 
How do community members communicate and articulate the ethnic and national layers 
of the Persian identity? b) What are the transnational and transcultural aspects of the 
Persian community and identity as communicated by community members? and c) What 
is the place of online platforms usage in challenging mainstream notions of ethnicity, 
nationality, homelands, and host lands?  
                                                 
1 www.facebook.com/groups/594348647261642/ 
 3 
 
The case of the Iranian immigration to Israel is a unique case within the research 
field of immigration and diaspora. In line with the dominant myth, presenting Israel as a 
‘promised land’ and a ‘patrimony’ (Yablonka, 1997; Yiftachel & Roded, 2003), the state 
of Israel is perceived as the homeland of all Jewish Diaspora.2 Thus, Jewish immigration 
blurs the concrete distinction between a host land and a homeland. In addition, the 
immigrating Persian community has gained, over the last few decades, an additional 
layer of complexity. In the heart of today’s Israeli-Jewish-Persian identity lays the 
relationship between Israel and Iran. The rivalry between the two states is often 
portrayed by global scholars and mass media as heated and dangerous (Parsi, 2007; 
Jaspal, 2013). Lastly, the Persian community in Israel represents the ethnic cultural 
structures in Israel, allowing me to explore cultural and social oppression through 
discussions of their ethnic identity. Thus, the Persian community in Israel needs to 
reconcile an identity that combines a religious and national Judaism, but at the same time 
an ethnic Iranian heritage that was, for many years, marginalized in the Israeli context. 
This sort of identity construction, and especially the process of formulating self-
identification as an Israeli-Persian, is an exceptional realm for studying a multi-layered, 
hybrid, and even conflicting identities formulated via online environments. 
Understanding the meanings of being Persian in Israel holds, as I show in this 
dissertation project, political and social implications.  
                                                 
2 Jewish Diaspora is often referred to as The Diaspora, hence the capital D. In the current 
research, due to an extensive use of the term in multiple contexts, I will refer all such 
cases from now as diaspora, a default term for all views and conceptualizations of 
diaspora in different contexts.   
 4 
 
 In this context, two main assumptions form the heart of this research. First, with 
the proliferation of social networking sites, mobile applications, and the overall shift of 
online environments from text based internet platforms into immersive virtual worlds, 
individual media users are able to negotiate and construct identities and cultures that are 
considered real and continuous to offline settings rather than distinct and synthetic. 
These changes allow scholars with a glimpse into the ways in which identity markers 
such as religion, gender, race, etc. are negotiated online. The second assumption is that 
marginalized groups form cultural enclaves, through media and other means, to escape 
social, political, and cultural oppressions. In these enclaves, they can negotiate belonging 
and celebrate self-constructed identities and cultures away from the dominant 
mainstream culture in which they are marginalized. 
 Tying these two assumptions together, I focus on the roles online environments 
play in the lives of the Persian community in Israel. I argue that through online media, 
members of the community are able to partake in cultural and political discussions that 
were fairly closed for them thus far. In them, they are re-formulating an ethnic identity 
that was, for many years, oppressed in the Israeli society. They are also able to negate 
and re-construct their national identity, moving themselves from the margins of society 
into the center of dominant national and cultural narratives in the Israeli civic society. 
Finally, via online media users take part in building transnational and transcultural 
bridges between Iran and Israel, facilitating a civic dialogue that at times transcends the 
diplomatic clash between the states, and at time rearticulates it.   
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Contextualizing My Ethnographic Work 
 
My interest in the life stories of Jewish migrants to Israel has emerged long before I 
started working on this dissertation project. Coming from a family of immigrants, and 
growing up in a society that was/is constantly shaped by massive waves of migration; 
studying the relations of media and immigration seemed instinctive to me. In my MA 
thesis entitled “‘As birds returning to their nests’ – The Representation of Jewish 
Immigrants and Immigration in 1950s Children’s Magazines” I explored the 
construction of Jewish national identity through the coverage of immigrants and 
immigration in 1950s Israeli children’s magazines. I focused on the narratives depicting 
migration to Israel and the migrants themselves. The study discussed the sharp contrast 
between the positive presentation of Jewish immigration to Israel as a fulfillment of a 
prophecy and the negative depiction of immigrants themselves as primitive “others,” 
lacking ideological commitment to the young state. I highlighted the ways in which 
journalists and state leaders used the image of the immigrant as a social tool for 
collective self-definition, illuminating the reciprocal relationships between culture and 
journalistic practices (Yadlin, 2012; Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014). 
Since that project, I have been immersed in the field of migration and media 
studies, focusing on the criticism of mainstream media’s negative depictions of migrants. 
In this dissertation project, I expand the breadth of my knowledge, focusing on the self-
presentation and processes of self-identity formation presented by post-migration 
community online. As I am writing this dissertation, almost no research was found on 
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the topic of Jewish-Iranian immigrants’ usage of online platforms in Israel or on ethnic 
media and homeland media consumption. I wish to position this study within said gap, 
aiming to investigate the use of online platforms for the formulation of a Persian Identity 
by Jewish-Iranian immigrants and their families in Israel.  
While focusing on media produced or circulated by members of a post-migration 
community rather than by mainstream media outlets, I focus on the gap between the 
“ideal” and the “real,” between the Zionist image of migration and the life of migrants 
themselves. The ethnographic work conducted for this dissertation allows me to bring 
forward participants’ voices and points of view about complex narratives of migration, 
estrangement, and belonging. To engage these topics, I provide in the following 
paragraphs a brief review of Iranian migration processes to Israel, and media 
representation patterns of the Persian community.  
 
Iranian Migration to Israel 
 
Two main issues should be considered while addressing the process of Jewish-Iranian 
immigration to Israel. First, the Persian community in Israel is not a homogenous group. 
The members of this community differ in geographical area of origin within Iran (big 
cities or rural villages for example), in socio-economic status prior to departure, in 
period of migration (before the establishment of the state of Israel or after, before the 
Islamic revolution in Iran or after), and in socio-economic status in Israel (such as 
occupation, income, and level of education). Second, the assimilation process of the 
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Persian migrants in Israel, as well as the Israeli society’s attitudes towards different 
waves of Iranian immigration varies. Thus, when presenting the process of immigration 
to and assimilation in the state of Israel, there is a need to depict possible cultural and 
social nuances within the Persian community. In the same vein, the users of the different 
platforms studied in this dissertation vary in their background. They might share the 
online space and a sense of identity, but they come from diverse backgrounds within the 
Israeli society, with multiple media usage patterns and aims that might transcend this 
research project. Hence, a review of Iranian migration to Israel is needed.  
In the early 20th century, around 1903-1907, small and sporadic waves of a few 
thousand Jewish-Iranians immigrated to what was then a territory of the Ottoman 
Empire, an area that eventually became part of modern-day Israel. Central to these 
immigration waves was the Mashhadi community (Iranians from the city of Mashhad in 
Iran) that settled in an area known today as central Israel. The Mashhadi are considered 
a wealthy group that was persecuted for their Jewish religion in Iran. While many 
members of the community supported and assisted with later Iranian migration waves to 
Israel, the community did not mix with the later immigrating Iranian communities in 
Israel (Yerushalmi, 2010; Nettl & Shiloah, 1986). In 1917, the Balfour Declaration (in 
which the British government declared endorsement over the establishment of a national 
home for Jewish people in Palestine) generated additional waves of Iranian immigration 
to Israel.  
Between 1917 and 1948, about 3,600 documented Jewish-Iranians immigrated to 
Israel, most of them settled in Jerusalem. The actual number is arguably higher due to 
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undocumented immigration that occurred during these years (Netzer, 1979; Yerushalmi, 
2010). On the eve of establishing the State of Israel, about 20,000 to 30,000 Jews of 
Iranian origin (immigrants and their offspring) lived in Israel, mainly in urban areas 
(Yerushalmi, 2010). According to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, between 1948 and 
2010, more than 80,000 Iranians have immigrated to Israel. Persian community members 
estimate that the community has doubled in number since 1948, with approximately 
250,000 Israelis of Iranian origin living in Israel today (RadisIn, n.d).  
The 1950s were the first years after the establishment of Israel, in which the 
Jewish-national leadership in Israel held full control over the volume and assimilation 
patterns of Jewish immigrants (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014). The Iranian immigrants 
of the 1950s were included under the “Mizrahim” (Mizrahi Jews, Hebrew for – eastern) 
ethnic category, and were perceived as inferior to the absorbing veteran Israeli society 
(Ram, 2008). The Mizrahi ethnic group is the Israeli term for “Oriental” Jews, hailing 
mostly from Arab or Muslim countries in the Asian and African continents (Zur, 2003). 
Often overlapping in definition and origin with the Sephardic Jewry (Jews of Spain, 
hailing from around the Iberian Peninsula) and the Maghrebi Jewry (of the north-African 
areas) Mizrahi Jews were portrayed as the direct opposite of the Ashkenazi ethnic group 
originated in Western Europe cultures and nations.  
The two allegedly distinct groups became the social hierarchical terminology 
within the Israeli society, presented by critical scholars as one Israeli manifestation of 
cultural imperialism and orientalism (Shavit, 2003), an approach I will further explore in 
this dissertation through discussion of postcolonial thought and media usage. This 
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outlook partially resulted from the religious nature of the immigrant’s state of origin. 
Immigrants arriving from Arab and/or Muslim countries, among them some particular 
waves of Jewish-Iranians, were perceived to hold “oriental” and “primitive” lifestyle, 
which was considered inferior in comparison to European immigrants and the absorbing 
Israeli society (Lissak, 1987; Shenhav, 2006). Thus, many see Israeli Mizrahi migrants 
as culturally colonized subjects with identity formed around European-centered 
oppression and marginalization (Boyarin, 1997; Shenhav & Hever, 2002a; Shenhav & 
Hever, 2002b). 
On the one hand, Jewish migration – Aliyah (Hebrew for ‘ascending’) – 
ideologically positions Israel as a safe haven for persecuted Jews, a ‘promised land’ and 
a ‘patrimony’ (Yablonka, 1997; Yiftachel & Roded, 2003). On the other hand, during the 
1950s many Iranians that did wish to immigrate to Israel were declined. Under a 
classification system that is known as the “selective immigration,” Israeli immigration 
officials approved the immigration of Jewish people that seemed fit, healthy, and 
motivated in regards to the Zionist goals. The negative stereotypes associated with the 
Mizrahi community, and the Iranian-Jews as part of them, led to the rejection of 
immigrants that were seen as unable to advance the objective of building a strong nation 
(Picar, 1999).  
Attention should also be given to the use of the term “Mizrahim.” The closest 
Hebrew translation to the word ethnicity is “Eda.” The two do not exactly stand for the 
same idea, but, as Moreno (2014) argues: 
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[it] is remarkable how the common translation of ethnicity into modern 
Israeli Hebrew “eda,” denoted only the Mizrahi subset of Israeli 
immigrant society, leaving the non-Mizrahi community unspecified, as if 
it constituted the norm. Linguistically, there exist “edot hamizrah,” [plural 
for eda] but not “edot hama’arav” (Eastern ethnicities, but not Western 
ethnicities). The conscious or unconscious choice of a variety of scholars, 
including some postcolonialists, to stick to the nickname “Mizrahim” 
when referring to olim from Morocco (which is, in fact, situated in the 
West in relation to Israel), reflected some echoes of Eurocentric 
perceptions of modernization within the common discourse. By means of 
this terminology, Morocco and its immigrants represented the East, as a 
concept, in this migratory passage from traditional ethnicity to absorption 
in Israel’s modern society. In this dissertation, I seek to employ the term 
as a discursive, rather than an analytic category (pp. 26-27). 
Similarly, for the lack of other terms that highlight the social hierarchy and 
oppressions experienced in the Israeli context, I use the term to denote a 
discursive category rather than an ethnic perception.   
Goldstein (1985) argues that within the Mizrahi community, Iranian immigrants 
maintained a relative low ethnic profile and have been less subsumed under the 
negatively characterized group. Upon arrival, the 1950s Iranian immigrants were 
stigmatized in regards to their social qualities (Massad, 1996; Shohat, 1999; 1997); 
however, following Persian immigration waves received a somewhat different attention. 
 11 
 
Due to modernization processes undertaken in Iran, Jewish-Iranians living under the last 
governing Pahlavi Shah, Muhammad Reza, were imagined as relatively less “Oriental” 
than Iranian immigrants emigrating under Muslim ruling in Iran (Ram, 2008, p. 2). Ram 
(2008) argues that the Israeli society saw them as much more modernized and 
westernized than Jewish people emigrating from Iran over the early 1950s. The close ties 
between the Iranian Shah and the Israeli government helped to further establish this 
approach, as Iran was portrayed in the Israeli public opinion as a legitimate ally 
(Menshari, 2010; Litvak, 2006). These changes in perception, however, were not 
documented in studies of Israeli mainstream media. 
With the occurrences of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the “diaspora in 
exile” myth was employed once again to describe the Jewish community in Iran (Ram, 
2008). Although once viewed as more western and modernized; the Iranian immigrants 
were now (that is, after the revolution) perceived as immersed in exile under Muslim 
oppression and suffering. Regardless of questions of accuracy related to such narratives, 
the occurrences of the revolution have once again enabled the Israeli society to portray 
itself as the redemption of all exiled Jews in diaspora. Within this narrative, Mizrahi 
Jews are deemed lesser in education, social integrity, and ideological conviction than the 
Ashkenazi Jews. These attitudes were also visible in the media representations of the 
Mizrahi group in Israel, as discussed in the following section.  
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Media Representation of the Israeli Mizrahi Group 
 
Representation of the Mizrahi group in early Israeli mainstream media (Israeli print for 
example) expressed reservations in regards to their social abilities, portraying them as 
unable to assist in the physical and educational aspects of building a nation state (Lissak, 
1987). Children’s magazines of the 1950s associated these immigrants with passivity, 
lack of ideology, and uncleanliness (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014), while other media 
outlets of that era depicted members of the Mizrahi group as poor, unemployed, and 
even as criminals (Shiran, 2001). Although Mizrahi groups went through critical ethnic 
awakening during the 1970s, mass media portrayal of this community maintained its 
negative depictions. On the one hand, during the 1970s, Mizrahi groups established the 
Israeli Black Panthers (drawing on U.S. race relations) to “politicize ethnic tensions 
within the Jewish population of Israel” (Frankel, 2008, p. 10). On the other hand, Israeli 
cinema of the 1970s and 1980s preserved the early stereotypical representation of 
Mizrahi community as the “oriental” and the “other” (Shohat, 2005). Even during the 
1990s and 2000s Mizrahi groups were illustrated in news and prime time television as 
remote from centers of cultural, economic, and social power, often in contexts of 
disorder and turmoil (Laor, Elefent-Laflar, Avraham & First, 2005).        
The representation of immigrants as a whole, and immigrating Mizrahim in 
particular, was constructed in comparison to the image of the Sabar, or in English, 
Sabra, the ideal figure of devotion and sacrifice built by the Zionist movement. The 
Israeli journalist Uri Kesari coined the term Sabra in a 1931 Doar HaYom newspaper 
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article (Shait, 2005; Almog, 1997). The term refers to the generation born in the period 
between World War I and the 1960s. The group includes members that were either 
natively born in Israel or immigrated to Israel in a very early age and underwent a full 
socialization process of absolute assimilation in Israeli culture through Zionist 
institutions in Israel. Such institutions included agricultural youth villages, youth 
movements, the pre-state Palmach (fighting force of the Jewish community during the 
period of the British Mandate for Palestine) and post-state establishment Nahal (Fighting 
Pioneer Youth). These were coupled with living in the Kibbutz (communal living 
setting), workers’ settlements, and formal Zionist education institutions (Shapira, 1997; 
Almog, 1997). The Sabra, his devotion to the state, and his way of living, became the 
symbol of the Israeli melting pot, calling all Jewish Israelis to abandon their past and 
become the new Israeli Jew.  
Although the members of this Sabra group did not necessarily share a past or a 
vision of the present (ideological differences existed even within the labor movement), 
many collective characteristics were attributed to them. The name, Sabra, refers to the 
Opuntia cactus (in Hebrew–Sabar) a desert plant found wild in many areas of Israel. 
This cactus is able to survive harsh climate, thorny and tenacious on the outer layer, but 
soft and delicate inside. The Sabra was portrayed as a robust worker of the land, with 
fluttering thick hair and sunburned skin. His clothes were modest and his temper was 
brusque. He spoke Hebrew and had a strong secular-social commitment to the Jewish 
state and state-members. This character was built as part of the Zionist movement’s wish 
to shake off the diasporic image of the Jew, dwelling amongst hostile strangers. Thus, 
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the Sabra was the heroic son of Israel, the New Jew, symbolizing the ideological way of 
living, the activeness, and the courage his exiled brothers and sisters were lacking of. 
The Sabra became a key, yet imagined, social agent in the Israeli society, playing a 
central role in socialization processes for decades (Schweid, 1984; Raz-Krakotzkin, 
1993). 
This social construction of the Sabra requires a brief discussion of the Israeli 
melting pot. Early post-state establishment Israeli leadership formulated the ideology of 
the Israeli melting pot in light of the Jewish secular socialist movement. This 
problematic concept—melting pot—became the official ideology and government policy 
during the first decades of the Israeli state (Gutwein, 2004). The paternalistic and 
oppressive melting pot attitude of the assimilating society asked to weaken any non-
European, highly diasporic, and religious cultural expressions in the name of creating a 
new Hebrew Zionist society and citizens. The mass migration experienced in Israel 
during these years led the political and educational leadership to believe that only state 
intervention could lead to the establishment of a strong independent state. In late 1950, 
merely a decade after the establishment of Israel, the Israeli society more than tripled its 
size through migration waves arriving from around the globe. To ensure that all citizens 
share an ideology (that is, a Zionist ideology) government policies initiated from above 
started taking shape through different socialization agencies—media, education, youth 
movements, the army, and the like (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014).  
The influence of postmodern times did not skip the image of the Sabra or the 
Israeli melting pot project. In the 1980s, the multicultural ideology appeared in the 
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Israeli discourse as a vocal post-Zionist; academic criticism. “The multicultural 
movement,” argues Gutwein (2014) 
spoke against the ideology of the melting pot on the grounds that it served 
as a justification of erasing the identity of different groups—especially the 
Mizrahi Jews, but also Holocaust survivors, Yiddish-speaking 
communities, religious groups and others—as a tool of subordination to 
Ashkenazi-Zionist hegemony led by the labor movement. 
Yet, Gutwein, as well as other scholars such as Yona and Shenhav (2000), point 
at the inner-conflict of arguing for multiculturalism in Israel. While multicultural 
approaches were necessary for the liberation of subaltern groups in Israel, 
multiculturalism often served as a promotional tool for privatization processes in 
the Israeli society, further aggravating the cultural and economic inequality it 
originally opposed. Opening the Israeli society, economy, education, etc. to an 
alleged multicultural “open market” de facto intensified the gaps and schisms 
between ethnic groups in Israel rather than brought them together.  
When it comes to the image of the Zionist “wonder boy,” the Sabra, it is argued 
that in many ways the image of the native-Israeli has change into the post-Sabra, the 
Israeli Yuppie or the Nouveau riche. In comparison to the older Sabra, the Yuppie and 
Nouveau riche are more inclined to the material pleasures of life, holding a global nature 
of living, working, and consuming. Online communication and internet based media 
play a central role in the creation of the post-Sabra image, connecting the Israeli locality 
with worldwide high-tech centers and the global class of Yuppies. With geeks and 
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hackers gaining more and more traction in today’s culture, and metro-sexual muscular 
images filling fashion magazines, undermining the place of the ideological Sabra 
(Almog & Blais, 2008). Yet, it is hard to claim that a figure that has been so fundamental 
in the Israeli society has completely disappeared from Israeli cultural and political 
discourses.  The case of identity construction processes in the Israeli context begs paying 
attention to the ways in which the iconic image of the Sabra is used. The topic is 
emphasized in this dissertation in the analysis of the ethnic schism in Israel between 
Ashkenazi and Mizrahi groups as portrayed by members of the Persian community.  
The dominant narratives presented thus far lack the perspective of the 
represented. While much is known about the ways in which hegemonic Israeli groups 
portrayed ethnic minorities in media, less attention was given to the way in which 
minorities portrayed themselves in the Israeli context.  
The current study is situated within this gap, and attempts to investigate the ways 
in which members of the Persian community discuss and portray their ethnic and 
national identity in light of the movement between Israel and Iran. Goldstein (1985) 
addressed an offline means through which Israelis of Iranian origin preserved their culture 
in Israel. Studying the Iranian culture in Israel, Goldstein presented the social use of 
“definitional ceremonies” to perform a Persian identity. Through definitional 
ceremonies—conferences, weekend retreats, and live shows—Israeli Iranians created 
activities that answered a need of connection to their past, to formulate Iranian ethnic 
context for the young members of the community in Israel, and to provide local 
identification source for newer immigrants.  
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The use of these ceremonies united Israeli Jewish-Iranians that held varying 
definitions of self, different pasts, different birth regions in Iran, different immigration 
periods, and different interests in the present. Goldstein conceptualized the “definitional 
ceremonies” as the meeting place of culture and identity, an act through which Iranians in 
Israel became visible to themselves as an ethnic group. These “definitional ceremonies” 
created a liminal place for a Persian identification, imagined and actual at once. However 
helpful these “definitional ceremonies” were for the community, they still mark a liminal 
space, and not a day-to-day routine of ethnic identification. They were arranged apart from 
the day-to-day lives of the Persian community in Israel, and represented a “break” from 
the routine that allowed ethnic identification.  
In the current study, I wish to further the discussion of ethnic identity construction, 
and to address means of identity construction through more lived, everyday acts of media 
usage. Instead of occasional gatherings outside the daily routine, online platforms, as 
further discussed in the next chapter, became inseparable of day-to-day lives, and are 
argued to be spheres of identity construction that intertwine online and offline experiences. 
Therefore, this study focuses on three online platforms—Facebook, online radio, and 
instant messaging mobile apps—that allow the active participation of the Persian 
community in the day-to-day formation of their Persian identity. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Addressing the Jewish-Persian identity construction in Israel, this research concentrates 
on several issues. The following chapter (Chapter II) reviews the main concepts and 
theories used in the dissertation. It opens with an attempt to define identity as a whole, 
and the national and ethnic identities in the context of migration in particular, as a 
research locus. This review is followed by a discussion of new, online spheres of identity 
construction. These are grounded within studies of migration and media, as well as 
studies of national and ethnic identity construction. Focusing on collective identities–
national and ethnic–the issue of identity construction online is further grounded in this 
section within studies of community formation online. This is done to understand the 
importance of communities for the issues of communicating identity online.  
The review then turns to discussing the construction of social and cultural 
enclaves by minority and marginalized groups. This discussion address both online and 
offline usage of media for the construction of enclaves as spaces of discursive change 
and liberation of minorities. Drawing on existing literature, I address online media usage 
of the Persian community as an enclaved usage that simultaneously makes them 
invisible from the mainstream public eye but visible to themselves as a public of interest. 
In this section I also address three theories that focus on the relationship between society 
and media technologies. I do this to further contextualize the nuanced analysis of 
cultural and social marginalization and the way it both informs and being informed by 
media usage. The theories discussed in this section are Social Shaping of Technology 
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(Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999), Mediatization (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp, 
Hjarvard & Lundby, 2015), and Participatory Culture (Jenkins, 2006).  
Following the conceptual and theoretical review, I turn to theoretically 
contextualize this dissertation project. I draw on two main theoretical frameworks, 
namely cultural approaches to media studies and postcolonial thought, to discuss 
processes of identity construction. By using Carey’s (1989) cultural approach to media 
studies, I focus on the ritualistic usage of media outlets, primarily online ones, and the 
new place of media users in the negotiation and construction of national identities. To 
complement this discussion, I also refer to Anderson’s (1983/2006) discussion of the 
“imagined community” and the census, map, and the museum as examples of tools 
designed to create a sense of shared identity within a society, generating a sense of 
belonging. I also refer to Appadurai’s (1991, 1996) “community of sentiment,” to stress 
the community connection between an individual’s identity with a larger community, 
stressing the constructivist cultural aspects of the homeland sentiment of groups in 
diaspora. 
These theories are coupled with postcolonial approaches to stress the agency and 
constraints of individuals in the processes of identification. Focusing on practices of 
cultural oppressions, I draw on postcolonial thought to address the cultural opportunities 
postcolonial subjects experience through online media, and the possible reproduction of 
oppression enabled by them. Through the use of postcolonial theory, I highlight the 
conflicting messages and sources of identification characterizing cultural affiliations of 
migrating communities.    
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The theoretical discussion is followed by a review of the data collection and 
analysis methods presented in Chapter III. This section consists of two parts. First, I 
review literature relevant to digital qualitative research, focusing on the expansion of 
qualitative research to digital media and online environments. It is followed by an in-
depth discussion of expanding ethnographic research from the offline to the online. As 
part of this review, I present the applications and limitations of online ethnographic 
research, issues of participant observation in non-avatar based online environments, and 
triangulation of data collected online and offline. I then turn to present online 
ethnography as a multi-sited project.  
Drawing on Marcus’ (1998) conception of the multi-sited ethnography, I reflect 
on the complex and intertwined online-offline media experience of media users today. I 
stress the need to investigate shifting practices within and between multiple 
environments we inhabit online and offline. Here I also reflect upon the place of the user 
as a consumer and a producer of media content, and the new considerations this dual 
position requires from media ethnographers, thus far somewhat distinguishing between 
media producers and consumers. The ethical considerations for conducting online 
ethnographies close this part of the chapter. The second part of the methods chapter 
deals with the methodological application of online ethnography in this dissertation. I 
create an in-depth discussion of practicing ethnography in the Persian-Israeli 
community, framing the analysis and finding chapters that follow.  
 Chapter IV focuses on the ethnic identity re-constructed by members of the 
Persian community in Israel. I endeavor to contextualize the Persian identity in social 
 21 
 
and cultural circles relevant to the construction process. I open the chapter with stories of 
migration and assimilation shared by participants online and offline. This is done to 
understand the overall sense of alienation expressed by community members, stressing 
the prominence of online platforms in the process of Persian identity construction in 
Israel. I then turn to unpack the meaning of using online media in light of these stories. I 
draw on analyzed data to discuss the different themes that build the ethnic Persian 
identity in Israel, ranging from the Persian calendar, through the Persian cuisine, all the 
way to hybrid media texts produced and consumed locally and globally. The analysis 
portion of the chapter closes with a discussion of the culturally subversive vs. 
affirmative nature of the discourse produced by community members. Based on these 
findings, I developed the concept I coined, “lived ethnicity.” I draw on the terms 
“ethnicity in motion” (Moreno, 2015) and “lived religion” (Ammerman, 2006) to explain 
how ethnic identities function as an interpretive framework for every-day practices, but 
are simultaneously informed by these same practices.    
 Following the analysis of the ethnic facet of the Persian identity, Chapter V turns 
to discuss the construction of nationality, or nationalities, as presented by community 
members. Here I focus on the construction of a Jewish national identity by members of 
the Persian community as it relates to the Persian ethnic identity. To do so, I highlight 
the complex relationship between nationality and ethnicity, showing that while members 
work to formulate a space that includes and respects their ethnic identification, they also 
include some mainstream notions of Jewish nationality in it. At the same time, I present 
the ways in which members create a dual nationality, constructing their sense of 
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belonging both in the Jewish nationality and Israeli society as well as in the Iranian 
nation. I endeavor to theorize this coupling of conflicting narratives (i.e. resistance and 
embracement) through coining the term “affirmative opposition,” describing how 
members of the Persian community reaffirm existing social and cultural structures 
through acts of opposition.  
 Chapter VI details the ways in which members of the Persian community in 
Israel take part in Israeli diplomatic efforts through a self-proclaimed role of circulating 
Israeli Hasbara (diplomacy) online. Alongside constructing a cultural identity that 
brings together multiple conflicting identity markers, members work to construct spheres 
within which they transcend offline cultural and political limitations, creating new online 
spheres that position the Persian community as a central political player within the 
Israeli-Iranian conflict. Broadly defined as Israeli public diplomacy, Hasbara becomes a 
means for the Persian community to create and maintain relations with other Persians 
worldwide, creating cultural bridges with communities inside and outside of Iran. 
Analyzing the ways in which Israeli military and diplomatic goals are weaved into the 
cultural practices of the Persian community in Israel, I discuss the creating of a new 
sphere of communication in which the private and the public are blurred. Here I also 
focus on the cultural bridges established by community members between Iran and Israel 
via online media.  
 Drawing on Chapters IV through VI, I discuss the conclusions of the dissertation 
in Chapter VII. In this chapter, I present the conceptual and theoretical contributions to 
the study of diaspora communities and media in the context of postcolonial approaches. 
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Namely, I address the changing nature of the Jewish narrative of “returning to a 
homeland,” drawing on participants’ stories to position Israel itself as a diaspora. 
Moreover, I stress how minority groups construct colonial subjects (other than them) 
even outside of established colonizing discourses. I conclude the dissertation by 
discussing the term “online homelands.” Expanding previous notions of media usage in 
diaspora into digital realms, I contribute to the field of new media studies, specifically in 
the context of new media and migration.   
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CHAPTER II 
IDENTITIES, COMMUNITIES, MIGRATION, AND MEDIA 
 
In this conceptual chapter, I discuss the role of online media in enabling processes of 
identity construction. I open the discussion with an attempt to define identity as the focal 
point of this dissertation. First, I present broader approaches to the concept, and then turn 
to discuss identity construction in spaces of contention. I highlight the specific case of 
ethnic and national identities, contemplating the overlapping areas between the two 
while addressing the Persian identity in Israel and Iran. The issue of post-migration 
identity construction is also discussed. This section highlights identities as a whole, and 
the Persian identity analyzed in this study in particular, as constructed, fluid, fragmented, 
reflexive, and narrative based social artifacts. I stress in this chapter, that identities bring 
together multiple, often overlapping, social and cultural markers (such as gender, 
religion, race, nationality, etc.) and involve constant reflection and reconstruction. 
Second, I address the issue of identity construction in online environments. In 
this section, I follow the evolution of studying and approaching identities in 
online/virtual environments from the 1980s until our days. The main argument being 
made in these paragraphs is that while in the past online constructed identities were 
approached as detached from offline identities, inauthentic or falsified, we are now at a 
point in which online and offline identities are intertwined. They are viewed indexical to 
each other, carried simultaneously via multiple online and offline platforms. Following 
this section, I situate the discussion of online identity construction within approaches to 
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online and virtual communities’ formation. Arguing in earlier sections of this chapter 
that identities are social and communal, the discussion of community formation online is 
integral to this dissertation and is necessary for the understanding of identity 
construction and research in online platforms. This section also reviews the creation of 
enclave media spaces by marginalized groups, further engaging with processes of 
community building and identity formation by minority groups. In this section I also 
address three theories that focus on the relationship between society and media 
technologies. These are Social Shaping of Technology (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999), 
Mediatization (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp, Hjarvard & Lundby, 2015), and 
Participatory Culture (Jenkins, 2006). This is done to further position the case of 
minority groups’ media usage, and engages the question - is it media and communication 
technology that shapes society or is it society that shapes advances in media technologies 
alongside changes in media design and use? 
 The fourth section of this chapter addresses the issue of migration and diasporic 
identities. Here attention is given to the concepts of host lands and homelands, 
developing the grounds for a later discussion of the blurring line between the two in the 
case of the Jewish identity. In the fifth section of the chapter, I review central literature 
connecting the concepts host lands and homelands with media studies. These include 
Appadurai’s (1990, 1996) “community of sentiment,” Anderson’s (1983/2006) 
“imagined community,” and Carey’s (1989) cultural approach for studying media as a 
ritual. Finally, these concepts and theories are further unpacked through a review of the 
postcolonial approach. By examining the case of constructing Persian identity in Israel 
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via online and offline environments, I wish to expand and add to these concepts and 
theories, developing in later chapters of this dissertation the concept “online homeland.” 
 
Defining Identity  
 
Focusing on identity construction via online environments, this chapter opens with a 
discussion of identity as a research locus. The main difficulty with studying identity is 
that “different disciplines use the word to mean very different things” (Childs, 2011, p. 
14). Hence, a clear definition of what identity means in this study and the kinds of 
identities this study looks at is needed. In the following paragraphs, I bring forward four 
relevant features for studying identities in the context of this dissertation. Through this 
review, I argue that identities are collective, constructed, narrative based, and reflexive.  
 
Collective Identities and Identity Construction 
 
First and foremost, formulating identity is viewed in this study as a social process. Two 
main assumptions lay in this context: the first is that identity is collective, formed in 
relations to existing or imagined communities. It is an individual’s conceptualization of 
self through interaction with larger social groups. The second is that identity is 
constructed rather than inherent and essential. “Social identity,” as Goffman (1963) 
defines it, is performed based on a person’s understanding of her/his place in society, 
and the characteristics they associate with their self. This does not mean that an 
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individual’s presentation of self or identity is not sincere. Rather, identity is enacted, 
constantly negotiated, and re-constructed against social settings (Goffman, 1959; Hall, 
2000).  
Thus, identity is often built in terms of sharing personal characteristics with 
others, and being a part of an existing social collective. According to Hall, identity 
formation, or “identification,” is the never-ending process of articulating an allegiance 
and solidarity with an establish group. Established groups can always change, be re-
formulated, or even be abandoned. Such identification is performed not only through 
recognizing the similarities one shares with a group, but also through the differences one 
holds from the “other” (Hall, 2000) or the “out group” (Goffman, 1963).  
The two main identity markers I focus on in this study are ethnicity and 
nationality. Ethnicity is viewed as a “collective identity and solidarity based on such 
factors as real or alleged common descent, language, customs, belief systems and 
practices (religion), and… even though physical features of people, such as skin, colour 
or simply racial characteristics, also contribute to ethnicity and ethnic identity, culture 
remains still the primary and essential determinant of ethnic formation” (Amanolahi, 
2005; p. 38). Thus, ethnicity is framed as a construction or an instrument built on some 
shared, biological or not, characteristics. According to Varshney (2007), ethnicity is 
often utilized for galvanizing collective identity and can be used to construct a shared 
sense of community on a local, regional, or national level. In the humanities and social 
sciences, ethnicity became one of these concepts holding variety of definitions, often 
even conflicting ones.  
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The term “ethnicity” according to Hall (1996), “acknowledges the place of 
history language and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity” (p. 446). 
Hall signals ethnicity as a means for marking differences between distinct ethnic groups. 
Positioned in the context of nationality, ethnicity has been used both for the construction 
of a shared sense of national cohesion, but at the same time further marked social 
differences, conflicts, and hierarchies within nation-states. Thus, individuals might share 
the same nationality, but associate with different ethnic groups (U.S. citizens of Latin or 
Caucasian ethnicities, as used by American census for example). At the same time, 
individuals that share an ethnic identity can be a part of different nationalities (for 
example – the Basques in France and Spain). In this context, nationality is defined as a 
social order or an ideology which renders the nation-state justifiable (Deutsch, 1953). 
Just like ethnicity, it might be based on engendered characteristics such as religion, 
geographical territory, or on imagined shared political or cultural past and present 
(Smith, 1986; Anderson, 1983/2006).  Ethnic and national identities are thus often hard 
to distinguish from each other.  
Acknowledging cases in which ethnicity and nationality overlap in definition, 
Varshney (2007) highlights the difference between the two: an ethnic group might exist 
without a state of its own, and a nation implies bringing ethnicity and statehood together 
(although, as mentioned, a nation-state might consist of more than just one ethnicity). 
The ethnic-Persian identity, on which this study focuses, further problematizes these 
already convoluted distinctions. During the Pahlavi era (1920s-late 1970s), the Iranian 
monarchy used ethnic-Persian descriptors (language, calendar, and European roots for 
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example) as a way to distance Iran from regional, Muslim-religious, and pan-Arab 
identities (Marashi, 2008; Mirsepassi, 2000; Ansari, 2006). However, in the 
contemporary Iranian context, the meaning of the term has shifted, as being Persian is a 
religious-centered ethnic identification. As “Persians” in Iran are nationally Iranian and 
mostly religiously Muslim (Shia). Thus, religious Jewish minorities in Iran today are not 
included under the definition of being Persian (Amanolahi, 2005).  
In Israel, however, some of the Jewish-Iranian immigrants define themselves as 
Persians, emphasizing their ethnic heritage alongside national identity (Jewish), religious 
identity (Jewish), and citizenship (Israeli). In some cases, being Jewish is also 
considered as an ethnic identity marker in of its own, one that further complicates the 
mentioned overlap between nationality and ethnicity. This is not to say, however, that all 
Jewish immigrants from Iran are necessarily Persians. Other Jewish ethnic minorities 
populate Iran. The Jewish Kurds and Kalimis, for example, are two Jewish communities 
in Iran that do not necessarily identify ethnically as Persians. These two ethnic-religious 
minority groups from Iran represent the fragmentation of the Jewish community in Iran. 
In Israel, additional factors further complex the discussion of ethnicity and nationality. 
Citizenship is a prime example of such complexity. 
Understanding the distinction between citizenship and nationality is important in 
the case of this dissertation project. Unlike the U.S., in which nationality and citizenship 
are coupled (being American is both a nationality and citizenship, regardless of one’s 
religious or ethnic background), in Israel nationality and citizenship are separate. While 
most Israelis (based on birth, descent, residence, marriage, or naturalization) qualify as 
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citizens of Israel (keeping in mind that the discussion of what constitutes as Israel is of 
importance, but will not be included in this dissertation), the state is defined as a Jewish 
nation. Under this approach, citizens’ nationality is not equal to their citizenship. One 
can be, for example, Israeli-Jew or Israeli-Arab. This is confusing as the Jewish and 
Arab national identities are based on religious and ethnic definitions and identifications. 
An Arab-Israeli will most likely be Muslim or Christian in religion. But, if a Jewish 
individual immigrates to Israel from an Arab state, Iraq for example, they will be 
considered Jewish in their nationality once becoming Israeli citizens, based on the law of 
return (further discussed in later sections of this chapter).  
This convoluted issue requires an understanding of what the state of Israel puts 
forward as one’s main identity marker. Yes, this is discriminatory and highly subjective. 
The topic is important to understand as I aim at unpacking both ethnic and national 
identity construction processes. Thus, when I address national identity rather than 
citizenship, I stress that participants in this study address being Israeli and Jewish, part 
of a national group, rather than just Israeli, as an all-inclusive, integrated, and 
multicultural identification of all members of the Israeli society. Participants in this 
study are those who identify themselves as Persians through a post-migration identity 
construction process in Israel, and prioritize national Jewish identification when 
referring to Israel and to being Israeli. This is not unique to the Persian community, and 
has been found as the default reference addressing the Israeli society from a Jewish-
national point of view (Yiftachel & Roded, 2003). Participants in this study are Israeli 
citizens and Jewish in their nationality. They view themselves as Persian, and based on 
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this self-identification I study in this dissertation the different meanings and roles online 
environments play in this identification process. It just might be that some of the 
participants further conflate Persian ethnicity with other ethnic descriptors or markers 
that are not considered Persian in Iran (such as being Kurd). Thus, while migrating to 
Israel from the same place of origin – Iran – under the same religious identification – 
Jewish – some Iranian-Jewish migrants to Israel might hold ethnic heritage that is not 
Persian. 
This complex Persian identity, as it is experienced by Israelis of Iranian origins, 
amalgamates conflicting religious, national, and ethnic sources and emphasizes the 
changing nature of identity in the context of migration. Therefore, in this study I address 
the Persian identity as a cultural identity, one that encompasses multiple intersecting 
identities in a specific locality. Cultural identity (rather than solely religious, ethnic, or 
national) reveals that identity markers cannot be easily divided, and are often gathered 
into one identity that encompasses different descriptors for different people. The process 
of constructing this identity is the center of this study.  
As discussed thus far, identities are viewed in this dissertation as social and 
collective. I now turn to discuss an additional feature of identities, which is the issue of 
construction. Granted, both ethnicity and nationality can be viewed as essential markers, 
organic and inherent to one’s identity. Studying ethnic and national identities from an 
essentialist perspective means assuming that identities grow organically based on shared 
primordial essence. The primordialism of shared ethnic ancestry, geographic location, or 
blood-line, serves as a strong mechanism for the formation of national and ethnic 
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identity (or national conflict, depending on the situation and the locality) (Varshney, 
2007). Constructivism, in contrast to primordialism, views ethnicity and nationality as 
modern frameworks that extend localities and regions by the creation of a shared 
identity, and is the line of thought utilized in this study. Scholars prone to this approach 
emphasize the invented and imagined aspects of ethnicity and nationality as modern 
identity markers, connecting masses of individuals through language, symbols, and mass 
media (Hobsbawm, 1983; Anderson, 1983/2006; Billig, 1995).  
Constructivist approaches are highly relevant to studying both Jewish nationality 
and Persian ethnicity. In the case of the Jewish nationality, it is argued that the Zionist 
movement emerged during the late 19th century as a hybrid of ethnic ancestry (biblical 
narratives) and social construction. Jewish nationality relied (and still does to a large 
extent) on a contemporary reading of ancient symbols and history, creating an identity 
that transcends the different localities, variety of languages, and host of political views 
Jewish people held in diaspora (Dahan & Wasserman, 2006; Ram, 2006). In this context, 
biblical narratives of “returning to a homeland” and to a “patrimony,” alongside other 
political issues, enabled the revival of the Jewish state in Israel (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 
2014). In a very similar way, Persian-ethnic identity markers were used for the 
construction of Iranian national identity. By stressing Iran’s Persian heritage–both 
through references to its Aryan background and to its secular history in Iran–different 
Iranian leaders have invoked a vivid abstraction of the nation-state (Marashi, 2008). 
Thus, for example, in October 1971, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi staged an official 
celebration marking the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of Cyrus, the founding of the 
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Persian Empire. Using ethnic heritage, the Shah attempted to create shared national 
language and experiences for citizen to draw on and identify with (Chehabi, 1993; 
Marashi, 2008). Such constructivist approach is chief to this study, stressing that identity 
is in constant flux, negotiated by individuals and groups, filling the role of a social 
gatherer. 
 
Narratives and Reflexivity in Identity Construction 
 
Social identities (Goffman, 1963) are not only collective and constructed (Hall, 2000; 
Cerulo, 1997). They are also considered as reflexive and narrative based. According to 
Giddens (1991) self-actualization—the defining of one’s self—is based on a dialogue 
with a social group’s present, past, and anticipated future. This means that identities are 
formulated through narratives and stories, which are told, negotiated, and made explicit 
through different methods. Central outlets to these narratives are mass media outlets 
such as television, film, and radio. Providing media audiences a repertoire of shared 
symbols for identity constructions, media outlets became a place for cultural gathering, a 
ritual, or the modern campfire around which community members meet (Carey, 1989). 
Online media, as will be discussed further in later sections of this study, make these 
processes not only more available for users (via blogging, photo sharing applications, 
social networking sites, etc.) but also more explicit and visible to scholars (Baym, 1999). 
The process of reflexivity is crucial in this context, and refers to the changing nature of 
identity. According to Giddens (1991) this is the constant process of revision, self-
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reflection, and changes we make to our presented identity “in light of new information or 
knowledge” (p. 20).  
There is, however, difference between Goffman’s process of building “social 
identities” as discussed earlier in this chapter, and Giddens’ process of “self-
actualization.” Goffman is more concerned with the co-presence of the individual and 
society, that is–the immediate social interactions that organize our performance of self in 
front of other individuals and groups. Goffman does not argue for one coherent set of 
identity markers being used by an individual in all instances, yet he stresses the 
consistency between the performer and observer, the individual and his/her audience 
(Goffman, 1959). Giddens, on the other hand, looks at identities as far more fragmented, 
dependent on more than immediate interactions. Giddens (1990) emphasizes the distance 
between time and space enacted through identity by looking at the ways in which 
identities are dis-embedded and then re-embedded into new forms of identities. To sum, 
while Goffman highlights identities as tools of becoming present in a society or 
situation, Giddens view identities as these processes that break the present in favor of 
fragmented pieces of time. These two understandings of identity, while conflicting to 
some extent, are both crucial for this study, as identity construction is viewed as a 
reformative act, bringing together multiple times, spaces, locations, and heritages.  
I draw on Goffman’s conceptualization of identity to stress the social aspect of 
identity performance. The Persian identity is studied in this dissertation in social 
contexts – the usage of online media. By using Goffman’s articulation of the shared 
understanding created between the performers and their audiences, I am able to discuss 
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communal effort of creating the Persian identity. I draw on Giddens to highlight the 
fragmentation of that identity, and to discuss the multi-layered, intersecting, and 
conflicting sources of identifications used by the Persian community. By using 
Goffman’s notion of the self, I refer to preformed and public notion of the constructed 
identity. By using Giddens’ concepts of fragmentation and distance, I stress the multiple 
sources of identifications combined into the Persian identity enacted by the Persian 
community members online and offline. Together, the two approaches enable me with a 
nuanced approach to the study of post-migration identity construction. 
 
Migration and Identity Construction 
 
Focusing on identities in the context of migration, reflexivity is an inseparable part of 
this study. Acknowledging that identities are reflexive and context dependent, means 
also acknowledging that identities are plural and complex; they are nested, always 
multiple and intertwined (Scopacasa, 2014). They are also fragmented, multi-layered, 
and hybrid; overlapping across and within different spheres of identifications (gender, 
religion, ethnicity, nationality, etc.) (Kraidy, 2005; Calhoun, 1994). Literature concerned 
with the relationship between identity and immigration focuses on these multiple, 
overlapping identities with respect to changing localities. Identity construction processes 
in the context of migration are mainly portrayed as experiences of strangeness, 
separation, and transformation of self (Aksoy & Robins, 2002). The negotiation and 
construction of identity involve geographical journey and reconfiguration of both the 
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place of origin and the new locality to which an immigrant arrives (Ahmed, 1999). 
Amidst these processes of spatial and cultural transformation, media outlets are essential 
resources for identity construction and maintenance (Appadurai, 1996). As identities are 
“never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside 
representations” (Hall, 1990, p. 222), the need for media images and cultural repertoires 
is constantly avid. Diaspora communities find media outlets to be a vital resource for 
overcoming geographical and cultural relocations and for ensuring a consistent sense of 
identity and belonging in the new locality (Eswari, 2014; Li, 2013).  
While this study focuses on the ethnic and national aspects of the Persian 
identity, it is important to acknowledge that other identity markers play a role in the 
identification process of the studied group and its members in their post-migration state. 
Religion, for example, is an underlying identity marker in the Jewish context, whether in 
relation to ethnicity or nationality. In the context of this dissertation project, however, I 
address the Jewish identity as nationality rather than religion. This is a conscious 
decision that follows a line of scholars that study the national-secular reading of the 
Jewish identity in Israel (for example: Ram, 2006; Dahan & Wasserman, 2006; Liebman 
& Don-Yiḥya, 1983). I further unpack this notion throughout the following chapters, in 
particular within the discussion of civil religion in Israel as seen on chapter five. I use 
the term civil religion as it is contextualized in studies of Jewish nationality in Israel – as 
a system of rituals and symbols that provide a secular reading to Judaism rather than a 
religious reading of nationality and the state (Liebman & Don-Yiḥya, 1983). 
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To summarize this section, I have discussed the main perspectives on the process 
of identity formation. Identities are presented as a social process rather than a final, static 
outcome. They are constructed, rather than inherent, and are often social rather than 
individual. Identities are built in a social context, negotiated by individuals and groups, 
and are being presented via media outlets. Construction of identities brings together 
multiple, often overlapping, markers (such as gender, religion, race, nationality, etc.) and 
involves constant reflection upon them. In this study, I focus on national and ethnic 
identity construction in the context of migration. I am interested in examining the way 
these identities are constructed using online environments. Therefore, in the following 
section I review the topic of identity construction as a whole, and immigrants’ identity 
construction, in the context of new media and internet based platforms.  
 
Constructing Identity via Online Environments 
 
Early studies of identity construction in online environments were conducted in 
anonymous internet based spheres such as bulletin boards, news groups, and MUDs 
(Multi-User Domains). Focused on the topic of identity, the main concern of these 
studies was the extent to which identities were manipulated online. Two main 
perspectives characterized these studies around the late 1980s and 1990s. On the one 
hand, a dystopian approach towards the internet tied formations of online identities with 
aggressive online acts such as rape, and associated the process with negative contexts 
such as forgery enabled by anonymity (Dibbell, 1993; Turkle, 1995). From this 
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perspective, studying the relations between identity formation and deception was central 
to scholars’ concerns (Markham, 1998; Dawson & Cowan, 2004). 
On the other hand, utopian approach towards the use of online spheres for 
identity constructions signaled the new opportunities presented to users (Darling-Wolf, 
2008). The internet allowed users to create fluid and fragmented; technologically 
mediated identities. These identities, in turn, allowed minority groups to overcome social 
marginalization. Gender, race, and religion are just some of the identity markers that 
were playfully challenged online, giving users opportunities to experiment with their 
place in a given social order (Haraway, 1991; Danet, 1998; Miller & Slater, 2000). 
Whether from a utopian or dystopian perspective, the online and the offline were seen in 
these early days as separate spheres. The movement between them allowed individuals 
to change their identity and become someone new. With access to endless forms of 
identities, identification online was perceived as a matter of choice, independent of 
offline physical cues (Poster, 1997). “In other words,” argue Zhao, Grasmuck & Martin 
(2008) “the disembodied and anonymous online environment makes it possible for 
people to reinvent themselves through the production of new identities” (p. 1818). 
In the context of web 2.0 environments, scholars have shifted into an 
understanding that online and offline identities, although not similar, do relate to each 
other. With an emphasis on user experience online, identity was conceptualized as 
continuous between online and offline. Scholars’ fascination with identity have shifted 
from approaching experiences of deception and disembodiment to studying how the 
internet is embedded in every-day lives, including in the process of identity construction 
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(Verschueren, 2006; Lövheim, 2013). Nowadays, with the proliferation of social 
networking sites and mobile applications, and the shift from a text based internet to 
immersive virtual worlds, the online and offline are seen as having an indexical 
relationship, one that is “causal rather than symbolic relationship to referent” 
(Boellstorff, 2012, p. 51). Identities presented online are not addressed as less “real” or 
“authentic” than offline identities (Wagner, 2013). We are now at a point in which 
online and offline identity might be intertwined, to an extent that new social and cultural 
contexts are created. This is important to understand, because in the world we live in 
today— “a world of global flows of wealth, power, and images, the search for identity, 
collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the fundamental source of 
social meaning… identity is becoming the main, and sometimes the only, source of 
meaning” (Castells, 1996/2000, p.3). 
Research probing identity construction in immigrants’ usage of online 
environments addressed a wide array of religious, ethnic, and national groups in 
different locations. Globalization is marked as a central term in studies of such 
transnational cultures, also referred to as cultural globalization or cultural hybridization. It 
has opened the nation-state borders to migration of people, capital, and culture and blurred 
the lines between the national, ethnic, and religious layers of identity (Kraidy, 2005). 
Thus, culturally globalized mass media are “active across large and irregular transnational 
terrains” (Appadurai, 1996, p.9) becoming more and more user based via online platforms 
(Chaffee & Metzger, 2001).  
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Kang and Yang (2011) for example studied ethnic identity construction among 
Taiwanese immigrants in the US, and stressed the importance of new media for ethnic 
identity maintenance. In the same vein, Brinkerhoff (2009) investigated Afghan, Tibetans, 
Egyptian, Somali, and Nepali diasporas’ use of online environments to construct and 
negotiate identity and solidarity. Brinkerhoff suggests that online outlets have been an 
important resource for the promotion of socioeconomic and political changes in the 
immigrants’ homelands. In this context, online media are crucial for the maintenance of 
connections with the immigrants’ places of origin. In the Croatian context, websites of 
Croatian music on demand constructed an imagined homeland around a collection of 
songs for Croatian-speaking users both in and outside of Croatia. Senjković and Dukić 
(2005) argue in this case that the online community formulated around the website 
experienced national solidarity and “togetherness” through online consumption on 
national-oriented music. Here we see again how online media become significant for 
immigrants looking for a sense of identity and community. Finally, Abrams, Baker & 
Brown (2013) addressed the religious aspect of the Jewish diaspora in the United 
Kingdom. They claim that social media might facilitate the creation of offline 
communities and ease feelings of alienation or disenfranchisement in diaspora. 
Yin (2015) highlights an important distinction for studying online media in the 
context of diasporic identity construction. According to Yin, researchers should 
acknowledge the difference between ethnic media and homeland media. Ethnic media 
content is produced by and for the ethnic community in a host country, with content 
provided both in ethnic and host languages. Ethnic media content play an important role 
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in both assimilation of the migrating community in the new locality and in fostering 
unifying ethnic and cultural pride. Homeland media is produced in the migrating 
community’s state of origin, without aiming at migrants as target audience. With the 
widespread of online platforms, this type of media content becomes easily accessible to 
migrants, contributing to the ongoing process of identity construction abroad. Thus, 
when approaching media content used and created by users online, scholars should 
consider both homeland media content produced in Iran and ethnic content produced in 
Israel or in other localities outside Iran by the Iranian diaspora, as integral to the process 
of identity construction by migrants.  
Considering identity construction in online environments as the central issue 
addressed in this dissertation, a few conclusions can be drawn from this section. First, 
online identities are less doubted than they were in early research of the topic. Although 
deception is always an option, usage of online spheres for the construction of identities is 
viewed as “real” as similar and highly connected offline acts. Engaging this discussion, I 
view online identities as indexical to offline ones. I contend that online media users carry 
their identities within and between online and offline platforms, creating a sense of 
identification that is consistent between the two rather than distinct within each sphere. 
The construction of a Persian identity is viewed in this study as a communal effort, and 
should be situated in relevant literature. Hence, in the following section of this chapter, I 
review the topic of online communities in the context of media studies. 
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Situating the Self in Online Communities 
 
Claiming that internet based media form new cultural structures and social relationships 
became a consensus among new media scholars. Online media users are now able to find 
and connect more easily with other users creating and promoting online communities 
(Jenkins, 2006; Castells, 1996/2000; Campbell, 2013). These can be communities with a 
prior offline existence, such as a neighborhood forum (Rainie & Wellman, 2012), or 
communities that were formed exclusively online, such as soap operas’ fan groups 
(Baym, 1999). Based on a variety of shared interests and a desire for a sense of 
belonging, these virtual communities are defined as “social aggregations that emerge 
from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with 
sufficient human feeling to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” 
(Rheingold, 1993, p. xx). Online communities are viewed as a passage point, one that 
gathers a collection of practices and beliefs shared by individuals that might be 
physically separate (Stone, 1993). Just as the topic of identity formation online has been 
studied from different perspective, so was the topic of online communities. The different 
perspectives are reflected in the many names online communities gained over the years: 
cybersocieties, cyber communities, web groups, virtual communities, web communities, 
virtual social networks, e-communities, and more (Zaphiris, Ang & Laghos, 2012).  
 Early studies of online communities approached the internet as a ‘cyberspace’ or 
a ‘virtual’ space. “These terms focused on the way in which the new media seemed able 
to constitute spaces or places apart from the rest of social life (‘real life’ or offline life)” 
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argue Miller and Slater (2000; p. 4). These early studies were also divided into the 
utopian and the dystopian views of computer-mediated communication mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. On the one hand, computer mediated communities were signaled 
as emancipating forms of shared experiences, freeing users from physical reality and the 
physical body constraints (Verschueren, 2006, p. 170). On the other hand, scholars have 
also argued that online communities are inauthentic in nature (backed by the notions of 
anonymity and deception reviewed above), and that they have the power to enhance 
social isolation rather than a “real” sense of togetherness (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). 
Thus, dystopian voices emphasized that while offline communities are real, online ones 
are mere representation of a community, an “unreal” aggregation of people (Slouka, 
1995; Turkle, 1995; 2012; Proulx & Latzko-Toth, 2005). 
 A social hierarchy was constructed between the real community; the offline one, 
and the unreal, or not-as-real community; the online one. Such hierarchy had to do with 
the perception of online environments as culture rather than a cultural artifact (Hine, 
2000). According to Hine (2000), viewing online life as the culture itself, means 
emphasizing its detachment from offline culture and the creation of social 
understandings unique to the online. In this context, both utopian and dystopian scholars 
were interested in the different social cues played out online to overcome lack of 
physical existence and geographical boundaries in the process of communicating and 
forming communities. These were mostly textual cues, as the environments were mostly 
text-based. For example, online-related lexicon that referred to the type of the 
community was designed (“rec” for hobby groups, “alt” for alternative groups; 
 44 
 
Campbell, 2013) and linguistic shortcuts for gathering “offline information” on 
individuals online were used (‘asl?’ for - age, sex, location?; Verschueren, 2006).  
Since the 1980s and the 1990s, the internet has dramatically changed in volume, 
design, and interaction patterns offered online. Text-based news groups have evolved 
into avatar based interactive environments, chats and forums have grown into social 
networking sites, and voice over internet protocols (VOIP) alongside video platforms 
enable users with visual and vocal internet-based communication. Moreover, Wi-Fi and 
mobile devices enable us an internet use that is not bounded to the home or the 
workplace, and blur the distinction between public and private spheres. The computer 
became smaller, portable, and more financially affordable, used today as a personal 
device rather than a device shared by multiple workplace colleagues or family members.  
Studies of online communities responded to these changes, and started situating 
online communities in everyday life, studying them as integrated in offline cultures 
rather than separated from them. Thus, scholars have acknowledged the new social and 
cultural possibilities offered by online networks, ones that were not possible offline; 
such as changing perceptions of time and space on a global scale. These changes and 
new opportunities were not seen as separated from older generation of media. They were 
situated alongside them, creating a new media sphere (Castells, 1996/200; Rainie & 
Wellman, 2012). This embedded approach emphasizes the continuity of communities 
between online and offline spheres, and view their formation online as a cultural artifact, 
not a culture on their own (Hine, 2000). Hine (2000) summarized the view of online 
community as a cultural artifact in the following statement: “the meaningfulness of the 
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technology does not exist before the uses themselves, but is worked out at the time of 
use” (p. 29). Thus, scholars started treating online communities built via internet media 
as embedded in other social contexts, not as self-enclosed “cybernian” apartness (Miller 
& Slater, 2000). A growing attention is given to the role these new spaces play in the 
cultural dynamics of marginalized groups.  
 
Marginalized Communities and Media Enclaves 
 
“Marginalized groups are commonly denied public voice or entrance into public spaces 
by dominant groups and thus are forced into enclaves” argues Squires (2002, p. 458). 
Focused on the African American community in the United States, Squires suggests that 
minority groups use enclave spaces to create “discursive strategies and gather 
oppositional resources” (p. 458). These discursive strategies and discursive places 
become means through which oppressed and marginalized groups can move themselves 
from the social and cultural periphery towards their own center (Flores, 1996). Whether 
tangible or imagined, these enclaves allow minority groups to celebrate their ethnicity, 
race, religiosity, gender, and so on, re-thinking and reconstructing their place in society. 
Enclaves spaces can take shape physically, for example, as residential areas for a 
particular group, or built spaces with a concentration of businesses that employ a 
majority of owners and workers from the same ethnic/racial/religious/national 
background (Yajing & Ross, 2015). These, however, can also be imagined spaces. In 
this sense, media content and outlets often become enclaved spaces for groups that seek 
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distinction from the larger cultural context in which they exist. These are created both 
online, through internet-based media, and offline, through older generation of media 
outlets such as radio and television (Campbell & Golan, 2011; Li, 2013).   
In this context, emphasis was given to migrating communities. According to 
Flores (1996) migrating communities’ lack of ability to form a sense of belonging to 
their place of origin and new locality result in isolation, alienation, and a struggle for a 
space and a home of their own. These feelings often result in the formation of physical 
and mediated enclaved spaces. Thus, enclaves become significant in the utilization of 
cultural discourses that are mostly hidden from the eye of the dominant public (Squires, 
2002). They become highly important to a point that “without independent spaces to 
retreat to in times of need or during negotiations with outsiders, marginal groups would 
not have as much freedom to innovate, draw upon their own traditions, and speak freely 
without interference from the dominant group” (p. 459). 
Morris (2016) reminds us that in these conceptualizations the enclaves become 
sites of sequestration, refuge, and rejuvenation. Thus, I draw on this literature to 
establish the notion that while these enclaves might, to some extent, push the 
marginalized away from the public eye. They nevertheless enable a different sense of 
“public” discourse for the marginalized. By utilizing media, marginalized groups 
become visible to themselves, forming a resource for identity construction and 
community building, especially needed in the process of relocation and migration. 
Drawing upon their own unique characteristics, marginalized groups are able, through 
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media enclaves as a whole, and participatory online spaces in particular, to become a 
public of their own.  
In this section, I have reviewed the construction of communities in internet-based 
platforms. I have shown how research have progressed from early notions of “unreal” or 
“inauthentic” communities formed apart from the offline, into seeing these communities 
as situated in day-to-day activities and cultural contexts. In my dissertation, I draw on 
this late notion, positioning the processes of national and ethnic identity construction as 
an act carried by a community. The focus is thus not on the formation of a community, 
but on the communal effort of forming a shared Persian identity and space. Such 
process, as argues earlier in this section, is carried through enclaved media spaces, 
allowing users heightened sense of freedom in discussions of their unique ethnic 
features. This brings the question of society and technology into the mix. Here, I address 
the relationship between society, culture, and media technology, and the question of 
which impact or allows which? Thus, in the following section I review three main 
theories that address the complex relationship between society, technology, and impact. 
This is done to further unpack the ways in which minority groups use media 
technologies for their specific needs, and the ways in which technological affordances 
shape minority groups’ communication abilities. 
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Approaches to Studying Society and Media Technology 
 
In this section I address three theories that focus on the relationship between society and 
media technologies. These are Social Shaping of Technology (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 
1999), Mediatization (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp, Hjarvard & Lundby, 2015), and 
Participatory Culture (Jenkins, 2006). The main issue addressed in this section is the 
shape and direction of the relationship between society and technology. In other words, 
this section raises the question - is it media and communication technologies that shape 
society or is it society that shapes advances in media technologies alongside changes in 
media design and use? The answer to this question is complex, and can be set on a 
spectrum. On the one end of the spectrum, Mediatization theory is used to understand 
media-related changes (Hepp, 2013, p. 616), while on the other end, the Social Shaping 
of Technology (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999) brings forward the social impact on 
media technologies.  
Proponents of Mediatization theory approach developments in mass media and 
digital platforms through a technological lens, where media technologies are approached 
and studied as agents of change (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014). However, in comparison to 
more “technological heavy” approaches such as Technological Determinism and theories 
of media effect, Mediatization is not focused on the linear and allegedly autonomous 
impact of technology on society, but rather on the interrelation between changes in 
media and changes in society (Tsuria & Campbell, Forthcoming). Thus, the theory 
argues that media technologies form, in a way, our social, cultural, aesthetic, and 
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political orders (Hepp, Hjarvard & Lundby, 2015). Mediatization, according to Hjarvard 
(2012), “generally refers to the process through which core elements of a social or 
cultural activity (e.g., politics, religion, and education) become influenced by and 
dependent on the media” (p. 30). Thus, looking at the technological impact on society, 
scholars utilizing this theory argue that non-media social actors have to adapt to media 
technologies’ rules and systems in order to reach audiences and advance socially 
(Deacon & Stanyer, 2014). 
Social Shaping of Technology theory also looks at the relationship between 
technology and society. However, if Mediatization theorists argue for an interrelation, in 
which technological change plays a role in social changes, then Social Shaping of 
Technology looks at the interrelation between social needs and technological changes, 
where society plays a leading role of a change agent (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999). In 
fact, the theory was designed as an alternative for the causality and linear influence 
proposed by advocates of Technological Determinism (Campbell, 2010; Williams & 
Edge, 1996). Highlighting the social component in any technological change, Social 
Shaping of Technology emphasizes processes of interpretation, meaning making, 
problem solving, negotiation, and development within larger socio-cultural-economic 
contexts. Through these processes, the theory details the ways in which different social 
groups approach, develop, and change media technologies and technological uses (Klein 
& Kleinman, 2002; Howcroft, Mitev & Wilson, 2004). Thus, the Social Shaping of 
Technology argues for a complex relationship between society and technology, but puts 
forward an emphasis on the group and individual agency, alongside multiple, often 
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different, communication and media needs of different social groups (Pinch & Bijker, 
1984). 
While both theories—Mediatization and Social Shaping on Technology—draw 
attention to the relationship between media technologies and society, each of them do 
argue for one component that plays a more important role, or that is utilized as a starting 
point for scholarly analysis. The Social Shaping of Technology puts forward social 
needs and understandings as this component. Mediatization stresses the technological 
change as this component. A theory that bridges these two ends of the spectrum, and 
advocates for a case dependent approach for studying media and society, is Participatory 
culture (Jenkins, 2006).  
Participatory culture is “a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic 
expression and civic engagement, strong support for creating and sharing creations, and 
some type of informal mentorship whereby experiences participants pass along 
knowledge to novices” (Jenkins, Clinton, Purushotma, Robison, & Weigel, 2006, p. xi). 
The term relates to supportive media environments that allow individuals and groups to 
take active part in the creation, archiving, negotiation, and re-circulation of their culture 
(Jenkins, 2006). In this new culture, internet-based media allow, more than any medium 
before, low barriers to participation. Online media, according to Jenkins, are compatible 
with the aim of un-professional groups (such as fan groups) wishing to share content 
across distance, more quickly, more easily, and with greater visibility. “The term 
participatory culture contrasts with older notions of passive media spectatorship” (p. 3) 
and enables new cultural organization around new media content. Thus, the theory 
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emphasizes new technological affordances that allow different social players to enter 
discussions and discourses that were fairly closed to them before (social, political, 
cultural, etc.).  
At the same time, these media outlets and content are being shaped, re-shaped, 
re-mixed, and re-articulate according to the needs and the characteristics of social 
groups. The emphasis of the social and the technological features that propel these 
processes are interchangeable, and thus Participatory Culture allows us, to some extent, 
to think of, and study, both technology and society as important players in larger 
processes such as globalization and migration, on which this project focuses. Moreover, 
participatory models are ones that emphasize the dissemination of information and 
media content that are not often available through mass media, where the involvement of 
participants in the creation of the media message is emphasized as a means for 
empowerment (Cadiz, 2005). Utilizing this perspective allows me to simultaneously 
look at media platforms used as unique in terms of being globally reaching and 
facilitating global bridges between Iran and Israel, while allowing me to also emphasize 
the unique usage participants create in the context of post-migration media usage. Given 
that this dissertation work focuses on a post-migration community, alongside the 
discussion of media and technology theory, the larger context of homelands and host 
lands, as well as diasporas, is discussed in the following section.  
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Diasporic Identities between Host Lands and Homelands  
 
“Diasporic identities are characterized by a ‘continuing relationship to 
the homeland’ that may either be physical, when individuals and 
group members continue to visit the homeland, or based on an 
imaginary community with the knowledge that they will not, or 
cannot, return” (Weiner & Richards, 2008, p. 103).  
 
 “[Diasporas are] ethno-national groups whose members reside out of 
their home country… and who retain a sense of membership in their 
group of origin and a collective representation and concern for the 
wellbeing of their homeland, which plays a significant role in their lives 
in both a symbolic and normative sense” (Morawska, 2011, p. 1030). 
  
The definitions above provide a good starting point for the process of 
conceptualizing diasporas. Drawing on them, I address diaspora in this study as a group 
that shares a physical detachment from its original homeland and a collective memory 
and myth about its homeland in terms of its location and history. The group also holds a 
strong self-identified ethnic consciousness that is presented through a sense of distinctive 
common history and common fate. Diaspora groups often experience a lack of 
acceptance within the host society, and an active pursuit to maintain relations and 
cultural solidarity with their place of origin (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997; Sheffer, 1986; 
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Vertovec, 1999/2000). Living in diaspora often involves the nurturing of an idealized 
homeland, a key element in the identity of the diasporic group (Naficy, 2001). This 
idealized homeland suggests a connection between scattered fellows, “whose sense of 
community is sustained by forms of communication and contact such as kinship, 
pilgrimage, trade, travel, and shred culture (language, ritual, scripture, or print and 
electronic media)” (Peters, 1999, p. 20). Thus, a homeland is viewed, in the broad 
context, as the place of origin from which an individual or a group migrated. A host 
land, accordingly, is the new locality to which an immigrant arrives.  
Originally coined in the context of Jewish migration, diaspora is the state of a 
group living outside of its place of origin due to migration. Thus, the dichotomy 
constructed above regarding a homeland and a host land is flipped in the Jewish context. 
While for most ethno-national groups the process of emigrating from a homeland created 
a sense of diaspora, for the Jewish diaspora the process was reverse. In the case of 
Jewish diaspora, Israel is viewed as the homeland, and living outside of it means living 
in a host land. Based on this construction, a Jewish individual that was born in Brazil, for 
example, and migrated to Israel, returned to a homeland rather than left one. By 
emphasizing the notion of “returning” to a “natural homeland,” the Jewish narrative 
constructed a “homeland hierarchy,” in which Jewish nationality and the life in Israel are 
portrayed as the center of the Jewish identity (Blumer, 2011).  
During the 20th century, immigration to Israel was an integral character of the 
Jewish social reality and the establishment of the State of Israel. Immigration from other 
places of origin to Israel was presented as the returning to a homeland from a variety of 
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host lands. The view of Israel as “The Homeland” of all immigrating Jewish people was 
central in the Zionist thought and in the Jewish identity (Shain, 2002; Yedgar, 2004; 
Cohen, 1997). Essential to this perception was the construction of the Jewish people as 
strangers in their land of origin, and the land of origin itself as a hostile host land 
(Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014). Thus, Jewish individuals born anywhere outside of 
Israel were perceived by the Jewish-Zionist perspective as members of the Jewish 
diaspora. According to Shuval (1998), this construction was reflected in the Israeli Law 
of Return (1950), which “established an open-door policy for Jews and extensive support 
benefits for immigrants” (p. 4) migrating to Israel. This law presented the Jewish 
migration to Israel as a “natural right” of returning to a homeland from a host land.  
Studying the ways in which Jewish diaspora members use online environments to 
maintain Jewish religious identity, Helland (2007) argues that Israel was often presented 
as their homeland, becoming a central component in the discourse of Jewish people 
living outside of Israel. In the religious context, online spheres are being used by people 
not just to travel online to sacred sites, but also to connect tangibly with their sacred 
homeland and to maintain contact with it and with people within it. Thus, by utilizing 
online environments, Jewish diaspora groups outside of Israel maintain this sense of 
Israel being the Jewish homeland. Hence, in the religious context it was found that 
religiously Jewish users carried the homeland hierarchy from the offline to the online.  
Consistent with this approach, Peters (1999) argues that “the existence of the 
state of Israel likewise serves notions of diaspora from exile, since there is no political 
obstacle to return” (p. 20). The hypothesis that immigration to Israel means returning 
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home is not inclusive or representative of all migration experiences. Moreover, the 
assumption that there are no political obstacles for Jewish immigration is misleading. 
Selective migration to Israel is well documented, as reviewed earlier in this dissertation. 
Alongside this, politics of identity have been central tension in the Jewish Israeli society. 
These political conflicts reflect a gap between the official state representatives’ push 
towards a melting-pot sense of identity and assimilation, and immigrants’ wish to hold to 
their ethnic and national roots and heritage. One of this study’s theoretical aspirations is 
unpacking this highly-contested field and the complex relationship between homeland 
and host land in the context of Iranian immigration to Israel. To do so, the following 
sections will further discuss the topics of homelands and host lands in the context of 
media studies. These will be followed by a review of the postcolonial thought, which is 
utilized in this study to probe the oppressive and liberating practices associated with the 
process of identity construction. 
 
Moving the Census, the Map, and the Museum Online 
 
In order to understand the uses of online media in the context of Iranian migration to 
Israel and the complex relations of homelands and host lands, we first need to 
understand the ways in which these topics were addressed in relations to offline media. 
Here I draw mainly on Appadurai (1990, 1996), Anderson (1983/2006), and Carey’s 
(1989) arguments to signal what might be this study’s most important theoretical 
contribution. Anderson’s (1983/2006) most frequently quoted concept in the context of 
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media and nationality is probably “imagined communities.” According to Anderson, 
media outlets play an important role in the formation of the nation state, enabling 
individuals to imagine their membership in the national collective. Media outlets in this 
case operate as “national equipment” – those cultural tools that construct and maintain 
the boundaries of a national community, constantly “flagging” national identity in a 
public context to facilitate a shared reality among its members (Deutsch, 1953; Meyers, 
2002; Billig, 1995). However, Anderson’s argument does not conclude at the national 
borders of a state. In his discussion of the census, the map, and the museum, Anderson 
presents the role of these cultural artifacts in the creation of national identity on a global 
scale. His argument touches upon the colonial state, and is essential for understanding 
identity and culture in Israel. 
 In the chapter ‘census, map, museum,’ Anderson (1983/2006) concludes that by 
using these three tools, colonial rulers can bestow a sense of national identity upon their 
citizens from afar. The census is a tool designed to create a sense of shared identity 
within a society, generating a sense of belonging. A citizen is included in a society as he 
or she is being measured as a citizen in the census. In the same way, using maps is 
another means for creating a sense of society. A map denotes the geographic imagined 
“place” of the community, making its imagined borders visible to the citizens. Maps, in 
this sense, are strong instrumental tools for constructing and maintaining communal 
sense, an “immutable mobile” that enable the spread of the national consciousness 
(Latour, 1986). Finally, the museum represents those cultural truths that are worth 
archiving. It is a place for creating and curating shared narratives and understandings of 
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a society’s shared past, and as an outcome, shared identity. Together, these three act as 
both the grammar and the concretization of an imagined community. 
 Mass media outlets were found to function in a very similar way. Replacing the 
notion of the “imagined community” with that of the “community of sentiment,” 
Appadurai (1991, 1996) addresses those social solidarities and collective experiences 
formed around mass media. According to Appadurai, “part of what mass media make 
possible, because of the conditions of collective reading, criticism, and pleasure, is… a 
‘community of sentiment’” (1996, p.8). This community connects an individual’s 
identity with a larger community, forming the homeland sentiment of groups in diaspora. 
This notion is well established in studies of diasporic communities’ media usage. 
Studying the consumption of Iranian originated television content by Iranian immigrant 
in Los Angeles, Naficy (1993) found that television programs assist immigrants with two 
important aspects of their identity formation. Iranian television consumed in exile 
provided migrants with the much-needed nostalgia and sense of home, while also 
allowing them to construct and validate a new sense of community in exile through 
shared cultural markers.  
In the same vein, Eswari (2014) studied the consumption of foreign television in 
the context of Indian migration. He argues that satellite television channels provide 
members of the Indian diaspora in the United States with a sphere to negotiate their 
home and host cultures and ethnicities. Via television content, members of the Indian 
diaspora familiarize themselves with the host culture, but also find “ontological security” 
(p.34), a sense of belonging to a place of origin, a home, or a culture.  
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   Homeland originated content provides a vital resource for these diasporic 
communities of sentiment. Sun (2002) exemplifies these claims in her studies of 
diasporic Chinese communities. According to Sun, consuming homeland media (Chinese 
media in this context) eased longing and activated collective memories. Although 
immigrants outside of China were not the intended audience of the Chinese TV shows, 
these shows were still important for the maintenance of their identities and nostalgia for 
home, even more than it did for Chinese citizens within China. For migrants, mass media 
outlets became a place for cultural gathering, a shared source for identity markers, and a 
place for the formation of a community. Thus, drawing on Carey’s (1989) definition of 
communication, media platforms become a cultural ritual for migrants looking for a 
connection with their homeland, a reassuring framing of their identity and place of 
origin. This cultural approach to media studies is crucial to the study of post-migration 
communities, as it focuses on those acts that represent and reinforces one’s identity and 
culture. 
According to Carey (1989) communication can be conceptualized both in terms 
of a transmission and in terms of a ritual. Looking at communication as transmission, 
media outlets are viewed as channels for the transportation of information. Here 
attention is given to the transfer of signals and messages between senders and receivers. 
This model falls under early approaches to media studies, mostly focused on issues of 
persuasion and propaganda. Alongside this approach, media outlets can also be viewed 
as facilitators of social ceremonies. They provide audiences with shared symbols and 
shared experiences that build a sense of community across time. Consuming media is 
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thus not only an act of getting and disseminating information, or transmitting it from 
point A to point B, but is also a ritual, an act of gathering that becomes meaningful for 
the creation and reinforcement of a sense of community (Carey, 1989).  
While some media scholars define media-related rituals as unique “media 
events,” spectacles that disrupt the day-to-day, routine, or mundane media schedule 
(Dayan & Katz, 1994), the cultural approach to communication articulated by Carey 
suggests a different view. According to the cultural approach to communication, culture 
and communities are built around these two social aspects of communication – sharing 
and gathering. The use of media itself becomes a ritual, a ceremony that draws the 
community together. As Dewey (in Carey, 1989, p. 18) argues: “there is more than a 
verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a 
community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is 
the way in which they come to possess things in common.”  
Based on this cultural approach, and considering the census, the map, and the 
museum, I ask in this study –what are some of the similar tools that community 
members use to denote the borders, past, and belonging to the community online? How 
do members of the Persian community in Israel discuss the role of online media in their 
experiences of community? What motivations stand behind their usage of online 
environment for the task of transcultural representation of national-ethnic identity? In 
line with other studies that have argued for the new possibilities online media provide 
for the articulation of self in the context of migration (Wallis, 2013), I wish to develop a 
line of inquiry that emphasizes the possibilities of voluntary ethnic-nation self-
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representation online. To further ground this aim in constructivist theories, I review in 
the last section of this chapter the postcolonial theory. This is done to highlight the 
process of identity construction within systems of cultural, political, and economic 
power, issues that are further developed in the analysis chapters of this dissertation. 
 
Postcolonial Thought and Identity 
 
The postcolonial approach comprises of a set of theories primarily seeking to critique 
and deconstruct practices of modern western colonialism (or neo-colonialism) in western 
and non-western societies (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008). “In a very fundamental sense,” 
Bahri (1995) reminds us, “postcolonial is that which has been preceded by colonization” 
(p. 51). This point of view position postcolonialism as a sort of framing device that 
characterizes the second half of the twentieth century. A different point of view positions 
postcolonialism as the study of cultural interactions between colonizing powers and the 
societies they colonized, “and the traces that this interaction left on the literature, arts, 
and human sciences of both societies” (p. 52).  
The prefix “post,” thus, refers to a point of view, an intellectual effort that asks to 
unpack global oppressions and opportunities informed by and critical of colonial orders. 
This is to say, “post” is not necessarily a marker in time that starts at one point, post 
WWII, rather, a way of thinking about colonial projects, with intellectual roots prior to 
this time. Some distinguish the two postcolonial approaches by the use of a hyphen. The 
hyphenated post-colonial refers to a point in time, post the era of the colonies, while the 
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unhyphenated term, postcolonialism, refers to the critical point of view. In this 
dissertation project, I adopt the second approach, using postcolonial approaches as 
critical frameworks of analysis rather than distinct points in time.  
In this context, it is important to note that the roots of the postcolonial thought 
stem from anti-colonial stands expressed by black philosophers such as W. E. B. Du 
Bois, and colonized nations’ leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi, who asked to free their 
communities from long periods of oppressions. From these early days, postcolonial 
theory has evolved, maintaining a critical stance through embracement of new ideas and 
approaches. Several main shifts and expansions, as detailed by Shenhav and Hever 
(2002a), identify this evolution. First, focusing on identity as a key term, contemporary 
postcolonial theorists steer away from a binary approach of analyzing culture, to 
promote awareness of multi-layered forms of interconnected identities that negotiate 
multiple sources of identification such as religion, race, migration, and so on. Thus, the 
colonial cultural categories identifying the occident/west as privileged and superior 
while positioning the orient/non-western as inferior (Said, 1978) are replaced in the 
postcolonial mindset with notions of multiplicity, overlapping, or intersecting identity 
markers. One way to explain this notion is through the formation of national identity.  
Bhabha (1994), a prominent postcolonial scholar, coined the term “third space” 
to address hybrid notions of national identity formation. The “third space” emphasizes 
that identity is constructed between constantly changing global and local forces, east and 
west binaries, and national and foreign cultural influences. Between these sources of 
affinity—locality, nationality, religion, race, ethnicity, and the like—hybrid identities are 
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formed. By pointing out hybrid identities, Bhabha acknowledges the re-working of 
modern social, cultural, and economic narratives into a postmodern perception of self, 
nations, and cultures. The fusing of social categories positions the third space as the 
notional realm in which social structures and truths are questioned and rearticulated to 
encompass the agency of constructing varying manifestations of hybrid identities in our 
postcolonial age.    
This scholarly shift also expands the field of postcolonialisim studying the 
politics of “blackness” (or other racial and ethnic descriptors) to the study of 
“whiteness.”  Instead of looking at whiteness as a given, a transparent identifier, writers 
such as Toni Morrison (1992) ask to “avert the critical gaze from the racial object to the 
racial subject, from the described and imagined to the describers and the imaginers, from 
the serving to the served” (p. 90). Thus, postcolonial studies endeavor at dissolving the 
white gaze, aiming at a dipper understanding of oppressions through the analysis of 
practices that establish whiteness as a given and natural social category. Through such 
examination, a greater understanding of oppressions based on racial and ethnic 
identifiers are achieved.  
A second shift pertains to the epistemological perspective of writing and studying 
postcolonialism. Here we see a movement towards the oppressed point of view, focusing 
on non-Eurocentric perspectives on culture, identity, and politics. This expansion is 
nicely exemplified in the practice of ethnography nowadays. With roots in the 
enlightenment project of European colonial empires of the 19th century, European 
ethnographers compiled information about the cultural practices among the “primitives” 
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populating colonized lands. These early scholars produced accounts of cultures as fixed, 
frozen in time, turning the collected objects and information into a cultural system, 
justifying inequality and racist theories (La Pastina & Yadlin-Segal, 2016). The task of 
representation in the ethnographic project has immensely changed over the years. The 
exploration of the “primitive” or “exotic subject” is substituted today by exploration of 
the locality and even the marginalized group the ethnographer is a part of. The 
European-centric scholar is replaced by the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual 
ethnographer.  
  Finally, the postcolonial project asks to expand the study of nationality into the 
study of post-nationality. From this perspective, scholars ask to understand the 
oppressive nature of the national meta-narrative in its western nature, looking at the 
possible practices that question or subvert national narratives and constructions. Shenhav 
and Hever (2002a) summarize this approach in the following: 
As part of this stand, nationalism was seen as imported and reproduced, 
transferred as part of the processes of colonization and migration and is 
expressed in different ways. In other words, a universal national model 
includes a bricolage of highly particular elements, when settling them 
together necessitates the use of force and repression. Instead of presenting 
nationalism as a universal force, subordinating national citizens in a 
uniform manner, postcolonial perspectives identify heterogeneous 
identities and processes, challenging the validity and universal 
justification of nationality (p. 18).  
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Focused on ethnicity and nationality in Israel, particularly in the context of 
marginalized groups, postcolonial theories and concepts become a fertile ground for 
studying the Israeli society. Zionism, according to the postcolonial approach, is 
perceived as a colonial movement in two particular ways. First, focusing on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, Israel is viewed as a colonial state, culturally, politically, 
economically, and geographically oppressing Palestinians inside and outside the green 
line. While highly impotent, this approach is less pertinent to the current dissertation 
project. A second view that positions Israel as a colonial state relates to migration and 
cultural-ethnic oppression, becomes a central line of thought in this dissertation. 
According to Israeli scholars (Boyarin, 1997; Shenhav & Hever, 2002a; Shenhav & 
Hever, 2002b, Shohat, 2005) colonialism is shaped within one of the prominent inter-
Jewish-national society schisms, which is the ethnic, or Ashkenazi-Mizrahi clash. In this 
context, postcolonial scholars ask to unpack latent and overt oppression systems within 
the Zionist-backed Israeli culture. The main assumption of this approach is that 
European-centric Zionist cultural-educational-political structures in Israel shaped 
systematic ethnic oppressions in the Israeli society, such that are experienced by 
minority groups even today. Focusing on the Persian identity in the Israeli context, I 
utilize the postcolonial perspective to ask questions about ethnicity, nationalism, and 
culture as they are reflected through new media usage.  
Thus far in this chapter, I have reviewed central literature and concepts related to 
studying Persian identity construction in online environments. I have discussed identity 
being a process of social construction and narrowed down the focus of the dissertation to 
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Persian identity construction. Persian identity is defined as a cultural one, conflating 
national, ethnic, and religious identifications both in the Israeli and in the Iranian contexts. 
I have also discussed the topic of formulating identities in online environments, and 
situated this dissertation in an approach viewing online and offline identities as indexical 
to each other, intertwined rather than disparate. Online identities in this dissertation are 
closely tied with online communities, arguing that identities are social, built by 
identification with a group or a community. In the case on online identities, both online 
and offline communities play a role in identification process. Based on the literature 
reviewed above, this study investigates how online platforms enable individuals with a 
sphere for constructing their Persian identity within a community. Such process is carried 
within and between online and offline spheres, and will be studied via an ethnographic 
research. Probing the construction of identities by media users, I utilize cultural and 
postcolonial theories, as described above, to discuss nationality, culture, and ethnicity in 
the Israeli society. 
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CHAPTER III  
THEORY AND APPLICATION OF RESEARCH IN AND OF ONLINE 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
This study examines the ways in which members of the Persian community in Israel use 
online environments to construct their Persian identity. Specifically, I am interested in 
the ways such constructions affirm and resist cultural oppressions and hegemonic 
narratives in the Israeli society, for example, blur the distinctions between homeland and 
host land in the context of Jewish migration and diaspora. I am, however, not an 
immigrant living in Israel, nor a member of the Persian community. Thus, I find that 
ethnography is a research approach that will allow me an in-depth understanding of 
media usage in such context. As a qualitative stance, ethnography enables researchers to 
collect data that represent the complexity of day-to-day lives, and the meaning groups 
and individuals give to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Focusing on the everyday use of 
online media for identity construction, I utilize an ethnographic approach to media 
studies to discuss the meaning members of the Persian community give to this process of 
identity construction.  
I open the chapter with a discussion of qualitative methods in the study of online 
and digital media. This discussion is followed by a review of expansion of ethnographic 
research from the offline to the online, focusing on existing research approaches for the 
use of ethnography in online studies. This is followed by the theoretical discussions of 
data collection within and between online and offline environments. In this section, I 
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focus on the conceptualization of multi-sited ethnography and its application in media 
studies. I also review the unique ethical considerations required from an ethnographer 
studying online environments. I then turn to discuss the conceptualization of user 
research vs. audience reception research within media studies as a unique consideration 
of online research. Finally, I conclude the chapter with an in-depth discussion of the 
methodological application of online ethnography to the case of Persian identity 
construction in Israel.   
 
Qualitative Methods Online 
 
As internet-based environments become central spheres of conduct in our everyday 
lives, scholars are increasingly focused on how culture is manifested online. Researchers 
studying online environments are not only looking into new social and cultural 
phenomena, but also contributing to the emerging methodological branch defined as 
“digital research methods.” In this emerging sphere, researchers develop new tools and 
approaches, as well as expand and transform traditional research approaches, methods, 
and tools to fit with the constantly changing online environments. Thus, digital research 
methods refer both to quantitative and qualitative research, and are viewed as the “use of 
online and digital technologies to collect and analyze research data” (Roberts, Hine, 
Morey, Snee & Watson, 2013).  
Under this broad term, we can find two clusters of methods: digitized methods 
and natively digital methods (Rogers, 2013). Digitized methods originate offline and are 
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moved online for internet based media research, while natively digital methods are those 
that emerged online. Surveys are a key example of digitized methods. A method that 
originated offline was easily migrated online for data collection via designated websites 
(e.g. survey monkey), email exchange, and more. In contrast, researchers utilizing 
natively digital methods base their analysis and data collection on already existing online 
tools and affordances such as hyperlinks, hashtags, and visualization software. Since I 
conduct my research through an ethnographic lens, I focus in this review on digitized 
qualitative methods as a whole, and ethnography in particular. 
In the early days of internet research, we find many studies that “digitized” 
qualitative methods for studying culture, communities, and identity online. Markham 
(1998), in her study of early identity construction in MUDs, used online interviews to 
understand the affordances of internet-mediated environments for formulating sense of 
self online. Given that internet-mediated spheres were text-based media in the early 
1990s, most interviews in Markham’s study were conducted in writing, and much 
emphasis was given in her writings to the technical aspect of the interview itself (its 
length, techniques, unique language, pros and cons, etc.). Thus, Markham utilized an 
offline method–the interview–to understand the online experiences of self and 
communication for internet users. Based on the data she collected online, Markham 
concluded: “Even in purely text based online context, people establish and maintain 
intimate friendships, romantic relationships, and stable communities” (p. 17).  
Another offline qualitative method–textual analysis–was migrated online by 
Baym (1999) to study an internet newsgroup dedicated to soap operas. As part of her 
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ethnographic project, Baym conducted a discourse analysis of 524 newsgroup posts 
featured in the newsgroup. Based on this analysis Baym argue that “the social context of 
an online group is perhaps the single most important influence on the identities 
constructed within it… people in… online communities define themselves not just in 
relations to their offline selves or to the medium, but also in relation to one another and 
to the group as a whole” (pp.157-158). 
Baym and Markham’s studies demonstrate the translation of offline methods and 
social pattern into online environments. These, as argued before, fall under the “digitized 
methods” category. Other, more recent studies focus on the ways in which online 
information can be translated into offline trends and predictions. Here we see tools and 
methods that enable visualizing knowledge and information and utilizing it for mapping 
of offline realities. Categorized as using natively digital methods and tools, studies of 
this type analyze online information from internet platforms such as social media and 
blogs to predict offline social trends such as movies’ revenues (Asur & Huberman, 
2010), stock market changes (Bollen, Mao & Zeng, 2011), and disease transmission 
(Sadilek, Kautz & Silenzio, 2012). All of these studies use digitalized and digital 
methods to study online platforms and users.  
As part of the discussion of digital research methods, it is important to 
acknowledge those online digital tools that are being used for studying offline 
environments. Under the approach conceptualized as digital ethnography for example, 
we can find scholars who use digital and online tools to conduct qualitative research 
offline. Online questionnaires digitally captured and stored, videos, blogs, digital pens, 
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wikis, embedded cyborg technologies, and visualization software are just some of these 
tools (Ducheneaut, Yee & Bellotti 2010; Murthy, 2008; 2011). Qualitative digital 
research can thus be conducted in primarily offline environments and still be considered 
digital. Yet, as argued by Murthy (2011), the combination of the two spheres “can 
increase data validity through triangulation” (p.171). Thus, triangulation—the use of 
multiple methods and sources of data—secures a rigorous, in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon studied in a qualitative research (Denzin, 2012). Conducting an 
ethnographic research is one way to reach such triangulation of methods. To ground the 
discussion of data collection online and offline, I discuss in the next section of this 
chapter the expansion of ethnography to online environments, its different 
manifestations online, and the necessity of addressing multiple sites of inquiry when 
pursuing an ethnographic research.  
 
Expanding Ethnographic Research from the Offline to the Online 
 
Ethnographic research seeks to provide a qualitative-interpretive in-depth analysis of 
social interactions. It is “an approach for studying everyday life as lived by groups of 
people [that] provides powerful resource for the study of the cultures of virtual worlds” 
(Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce & Taylor, 2012, p. 1). Thus, using ethnographic approaches 
for studying the usage of and participation in online environments allow me to produce a 
‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) viewing participants as an essential source for 
understanding the studied cultural phenomenon. Led by this study’s participants, I am 
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able to observe, record, analyze, and inscribe the Persian experience of Iranian 
immigrants in Israel, and the way it is translated within and between online and offline 
environments.   
Early implementations of ethnography (19th century) are rooted in the 
enlightenment period. Backed by European colonial powers, researchers mapped the 
world, producing accounts of cultures as fixed and static through survey data. Early 20th 
century western ethnographic accounts steered away the approach from utilizing survey 
data into a form of a participatory practice. Leading among these was Malinowski 
(1989) and his early conceptualizations of ethnographic participant observation and 
fieldwork. Further shifting the concentration of the ethnographic process from the 
singular interpretation of the ethnographer into a multi-layered analysis comprising both 
participants’ point of view and the researcher interpretation Geertz (1973) introduced 
ethnographers to the concept of “thick description.”  
Originally coined by Gilbert Ryle, and further developed by Geertz, this 
intellectual effort calls to view participants as an essential source for understanding a 
cultural phenomenon. Hence, ethnographers, in a way, depend on research participants 
to fully describe the topic they are studying. Assisted by their participants, ethnographers 
observe, record, analyze, and inscribe specific cultural phenomena in order to further 
understand “the universe of human discourse” (p. 14). With the spread of the participants 
led research approach in the field of anthropology, many questions were raised, 
challenging the validity of ethnography and anthropology in the postmodern era. These 
questions emanated as a backlash to the colonial origin of the discipline, and as a part of 
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a representation crisis and a methodological turn experienced in anthropology, but also 
in related fields such as rhetoric and sociology. According to Marcus (1998), these 
critiques were concerned with the “grand narratives” employed by ethnographers as a-
priori set of theoretical and epistemic structures. An example for such a grand narrative 
can be Capitalism as an economic system; related to the way we understand the 
influence of Capitalism on society (e.g. taken for granted social-economic class divides 
and power structures that were not questioned enough by ethnographers).  
The response to these critiques, according to Marcus, is seen in a process of 
methodological self-reflection in anthropology and other fields such as cultural studies 
and media studies. Thus, nowadays we see more ethnographic projects that no longer 
dramatically cross cultural boundaries. We also see an almost paranoid withdrawal from 
employing social and cultural pre-assumptions based on meta-narratives (related to 
gender, east-west binaries, economics, historical narratives, sexuality, etc.). In the same 
vein, the task of representation in the ethnographic project has changed. The “exotic 
subject” is substituted today by the study of the self and the society the ethnographer is a 
part of, where the white, Western, European\American centric ethnographer is replaced 
by the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual ethnographer.    
These changing modes of inquiry were also experienced in the field of media 
studies. Since its introduction to media studies around the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
ethnography became synonymous with audience analysis and reception studies. At these 
early stages, researchers have addressed the complexity of communicative processes in 
everyday settings by immersing themselves in local cultural contexts, mainly ones that 
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pertain to disenfranchised cultural and social groups (La Pastina & Yadlin-Segal, 2016). 
The ethnographic approach helped media scholars to overcome the large generalizations 
required in a field characterized up to that point by quantitative methods, by focusing on 
smaller cases in a more sensitive, in-depth manner (Horst, Hjorth & Tacchi, 2012). The 
use of ethnography, however, had many limitations in the context of media studies.  
Baym (1999) argues that early media studies using ethnography as their 
methodological stance, have failed to holistically approach their studied community. 
While applied in other disciplines for the studies of larger, linguistically, gendered, 
nationally, or ethnically bounded groups, media audience groups were not bounded or 
clearly defined. Drawing on Ang’s critique of the topic, Baym stresses: “audiences 
rarely represent and organize themselves as ‘we, the audience’… even if one wanted to 
find a nicely bounded, self-defined audience community of interrelated members, it has 
not been easy” (p. 19). In the case of media studies, the heart of the ethnographic process 
– participant observation – was often replaced with brief visits to subjects’ personal 
homes, focus groups, and interviews, which qualify as qualitative methods, but not 
necessarily as ethnography. Nonetheless, ethnography was and still is seen as a means of 
reaching a rich account of the lives and social structures, and cultural habits and values 
of participants. Ethnographic research allows media scholars a thorough understanding 
of material and symbolic aspects of the everyday lives related to media consumption 
(Morley & Silverstone, 1991). 
Taking the mentioned limitations of ethnography into mind, Baym approaches 
the internet as a possible way to further incorporate participant observation into media 
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studies. Online platforms, according to Baym, proliferate the existence of self-defined 
audience communities and make them visible to researchers using ethnographic 
approaches in ways that did not exist offline. With the introduction of internet-based 
media into the domestic sphere, the 1990s and early 2000s represent the expansion of 
offline\traditional ethnographic work to online ethnography (Wittel, 2000). Ethnography, 
as a methodological stance, has been “broadened and reformulated through new 
proposals such as digital ethnography, ethnography on/of/through the Internet, 
connective ethnography, networked ethnography, cyberethnography, etc. Each of these 
maintains its own dialogue with the established tradition of ethnography … in different 
ways” (Domínguez, Beaulieu, Estalella, Gómez, Schnettler & Read, 2007, p.1). 
Ethnography has been translated and redefined within the study of digital cultures and 
applications, creating a diverse set of methodological approaches.  
 
Ethnography of and in Online Environments 
 
Ethnographic research of internet-based media was conducted as early as the 1980s, 
focusing on older versions of computed interaction and communication. Hakken’s 
Cyborgs@ cyberspace?: An ethnographer looks to the future is a prime example for 
these early studies. According to Hakken, “cyberspace refers to the notional social arena 
we enter when using computers to communicate… [a] type of culture being created via 
Advanced Information Technology (AIT), the congeries of artifacts, practices, and 
relationships coming together around computing” (p. 1). Based on this notion, Hakken’s 
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ethnographic explorations are focused on the ways in which computer technologies were 
incorporated into existing offline spheres. Since connectivity and web 2.0 online spheres 
were not the main features of computer technologies, Hakken’s research mainly 
addressed the work place and the introduction of different computer based platforms into 
it. Hakken’s aim was to convey the cultural aspect of a highly technical field; the human 
agency in a field that is focused on technology.  
Why, then, does Hakken writes about cyber-ethnography rather than just 
“ethnography”? This has to do with the way he perceives human-technology interaction. 
Hakken claims, in line with the Actor Network theory, that a cyborg is any individual 
that uses computers (not what we perceive today, as online, place less, sci-fi avatars). 
Cyborgs are users communicating via computers (again, not necessarily connected to 
other computers), when cyberspace is the sphere of conduct for all human and non-
human computer-mediated activity. Correlating with these notions, cyber-ethnography 
includes both observation and active participation of cyborg’s use of computed 
technology in various contexts (workplace and home for example). 
Another form of internet related ethnography–virtual ethnography–is discussed 
in Hine’s (2000) book Virtual Ethnography. In contrast to Hakken’s studies, Hine argues 
that this type of ethnography focuses on online connectivity, and in line with larger 
changes of the era, she refers to her ethnographic work as multi-sited. Corresponding 
with Hakken’s claims, Hine (2000) stresses that “work in sociology of technology and in 
media sociology sustains a view of technologies, including communications media, as 
thoroughly socially shaped” (p. 38). According to Hine (2007) virtual ethnography  
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[M]oves between online and offline as users of computer-mediated 
communication do… looking at the construction of boundaries and the 
ways in which different forms of communication are used to contextualize 
one another. It is open to embedding processes, looking both at the ways 
that lives are embedded into computer-mediated communication and 
processes through which computer-mediated communication is embedded 
into lives (p. 617).  
Thus far, I have addressed earlier notions of internet-related ethnography, ones 
that studied typed-based internet as the most advanced form of online connectivity. 
Since the 1980s and the 1990s, the internet has dramatically changed in volume, design, 
and interaction patterns offered online. Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce &Taylor’s (2012) book 
Ethnography and virtual worlds: A handbook of method, captures said changes as they 
are manifested in relations to ethnographic research. In their book, Boellstorff et al. 
(2012) discuss ethnographic work as it is manifested online. While Hine refers to all 
internet mediated activities and their relations to the offline under the umbrella of virtual 
ethnography, Boellstorff et al. differentiate between studying virtual worlds and other 
online environments. They make a distinction between ‘ethnography of the virtual’ 
(applied when studying virtual worlds) and ‘virtual ethnography’ (for other online 
environments).  
A virtual world, according to them, is a multi-user platform that creates a sense 
of “worldness” and continues to exist in some form even if the users log off. These 
environments allow participants to embody themselves in the virtual via the use of an 
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avatar. Based on this definition, Boellstorff et al. consider social networks, chat rooms, 
forums, and some of the first person online games as environments that cannot be 
studied by ethnography of the virtual. “Ethnographic research requires immersion in a 
field site using a palette of methods that always include the central technique of 
participant observation” (p. 3) Boellstorff et al. argue. Their goal in applying 
ethnography of the virtual to study online environments is to comprehend everyday 
perspective by participating in what they see as daily life “rather than to subject people 
to experimental stimuli or decontextualized interviews” (p. 3).  
Horst and Miller (2012) view digital anthropology as an emerging sub-discipline 
of anthropology, and define it as a “binary code,” “everything that has been developed 
by or can be reduced to, the binary – that is bits consisting of 0s and 1s” (p. 5). Echoing 
Boellstorff et al.’s (2012) argument, digital ethnography stresses the centrality of 
participant observation to the ethnographic research. It is employed, alongside other 
methods and tools such as interviews and textual analysis, in both online and offline 
settings. According to them, virtual and actual worlds are not collapsing into one sphere. 
The virtual and actual, or the offline and the online, have an indexical relationship, one 
that is “causal rather than symbolic relationship to referent” (Boellstorff, 2012, p. 51). 
This approach requires a review of the practical research implications in terms of ethical 
considerations (to be reviewed later in the chapter) and data collection, as discussed in 
the following section of the chapter. 
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Collecting Data between Online and Offline Spheres 
 
It was already argued earlier, that online phenomena such as building communities and 
constructing identity are viewed as real and authentic, continues to offline spheres rather 
than disconnected of them (Horst & Miller, 2013). However, when it comes to data 
collection between online and offline spheres, different scholars hold different 
approaches towards data triangulation. On the one hand, we find studies that promote 
data collection only in online environments. Donath (1999), for example, studied 
identity formation in Usenet newsgroups, using data that originated solely online. 
Donath, who emphasized the centrality of online environments for her study, focused on 
questions about the components and features of text posted by users in these 
environments, and on the identity markers embedded in them (names and visual 
representation for example). Donath did not focus on the connection or correlation of 
these markers with offline environments. Studying identity markers as they are presented 
online, according to Donath, does not require the collection of related data offline, and 
enables scholarly examination exclusively in online platforms. 
An example of an ethnographic work focused on online data collection and 
analysis can be found in Marciano’s (2014) account of negotiating transgender identities 
in Israeli forums. Based on what Marciano describes as a virtual ethnography, he 
conducted a discourse analysis of online domains essential to the Israeli transgender 
community. Here, Marciano only analyzes online texts posted on two main forums, with 
the wish to emphasize the ways in which transgender users employ online spheres to 
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negotiate identity. While observing and participating in community events both online 
and offline, Marciano’s final analysis focused solely on online texts.  
The researches described above raise the question of the field boundary. That is – 
where does a phenomenon start and where does it end? With the increasing 
understanding of the online and the offline relation as contiguity, can a scholar 
nowadays ignore one of these spheres completely? The answer depends, of course, on 
the studied phenomenon and the researcher’s approaches towards this relationship. In the 
cases of Marciano and Donath’s research projects, their main interest was online 
dynamics. Hence, analyzing data that is restricted to online collection is valid and 
effective. However, rather than studying phenomena that occur only online or offline, 
many scholars focus their ethnographic research nowadays on the ways in which culture, 
identity, community, relationships, etc. are carried between and within different online 
and offline spheres. 
While some researchers pursue data collection only in online spheres, we can see 
examples of studies that combined data gathered in offline and online spheres into one 
set of observations. Orgad (2008), for example, argues that some situations require data 
collection both online and offline. In her studies of the meanings of online engagement 
for women with breast cancer, the use of the internet is conceptualized as embedded in 
the participants’ everyday experience of illness. In order to understand the study 
participants’ online engagement, information and data about their offline, day-to-day 
coping with breast cancer was needed. Thus, Orgad analyzed the data and constructed 
conclusions based on ethnographic work both online and offline.  
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In the same vein, Campbell (2005) stresses the need of online and offline data 
collection for the understanding of complex social interactions. Focusing on the 
formation of religious communities online, Campbell studied the community building 
practices of fourteen online religious groups through an ethnographic lens. The research 
included the use of multiple digital methods online and offline, such as email exchange, 
face-to-face interviews with selected members, and attending online and offline 
gathering of some of the communities. Data triangulation between the online and offline 
was a tool for verifying the accuracy of the data collected online, but also an important 
layer for depicting the full experience of religious communities today.  
To reiterate, my argument in the last few passages focused on the expansion of 
research from the offline to the online, a movement that requires in-depth thinking about 
the data collected and analyzed in one’s research. These epistemic and methodological 
considerations relate to the studied phenomenon, and require a process of decision 
making on the researcher’s part. In the lack of a clear thumb rule for data collection and 
analysis in online research, a somewhat apologetic approach is often required, fully 
delineating the decision-making process and the reasoning behind the collection and 
analysis process. This requirement, coupled with the diverse approaches to 
ethnographies of internet-based media, makes a clear working or operational definition 
of one’s approach a necessity. Thus, in the following section, I focus on the definition of 
“online ethnography” as the methodological stance employed in this dissertation.  
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Online Ethnography as a Multi Sited Project 
 
The scholars and researchers cited above reveal the diversity of ethnographic research in 
the digital age. Alongside the approaches abovementioned, scholars address 
ethnographies of internet-based communication and media as “netnography” (Kozinets, 
2002), “internet ethnography” (Sade-Beck, 2004), “cyberethnography” (Rybas & 
Gajjala, 2007), “webnography” (Puri, 2007), “connective ethnography” (Fields & Kafai, 
2009) and “network ethnography” (Howard, 2002). While often overlapping in 
definition, each of these approaches to ethnographic work emphasizes a different aspect 
of internet research. Some highlight linguistic components, other focus on 
embeddedness and participation. Thus, a clear definition of the term “online 
ethnography” is required in order to highlight the approach taken in this specific 
dissertation project.  
Online ethnography is the “extension of traditional collaborative ethnography, in 
which a network of participant observers in offline laboratories or networks, as well as 
online, work together (sometimes unknowingly) to produce ethnography” (Gatson; 
2011; p. 245). It is the research of physical or online culture at the intersection of 
internet-based communication and everyday life (Markham, 2005). Online ethnography 
ranges from a text centered approaches, focusing on “studying patterns of 
communication and social relationships accomplished through language” using log-data 
through observation and archival work (Androutsopoulos, 2008, n.d.), to real-time 
interactions, based on participant observation and interviews (Hine, 2015). My project 
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focuses on the new possibilities online environments provide their users in terms of 
identity and community formation. Thus, as will be further explained later in the chapter, 
I combine online and offline participation, with thematic textual analysis, interviews, 
and online observations to create a rich and comprehensive understanding of the role 
online and offline interactions play in the formation of Persian identity in Israel. My data 
collection is based on real-time participation rather than archival one. That is, I collected 
data for analysis through observation and participation in real-time occurrences, rather 
than scrolling back to older posts, shares, discussions, and the like, for data collection. 
While focusing on new online media, the methodological approach of online 
ethnography is consistent with traditional offline ethnographic research. First, studying 
internet-mediated interactions is tied with the basic interface of the internet – the World 
Wide Web. This structure resonates Geertz’s (1973) notion of culture being a web of 
significance (p.5). Drawing on Max Weber’s work, Geertz argues that the ethnographic 
work is the process of unpacking and interpreting meanings within a cultural web. No 
one cultural notion or artifact stands on its own in a culture. Rather, they are all gathered 
into a “multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon 
or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit” (pp. 9-
10).  
The basic notion of online platforms being connected by the web, that is, the 
World Wide Web, is central to online research. Online platforms are linked and 
connected, referring to each other through hyperlinks, functions of sharing and 
embedding, and users that populate them (van Dijck, 2013; Haskins, 2007). In addition, 
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and as mentioned before, online spheres nowadays, are viewed as continues to the 
offline ones, integrated and interwoven rather than separated from (Castells, 1996/2000). 
Hence, the fieldwork of this study is constructed within and between different online and 
offline sites, viewing them as a connected web rather than two distinct spheres. Culture 
and identity are thus studied as constructed and carried within and between the online 
and the offline.   
Second, ethnographic research in the digital era becomes a multi-sited project. 
Coined by Marcus (1998), multi-sited ethnography moves away from the single sites and 
local situations of conventional ethnographic research into an examination of the 
circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities within new understandings of the 
time-space order. “This mobile ethnography takes unexpected trajectories in tracing a 
cultural formation across and within multiple sites of activity that destabilize the 
distinction” (p. 80). Multi-sited ethnographies follow their subjects of study through 
several different modes, following conflicts, social metaphors, biographical narratives, 
material objects, intellectual properties, etc.  
While others have utilized the multi-sited approach in the context of media and 
migration studies, it seems like its application remained partial or only theoretical, used 
only as a methodological model rather than an actual empirical examination (Wilson & 
Peterson, 2002; and Larsen, 2008 for example). Some scholars have discussed multi-
sited ethnography as it pertains to online media usage, but looked at offline locations as 
the only sites of their studies (Charmarkeh, 2013; Aouragh, 2008). That is, interaction 
with participants was conducted only offline, discussing online communication, online 
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usage, and online interaction rather than immersing in the discussed online environments 
as researchers. Additional researchers that utilized multi-sited explorations in their 
studies have distinguished between online platforms and “the real life” (that is, offline 
settings), expressing older perceptions of the hierarchy between the online and the 
offline within their multi-sited research (Ostrander, 2008). Some researchers did include 
both online and offline sites as equally important to the ethnographic process, but did not 
document the movement between different online sites (that is, focused only on one site 
online rather than on multiple sites as the name of the approach suggests; Gatson & 
Zweernik, 2004). Finally, some have drawn on the multi-sited stance, studying multiple 
online and offline sites at once, but did not follow the users, metaphors, goods, etc. 
between the different sites, rather used a digitized algorithm search based on key words 
(Google search) to identify multiple sites of interest (Hine, 2007). 
 These studies exemplify the complexity of actual immersion in multiple, often 
geographically non-contiguous sites of online-offline multi-sited ethnography. In my 
dissertation, I aim at this kind of immersion, as I “follow the people” (Marcus, 1998, p. 
90) to discuss the movement of identities and communities within and between online 
and offline spheres. Thus, I emphasize the importance of both online and offline data 
collection in multiple sites, as well as emphasizing the participants who lead the 
ethnographic journey to sites of significance. I also stress the need of different levels of 
immersion in the studied sites, through different observational methods.  
The goal of using the multi-sited notion in this study is thus three-folded. First, 
focusing on the physical and imagined movement between homelands and host lands 
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through migration, the study focuses on cultural movements between sites and 
identifications rather than their formation in one site. Thus, the study refers to the way 
culture is circulated between geographically non-contiguous spaces. Second, this is a 
multi-sited effort because it emphasizes the movement of culture and identity between 
the offline and the online sphere, among different online and offline sites, between 
national communities of sentiments, and between homelands. Here I am not studying 
merely the movement of people, but the moving and changing nature of national and 
ethnic identity as it pertains to geography, locality, and specific national contexts. Third, 
being a media based ethnography, the research movement between different media 
platforms, and between and within online and offline spheres is viewed as movement 
between sites.  
Focusing on the importance of online platforms for the participants themselves, I 
let the participants lead me to these spheres–online and offline–that have significance for 
their sense of identity. Starting in one specific Facebook group (“It means you are 
Persian”), participants led me to other Facebook groups in which I was able to conduct 
participant observation. I also followed participants to other websites, social media 
platforms, and blogs. Two such sites (that is, research sites, not web-sites), for example, 
is the globally reaching online radio stations studied in this research, and the use of 
mobile apps for maintaining connection and discussing matters of identities between 
Israel and Iran. I also followed participants from the online to the offline, attending 
multiple social gathering in Israel. This participants-led multi-sited approach draws 
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heavily on Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce & Taylor’s (2012) approach to the centrality of the 
user in the ethnographic research of and in online environments.  
According to Boellstorff et al. (2012) an ethnographer of online environments 
needs to take lead from their informants, following them to, as well as collecting data in, 
multiple online contexts. Ethnographic research usually includes journeying to other 
online locals such as forums, blogs, and wikis. Engagement with participants is extended 
to other sites, including forums, instant messaging, podcasts, other virtual worlds, blogs, 
wikis, guides, videos, email, Facebook, twitter, and gaming databases. Thus, Boellstorff 
et al. remind us that  
[E]thnography is not a method narrowly defined; it is not part of the same 
categorical set as ‘interview,’ ‘survey,’ and so on. Rather…the written 
product of a palette of methods, but also a methodological approach in 
which participant observation is a critical element, and in which research 
is guided by experience unfolding in the field (p.15).  
Here, Boellstorff et al. focus on online journeying. My ethnographic project 
expands this approach to collect data in offline settings that are also integral to the study. 
Conceivably, observing, interviewing, and collecting textual data related to new media 
(online and offline) raise new and old ethical considerations researchers need to 
acknowledge in the qualitative research. In the following section, I address these, further 
discussing the expansion of ethnographic work into online spheres.  
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Ethical Considerations for Online Ethnographies 
 
“We may be moving to a situation where the pencil and notebook are being replaced by 
the iPhone and iPad” argue Back, Lury & Zimmer (2013). “But these devices produce 
new kinds of methodological problems as well as opportunities” (p. 1). Online 
ethnography raises the standard ethical issues related to qualitative research. Some of 
these relate to the process of obtaining an informed consent from participants in the 
study, creating an accurate portrayal of participants, caring for the anonymity of 
participants when needed, and overall avoiding deception while recruiting for and 
writing down the study (Boellstorff et al., 2012). Other ethical considerations relate to 
the nature of the multi-sited ethnography. Alongside these, online ethnography raises 
ethical questions that are unique to the online realm. In the following section I address 
these offline and online considerations. First, I attend the ethical complexities related to 
the multi-sited ethnographic account. Second, I will focus on two central ethical issues 
related to online ethnographies. The first is the issue of data collection through 
observation, also known as lurking, and the second is the ethical consideration of the 
blurring lines of privacy between online and offline spheres. 
 In the context of multi-sited ethnographies, Marcus (1998) argues: “the ethical 
issues in multi-sited research are raised by the ethnographer’s constant movement among 
different kinds of affiliations within a configuration of sites evolving in a particular 
research project” (p. 121). The described movement needs to be acknowledged on two 
levels: first, on an institutional level, sites of study should be recognized and declared in 
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the research IRB authorization forms. Second, sites’ administrators should be informed 
about the research prior to data collection. The constant moving, online or offline, 
requires the full attention of the researcher to amendments and clarifications of the IRB 
application. Unable to anticipate the following few moves, a multi-sited account requires 
the constant ethical transparency on the ethnographer’s part. Such constant 
correspondents with IRB systems and personal, while ethical, requires resources such as 
time for IRB’s evaluations and response. This, in turn, might delay the ethnographer’s 
ability to continue moving with participants, while keeping an updated IRB account. 
Thus, two ends of a spectrum are at risk – keeping an updated IRB application while not 
fully acknowledging a new site, or immersing in a new site and observing without an 
IRB amendment.  
 Each new site added to a multi-sited research requires participant’s consent. This, 
again, leads to question of the immediacy in which data is collected. Should 
ethnographers refrain from documenting valuable data in a new site to which participant 
led them? Or should they first document and only then ask for permission from the site’s 
administrator? The movement between sites, thus, becomes a source for ethical 
considerations ethnographers should attend while conducting multi-sited research. In this 
ethnographic project, all documented data in the multiple sites was authorized by both 
administrators and IRB in advance. This led to long delays in data collection processes, 
and prevented participation in several events online and offline. Yet, I believed that full 
consent and authorization are more important to this sensitive project than shorter 
periods of data collection.   
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Other ethical considerations relate to the nature of the online sphere, and 
particularly to online observations and lurking. Being the most common way of users 
conduct in online groups, lurking is defined as the lack of participation in human 
interactions in online platforms (Edelmann, 2013; Nonnecke & Preece, 2001). Online 
lurking has been marked as a widespread occurrence, argued to be found in nearly every 
online discussion group or forum (Ebner, Holzinger & Catarci, 2005). In fact, it was 
estimated over 16 years ago, that the ratio of lurkers to posters in online environments is 
100:1 (Nonnecke & Preece, 1999). With the growth of social networking sites and 
virtual worlds, which require registration and identification, this ratio has probably 
changed. Nonetheless, even when registration is required, and users might be visible to 
others in terms of profile, user name, and the like, contribution to any discussion is not 
often a requirement in these platforms. That is to say, that even with the technological 
developments in web 2.0 internet-based media, lurking is still estimated to be a prevalent 
phenomenon in online spheres. 
On the one hand, lurking is often perceived as a negative behavior. Scholars 
frequently approach lurkers as a menace for the online knowledge and culture, feeding 
on others’ intellects without any contribution (Tagarelli & Interdonato, 2014). Lurkers 
are often approached as lacking a commitment to the community, receiving benefits such 
as inside knowledge and tips, without giving anything back (Ebner, Holzinger & Catarci, 
2005). In this context, lurking behaviors of researchers themselves, studying online 
platforms, might also be perceived as a negative behavior. First, lurking implies an 
element of power, observing others and obtaining their knowledge or information 
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without their awareness. Second, lurking might denote a violation of the consent 
participation convention. Participants that are being lurked by researchers online without 
their knowledge do not have the option to refuse participation in a research project or 
review a study consent form (Richman, 2007). 
On the other hand, lurking has been marked as a necessary means of conduct, 
positive for internet users and researchers when is not carried out in malicious ways. For 
example, in cases of medical issues and health related online forums, online lurkers may 
wish to communicate with others, but are afraid that their advice or knowledge might 
harm other participants. Hence, lurking is enacted out of the care to the other and not out 
of vice or evil (Bishop, 2007; Preece, 1999). The same applies to users that do not have 
the media literacy or ability to react on such platforms, but can nonetheless benefit from 
reading the content shared on them in terms of medical developments, information for 
the elderly, etc. Lurking is also seen as a learning tool for newcomers, halting 
participation until they are fluent with the communities’ engagement norms and habits 
(Walther & Boyd, 2002). Hence, lurking should not be seen as one dimensionally 
negative or even consistent in nature. It can take many forms, be enacted in many 
platforms that are different in their features and essence, and thus can be ethical as well 
as unethical when used as an observation method in studies of online environments 
(Preece, Nonnecke, & Andrews, 2004).     
Applied in ethnographic internet research, lurking might play an important role 
and be necessary in early stages of a research. When entering the online research site, 
lurking allows the ethnographer a learning period, observing the interaction in hand 
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without taking part in it. Usually, as reviewed above, such behavior is common to other 
members of the group, and thus does not position the observing ethnographer in a unique 
or unusual position uncommon to the studies phenomenon. The important questions 
relevant to this position are: did the ethnographer asked the administrators of the online 
environment for permission to observe and collect data?; what other sources and 
methods does an ethnographer use to collect data (e.g., interviews, focus groups, etc.)?, 
and finally, in what way does the ethnographer obtain a consent form from participants 
they include in the final product? While lurking in of itself is not necessarily unethical or 
uncommon in online culture, lurking without permission or using data collected via 
lurking without members’ consent, as well as relaying solely on observations without 
other data sources, can be unethical. This has to do with the blurring lines between 
private and public domains online.  
In many cases, online platforms (such as MUDs and bulletin boards in early 
internet research, and user comments nowadays) are perceived as a public domain. 
Murthy (2008), for example, describes in length how many researchers in the early days 
of the internet, did not address lurking as intruding into private spaces:  
Denzin (1999: 123), for example, admits he was ‘a passive, lurking 
observer’ and never asked for permission to quote postings. Denzin’s 
situation is hardly unique, with Schaap (2002) ‘lurking’ for over two years 
in an online role-playing-game (RPG) community. Indeed, as Kozinets 
(2002: 65) observes, digital ethnography’s ‘uniquely unobtrusive nature [...] 
is the source of much of its attractiveness and its contentiousness’. The only 
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base- line which researchers seem to concur on is that ‘we must consider the 
act of lurking and its implications’ on those being investigated (Richman, 
2007: 183) (p. 840)  
However, with the evolvement of web 2.0, and the introduction of social 
networking sites to the individual user, the lines between private and public online 
spheres have blurred. In this context, some spaces have remained clearly private–such as 
the private message on Facebook–and some have remained clearly public–such as the 
user comments section in online news sites. Nonetheless, some environments do not fall 
distinctly under private or public, and should raise questions pertaining to the ethical 
process of data collection for academic research. A closed Facebook group that requires 
administrators’ approval for participation, but has thousands of followers is a good 
example. Can it still be private if so many people populate it? Can we use the data 
shared in the group without the consent of the individual user sharing the data? 
Alternatively, can we analyze photos shared on Twitter by users that set their profile 
privacy to private, but share photos with public hashtags? Are these considered public or 
private?  
Moreover, the internet’s archival nature point to questions that might not be 
relevant to offline research. Online ethnographers are confronted with questions about 
utilizing data that was not necessarily shared directly with them or at the time of 
conducting the research, but is archived online. A researcher can go back to older posts 
on forums or Facebook groups and analyze shared content. If a participant posted a story 
on a forum before agreeing to participate in a research, can we use this as data in our 
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research alongside data that was posted after obtaining consent? These ethical questions 
relate to the extent to which participants’ personal information and personal identifiers 
shared in online platform can and should be used by online ethnographers without the 
users’ consent. These become even more urgent when data collection is conducted 
“under cover” by lurking in online environments. 
These ethical considerations have to do with the nature of online data in the web 
2.0 era. Much of this data is produced by users with the wish to share (privately or 
publically) rather than by professional media producers. To fully understand this 
conceptual change, I review in the next section the new realm of convergence culture, 
the conceptual movement from studying media audiences to studying internet users, and 
the practice of ethnography in this study.  
 
Users and Producers in Online Research 
 
Whether focused on identity formation, or on other social processes and interactions, 
media ethnographies often concentrate on reception practices. Consumption became a 
central concept in this field of inquiry, where ethnographic exploration enables a 
researcher to study fluid, flexible media consumption practices through different levels 
of observation and participation (La Pastina, 2005). Some media related ethnographic 
work, however, was also conducted in the context of media production. Tuchman’s 
(1973) research comes to mind as a noticeable example of production ethnography. 
Studying organization structures of newsrooms and news classification practices, 
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Tuchman conducted participant observations and interviews in news organizations to 
explain the ritualization of media content production. 
While audience research scholars argue for the active role of the audience 
member (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974; Hall, 1980; Morley, 1993; Bird, 2001; 
Carpentier, 2011) there was still a somewhat clear distinction in their studies between 
mass media content production and mass media content consumption. The audience 
member, although actively decoding and even resisting media messages through 
processes of social meaning making, was still conceptualized as a consumer. Thus, 
audiences were studied through the lens of reception, and producers were studied within 
the perspective of creators of content, or encoders, disseminating media content to 
groups of audiences. Media producers and consumers often shared a culture, drawing on 
the same cultural interpretive framework for encoding and decoding media messages 
(Carey, 1989). In other cases, media products reached global markets that drew together 
media producers and consumers based on multiple proximities (La Pastina & Straubhaar, 
2005). 
According to Jenkins (2006) the mediascape based on older generations of 
media, and within it the conceptual separation between the producer and the consumer, 
is metamorphosing through a cultural shift he addresses as “convergence culture.” 
Jenkins refers in his discussion of convergence culture to new social structures and 
processes formed around online networks of knowledge and information. In contrast to 
older approaches towards media convergence, Jenkins does not view the process as 
solely technological. That is, by using the term convergence Jenkins does not describe 
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the old notion of different devices converging into one central device. Jenkins views 
convergence culture as a new cultural system, a meeting point of old and new media, 
media producers and consumers, different media narratives and industries, and different 
social relations and interactions. He stresses that the culture of convergence is the 
process that alters the way media content is produced, consumed, and carried via online 
and offline platforms, empowering media consumers to create, edit, and circulate 
amateur, semi-professional, and professional media content online. This, in Jenkins’ 
terms, is based on participatory culture, which was discussed in details earlier in this 
dissertation. 
Jenkins’ discussion has clear methodological implications. Internet-based media 
researchers need to consider the new place and practice of research participants, that are 
now producing and circulating consumable content online but also consume it. In that 
sense, the rise of the ‘proAms’ (professional amateurs), ‘former audience,’ ‘prosumers,’ 
or ‘prod-users’ (Limonard as cited in: Bergström, 2008; Horsfield, 2012; Gillmor as 
cited in: Paulussen, Heinonen, Domingo & Quandt, 2007) blur the lines between 
production and consumption of media more than ever. The combination of producers 
and consumers, producing media content online, intensified the circulation of 
professional and non-professional media content online, exaggerating the competition 
between media outlets. On the one hand, producers of older generations of media content 
are required to pay more attention to the requests and desires of consumers who can now 
turn to other sources for information. Consumers, on the other hand, are no longer 
obligated to official information sources and can now search more easily for alternative 
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online sources and even create such sources themselves. Thus, convergence and 
participatory cultures change the traditional distinction between media producers and 
consumers.   
This theoretical approach shifts the scholarly focus from the “audience member” 
to the “internet user.” The practice of media ethnographies, that was challenging enough 
to begin with, became even more complex. The basic, yet multifaceted, attention given 
the surrounding ideologies, cultural preferences, environmental influences, and 
individual values and attitudes in the ethnographic process (La Pastina, 2005) has 
changed. It is now coupled with the movement between online and offline spheres, and 
with the dual position (as producers and consumers) of the internet user as a research 
participant. Thus, the goal of online ethnographic accounts should be understanding the 
affordances these new roles and environments give internet users and communities, but 
also understanding the complexities and limitations of the studying such complex, multi-
dimensional, social interactions. Based on the methodological review presented thus far, 
I turn to discuss the application of an online multi-sited ethnography to the case of 
Persian identity construction in Israel. 
 
Methodological Application - Practicing Ethnography in the Persian-Israeli 
Community 
 
In this dissertation project, I explore the relationship of post-migration community with 
media through online ethnography. Specifically, I look at the ways in which ethnic-
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national identities are being constructed between online and offline environments in the 
Persian-Israeli context. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, my interest in 
migration and the Israeli society has been established long before I started my PhD 
studies. I was well immersed in the literature on migration and media as a whole, and 
migration to Israel in particular, as I wrote my MA thesis on the representation of 
immigrants and migration in Israeli children’s magazines (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 
2014). I focused in my MA project on older generations of media during the formative 
era of the State of Israel (1950s), and knew that I wanted to continue my work on the 
topic of immigration in the future. However, exploring new media and contemporary 
usage of them was more inviting than going back to the archive exploring microfilms 
and crumbling 60 years old magazines and newspapers. Experiencing such archival 
work and knowing how isolated this process might be, I was ready to move from textual 
analysis into ethnographic work in which much of the data collection is done through 
participation and conversation. Backed by my faculty advisors and mentors, I turned to 
explore the place online and digital environments play on their users’ day-to-day lives. 
Throughout my research on migration in Israel, it became clear to me that within 
the academic literature, less attention was given to the Persian community. With the 
growing attention to the Israeli-Iranian relations around the world, the renewed interest 
in the Iranian-western relationship around the nuclear negotiation, and the lifting of 
some western sanctions, my interest in the topic grew even bigger. Witnessing the 
discourse that position Iran as the opposite of the west, I became interested in studying 
the complexity of identity within these relations, rather than the dichotomy through 
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which the western-Iranian relationship was usually approached. The case of the Jewish-
Iranian migration to Israel was thus a perfect case study. As I have written before, the 
identity and culture of Israelis of Iranian origin embody conflicting religious, national, 
and ethnic sources, and emphasize the complexity of cultural experiences within national 
and political conflicts.  
 
Entering the Site 
 
I started collecting data online through an observation of the Facebook group “It means 
you are Persian” in early February of 2014. At that stage of the process, I was not sure 
about the main questions or main goals of this project, and started looking into this 
group as part of my class work in different graduate seminars. “It means you are a 
Persian” (Siman She’ata Parsi in Hebrew) was established in early 2013 by a fifteen 
years old Facebook user and is administrated today by his mother and additional 
members of the Israeli-Persian community. The group has (as of December 2016) about 
16,000 members. Its professed aim (taken from the group’s “Facebook about,” originally 
in Hebrew) is to share essential common Persian memories and experiences. It wishes to 
establish itself as the “home of the Persians” and asks the members to “preserve the 
Persian culture, language, shared memories, photos, stories, events, recipes, authentic 
Persian proverbs, and anything about Persian folklore.” Most of the group’s discussions 
are posted in Hebrew, and any Farsi written posts (or a Hebrew-Persian/English-Persian 
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constellation) analyzed in the study were translated into English by two professional 
Farsi translators.  
This group was picked as a first site for this study for three main reasons. First, I 
have looked for groups and pages that discuss the Persian identity in social networking 
sites, and this group has been the largest Israeli group on Facebook. At the time I started, 
only three groups came up through the Facebook search with the word Persian in 
Hebrew. The two other groups had only few hundred members. Secondly, the other 
groups did not seem very active. “It means you are a Persian” had over 13,000 members 
at the time I started the project, and seemed significantly more active. The size and 
liveliness of the group were thus the two main reasons for starting there. Moreover, there 
was a simple methodological reasoning behind the selection this group in particular. The 
names of the groups’ administrators and the aim of the group were clearly marked in the 
description (“about”) section on Facebook. Thinking ahead about IRB approval and 
ethical conduct in the realm of online ethnographic research, I knew I would be able to 
more easily communicate with the administrators and reason my selection within the 
IRB application. This turned out to be the right choice, as the administrators were open 
for collaboration and highly exited to participate in my proposed study, and have been a 
valuable resource in this study since the initial communication with them. 
I have approached the administrators of the group to get approval for conducting 
research in early February of 2014. IRB application was sent with the administrators’ 
willingness to take part in the project, and the official approval from IRB was granted on 
April 2014. In between these two dates, I had the chance to familiarize myself with the 
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group, and got to know its dynamics, types of postings, and central issues discussed. I 
made daily visits to the Facebook group, often multiple, to became informed about the 
ways in which members use it to maintain and construct their Persian identity. I kept a 
field journal of the topics I found relevant since then in my observation, and collected 
representative posts that I found relevant to my interest. These were gathered with the 
wish to remind myself in the analysis stages of project what I saw as the flavor of the 
discourse constructed there.  
 
Sources of Data 
 
Observation Online (or “Lurking”) 
 
Since receiving Texas A&M University’s IRB approval and the approval of the group’s 
administrators, I have been conducting observation in “It means you are a Persian” for 
two years. The main aim of this layer of data collection was mainly contextual. I wanted 
to learn about the ways in which the group works, the main communication patterns, and 
the main themes discussed in it. More specifically, I was interested in learning about the 
ways in which group members discuss their Persian identity, Iranian background and 
memories, migration processes, and assimilation in Israel. Alongside these, I was 
looking for the ways they talked about the platform itself – the Facebook group. I was 
interested to see if and how they frame the technology’s place in gathering the group.  
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Other than occasional likes on others’ posts in the group, and a surprising 
celebratory post on the group’s wall on my birthday (posted by the administrators with 
which I was in touch throughout the research), I did not take any active part in it. The 
conversation in the group focused on the cultural experiences of being Persian, the 
memories from Iran and from growing up on Persian households in Israel, and my main 
activity remained in the realm of observing, or ‘lurking’ with a full administrative 
approval. Being in the very early stages of the research process, not knowing too much 
about the group, but having the permission of the administrators to study it, I decided to 
spend some time without actually posting and participating in the group, at least until a 
genuine opportunity for participation will present itself.  
I concluded that lurking, or in a less negative context, observing, is sufficient 
enough for that stage of the study. Being the most common way of participation in 
online groups, lurking was not seen as ethically problematic (Edelmann, 2013; 
Nonnecke & Preece, 2001). The group administrators themselves acknowledged in 
several interviews that most of the participants in the studied group were only observing, 
and not taking active part in posting in the group. Thus, the group was at first stage just 
observed. This observation was not being held under cover, or through the use of an 
alternative Facebook account, but rather through using my own Facebook profile 
throughout the whole process. Additionally, I did not include any data in this study that I 
was not authorized to use by participants in the research. To gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the process, I added interviews with active members of the group to the 
data collection process. Thus, data collected in the observation stage was only 
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contextual. In this exploratory stage I collected 350 Facebook posts from the Facebook 
group “It Means You are Persian” to gain a better understanding of the flavor of 
conversations and exchange that exists in the group. Through semi-structured and 
ethnographic interviews, a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which the 
identity is formulated and understood was gathered.  
 
Semi-structured and Ethnographic Interviews 
 
Alongside conducting observations online, I started conducting interviews with some of 
the groups’ administrators, to get a further understanding of the aims and goals of the 
group, and to understand its scope. Two administrators of the group were interviewed 
multiple times in this stage of the research. Through several interviews carried with 
these two administrators over the phone, Skype calls, Facebook messages, and Facebook 
chat, I have learned about the Persian identity being the main identity marker shared and 
presented by the group members. I became Facebook friend with the two administrators 
and the conversation between us has continued ever since. Communication with these 
two administrators has moved beyond the context of the project, and we often exchange 
messages in holidays, birthdays, and other occasions.   
At this point, it is important to explain the different types of interviews I 
conducted with participants. By using the term semi-structured interviews, I refer to 
interviews scheduled in advance with participants, in which I followed a flexible list of 
questions designed in advance and approved by IRB. These questions were leading the 
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conversation, but the interview was not restricted to them in any way, and was highly 
conversational in nature. These semi-structured interviews were conducted both online 
and offline, on phone calls, through Skype, or in-person. Ethnographic interviews, in 
comparison, are those conducted without specific prior preparation. They are 
unstructured in nature, and are conducted as an open conversation with the participants. 
These were usually conducted over Facebook chat and messages, but also through Skype 
calls in a more spontaneous manner. 
After a few interviews with the group administrators, they have offered to put me 
in touch a few group members that have heard about the project, and were interested in 
participating in the research. Thus, several more participants were added to the project, 
with whom a few more interviews were conducted. At that stage of my research process, 
I had only interacted with participants from afar, via phone, Facebook, or Skype. All 
interviewees were added as Facebook friends, and maintained connection with me 
through it after and between interviews using messages and chats, which I categorize as 
ethnographic interviews.  
Administrators of another Facebook group, as discussed below, were also 
interviewed for this study. This second Facebook group is a “sub-group” (as participants 
refer to it) of the original “It means you are Persian,” that focuses on the Persian 
language. More information about this group is shared later in this chapter as part of a 
discussion of conducting participant observation. Through these two Facebook groups 
and interviews reached through them, I have learned of three different online radio 
stations, operated voluntarily by members of the Persian community, which broadcast 
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live in Farsi in Israel today. These are RadisIn,3  Radio Asal,4 and Radio Ran.5  RadisIn 
was closed a mere few weeks after I concluded collecting data for this study, and an 
additional radio station was established online by some of the volunteers who operated 
it. The new station, Radio Setareh, was not included in the process of data collection. 
Additional interviews were conducted with producers of RadisIn, Radio Asal, and Radio 
Ran, adding further sites to be studied both online and offline. Overall, twenty 
participants have been interviewed for this dissertation project. Additional interviews 
were conducted with other members of the Facebook group based on a snowball 
sampling.  
Although the sampling method for this study was non-representative and non-
random, I tried to conduct interviews with both female and male participants, of different 
age groups and backgrounds, born in Iran and in Israel, to have a taste of the different 
profiles and experiences of members in the group. All of the interviewees in this project 
were reached through the two Facebook group or through members of these groups. I 
have met face-to-face with over 70 members in offline meetings with which I conducted 
ethnographic, non-structured or planned interaction (described below), yet only 20 of 
them participated in in-depth interviews. Thus, 9 males and 11 females were 
interviewed, 11 of them born in Iran, 9 of them born in Israel (not respectively). Only 
one of the interviewees does not identify as Persian in ethnicity, but is an expert in 
                                                 
3 http://www.radisin.com/ 
4 http://www.radioasal.com/ 
5 http://www.radioran.co.il/ 
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Israel-Iran relations and have worked constantly with one of the radio stations to discuss 
said relations, arranging visits of Iranian leading cultural figures (such as Iranian poet 
Payam Feili, who’s visit to Israel will be further discussed in chapter 6)  to promote 
dialogue and facilitate relations between the two. Other than this participant, all other 19 
participants identify as Persian and actively participate in the radio stations or Facebook 
groups. Participants’ age range between 18-65, and all have actively agreed to take part 
in the project, being interviewed multiple times online or offline. 
 
Participant Observation Online 
 
In one of the interviews, a participant shared with me information about her own 
Facebook group – “Lovers of the Persian language” (Ohavey Hasafa Ha’Ivrit in 
Hebrew, and Dustan aziz chush amdid in Farsi) – that became a second site of analysis 
in this study. This group was described by few community members as one of the “sub-
groups” growing out of the original “It means you are Persian” Facebook group. It has 
around 4,700 followers (as of December 2016), and specifically focuses on the Farsi 
language, and consist of discussions of the place of the language in the Persian culture 
and identity. Through this group, I was able to add participant observation, the heart of 
the ethnographic process, to the project. The genuine opportunity for participation I was 
looking for, became available through this group - the group administrator, who is one of 
this study’s participants, started teaching Farsi through online lessons shared in the 
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Facebook group. This did not require any former knowledge of the language, and 
seemed like the best option for me to take part in the discussions.  
Once or twice a week, for a few months, the administrator uploaded a “lesson” 
on Farsi letters and vocabulary to the Facebook group (see Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3). 
These included small writing and translating assignments we (participants in those 
sessions) were asked to complete, as well as questions we were asked to answer, all in 
Farsi. Once a participant completed these “homework assignments” they posted a picture 
of them (if they were written by hand, some have also typed the answers) as a comment 
to the original lesson post. We were then “graded” by the administrator on the effort of 
studying Farsi and the correctness of the answer. Other participants also commented on 
these, mostly liking and congratulating others on their success and advancement in 
learning the language.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1, Screenshot, reprinted from Lovers of the Persian Language Facebook 
group, 2015, participant observation lesson number 20, part 1 
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  Figure 2, Screenshot, reprinted from Lovers of the Persian Language Facebook 
group, 2015, participant observation lesson number 20, part 2 
Figure 3, Screenshot, reprinted from Lovers of the Persian Language Facebook 
group, 2015, participant observation lesson number 20, part 3 
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This was an excellent opportunity for me to be somewhat at “a leveled playing 
field” with other participants who did not know the language even though coming from a 
Persian background. I am still not Persian, nor will I ever be, but through these shared 
learning experience I was able to add participation to the already existing observation in 
this study. Little by little, I reached more members, added them as friends on Facebook, 
and become more immersed in the Facebook groups. During this ethnographic 
exploration, my Facebook feed got to a point in which I often saw more content posted 
in Farsi or by members of the Persian Facebook groups, than posts of other friends I 
have, posting in English or Hebrew.  
 
Participant Observation Offline 
 
In addition to the work conducted online, I have attended two offline meetings with 
members of the community while visiting Israel. These two meetings were organized by 
community members, and I have joined them after getting permission from both the 
organizer of the events and the administrators of the Facebook groups, that were my 
informants in the community. It was important for me to receive this approval from 
them, as the relationship with other members in the community was originated by them. 
About twenty members have attended the first informal gathering held in May 2015, 
some of whom I already knew and interviewed, and some of whom I only recognized 
from the observation part of this study. The second meeting was held in December 2015. 
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This was a bigger gathering, attended by around 50 members of the group, some of 
which I already knew, and some that I got to meet for the first time. 
In these two occasions, I was able to meet participants face-to-face, and to 
experience with them the gatherings they have talked about many times online. The 
meetings included Persian food, music, and stories. In the second meeting, the host have 
even invited a professional Persian singer and key-board player to entertain the guests. I 
was able to witness how the group’s online Persian identity was carried offline, as they 
kept mentioning the group and shared Persian food and memories in the meeting. Most 
participants did not know each other prior to meeting online, In the Facebook group “It 
means you are Persian,” a fact they kept on reiterating both online and offline. 
These meetings enriched the context of the research and gave it depth, focusing 
on the interplay between online and offline spheres that are both integral and relevant to 
the identity construction process. After attending these meetings, I gained more of the 
participants trust, and was able to meet new members that led me to another site of this 
study – online Persian radio. While I already learned about the radio station via the 
groups, I was able to meet two of the radio producers face-to-face offline in these 
meetings, and gain permission to add these sites to my study.  
In my second trip to Israel (December 2015), I visited two Persian radio stations 
broadcasting live from Israel via websites – Radio Asal and Radio Ran. Following 
Carey’s model of communication as culture, I emphasize the place of the producers in 
the community and in creating a Persian social hearth. Working within a community and 
sharing a culture with the audience, the producers of the radio broadcasts are in charge, 
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to some extent, of those shared symbols consumed by the community. By interviewing 
the producers and visiting the radio stations, I gained a sense of the imagined borders 
and the perceived cultural needs of the Persian “community of sentiment” (Appadurai, 
1996). These visits broadened my understanding of the cultural work being done within 
the community and allowed me a holistic understanding of the online Persian 
mediascape in Israel. 
While visiting Radio Asal, I was also invited to take part in the broadcasting of 
one of the shows, to share my research live with listeners and to ask the broadcasting 
crew questions about their own migration story and gather information about the place of 
media in forming the Persian identity in Israel. In the second station – Radio Ran, I was 
able to sit in the studio while the broadcasters interviewed live, in the station, Payam 
Feili. Feili is a Muslim Iranian poet who fled Iran in 2015 because of the persecution he 
faced over his sexuality. These two unique opportunities have expanded my data 
collection, adding depth to the understanding of the online sphere in the global context. 
 
Textual Analysis 
 
Another important data collection layer in the Facebook groups is a textual one. I have 
been tagged by the participants in comments of Facebook posts that they found 
representative of their Persian identity. The first participants in this study, who thought it 
would be easier for her to demonstrate the need of people to discuss their past and 
memories through those posts, originated this act. In line with Marcus’ (1998) 
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suggestion of “following the people” in the multi-sited ethnography, I decided to 
embrace this method, and have asked other participants to tag me in their own postings 
that seem relevant for the study. Thus, 45 posts were collected and thematically analyzed 
to find central motifs participants emphasize when talking about their Persian identity. In 
terms of translation, it is important to highlight at this point that most posts gathered 
were in Hebrew, or in a combination of Hebrew and Farsi that allowed me to gather an 
understanding of the topic in hand. The posts that were originated in Farsi and I could 
understand were translated into Hebrew by a professional translator that was also my 
Farsi language teacher in the past (prior to the beginning of this project). Overall 108 
posts or comments on posts were translated by the professional Farsi translator.  
This layer of analysis is important for gaining a thick, rich, and in-depth 
understanding of the construction process and the meaning of it for participants. 
Alongside my point of view gathered via observations, participation, and interviews, 
these Facebook posts further enable me with the participants’ point of view, with 
emphasis on what they find integral to their experience online. Texts of the interviews 
(some typed online, some recorded) as well as notes written during the interviews and 
throughout the observations in my field journal, were also analyzed thematically. 
Through thematic analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun & Clarke, 2012) I 
aimed at identifying and interpreting patterns of collective or shared meanings and 
experiences across the set of data collected in multiple sites online and offline. Using 
thematic analysis, I unpacked the salient and latent commonalities in group discussions, 
interviews, meetings, etc. at different levels, in order to uncover the common ways in 
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which participants address the role online media play in their community and in the 
process of forming the Persian identity.  
Thus, the many layers of data in this project stem from online and offline 
engagements with the community. In terms of observation, I followed the community 
through a Facebook group for several months prior to interviewing and participating. At 
this stage I collected 350 contextual Facebook posts that were gathered as the 
exploratory phase of the project. Alongside the observational stage, participant 
observation was also conducted in this study as the heart of the ethnographic research. 
Online, I took part in a Farsi language Facebook group and a Farsi learning class for 40 
lessons. Offline, I conducted two community meetings in which I interacted with about 
70 community members. I also conducted multiple visits in radio stations that broadcast 
in Farsi from Israel, and even got to broadcast with them during one of my visits. In 
terms of interviews, 20 community members were interviewed for this dissertation 
project. This layer of data collection included multiple interviews with each of the 
members both offline, in person, and online, through Facebook chats, Skype 
conversations, and phone conversations. Alongside these, as mentioned, 45 Facebook 
posts were also gathered for an in-depth analysis based on participants’ 
recommendation.  
This thick and layered body of data was thematically analyzed and is brought 
together into use in the following chapters. In each chapter I combine examples from 
visits to the radio stations, participation in groups’ meetings, interviews, and so on, to 
highlight the interconnected nature of identity construction and cultural negotiation 
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between the online and the offline. The conscious decision of not distinguishing between 
different sources of data in the following stages stems from the theoretical understanding 
that culture is a “web of meaning” (Geertz, 1973) that can only be understood as a 
whole.  
 
Research Questions 
 
By focusing on these data collection methods within my ethnographic research, I aim at 
answering the following primary research question:  
What is the role online media platforms play in the process of constructing Persian 
identities in Israel?  
Some other secondary questions studied in this dissertation are:  
A. How do community members communicate and articulate the ethnic and national 
layers of the Persian identity? 
B. What are the transnational and transcultural aspects of the Persian community and 
identity as communicated by community members? 
C. What is the place of online platforms usage in challenging mainstream notions of 
ethnicity, nationality, homelands, and host lands?  
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CHAPTER IV 
NARRATIVES OF BELONGING AND ESTRANGEMENT: CONSTRUCTING 
AN ETHNIC IDENTITY, BUILDING AN ONLINE HOME   
 
“The internet media are very capable of bringing dispersed things into immediate, 
virtually face-to-face, contact: prices and commodities, families, music cultures, 
religious and ethnic diasporas. However, there is no reason to suppose that these 
encounters dis-embed people from their particular places; or that they come to treat 
their real-world locations as less relevant to their encounters or identities; or that they 
construct new identities in relation to ‘cyberspace’ rather than projecting older spatial 
identities through new media” (Miller & Slater, 2000, p. 85). 
 
This chapter focuses on contextualizing the Persian identity as members of the Persian 
community construct it within Israeli society. In order to understand the formation of the 
Israeli Persian identity (rather than Persian identity in Iran or other exiled Persian 
communities worldwide) I focus on the social and cultural circles relevant to the process. 
I open the chapter with stories of migration and assimilation shared by participants 
online and offline. I then turn to unpack the meaning of using online media in light of 
these stories. This section focuses on the different themes that build the ethnic Persian 
identity in Israel, ranging from the Persian calendar, through the Persian cuisine, all the 
way to hybrid media texts produced and consumed locally and globally. The analysis 
portion of the chapter closes with a discussion of the culturally subversive vs. 
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affirmative nature of the discourse produced by community members. These three 
sections are then interpreted within the larger context of new media studies and ethnic 
identity studies. In this final part of the chapter I define a term I coined—“lived 
ethnicity”—focusing on the dynamic essence of studying and constructing ethnic 
identities online. 
 
Migration and Assimilation Narratives between Iran and Israel 
 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the Zionist ethos constructed Jewish migration 
to Israel during the 20th century as a “returning to a Homeland” and to a “patrimony.” 
The stories participants share attest otherwise, somewhat supporting somewhat 
challenging this social perception. Members of the Persian community share stories that 
reveal the hardship of migrating to Israel, stories about the complicated assimilation 
process in Israel, and above all, stories that are not consistent with the ideological 
narrative of the almost “magical” returning of Jewish people to Israel from all ends of 
the globe. Alongside these accounts, participants also share stories about being and 
becoming a part of the Jewish Israeli society, Zionist at heart and supporters of the 
Israeli state. These tensions, as shown throughout the analysis chapters, are the main 
theme in the story of the Persian ethnic identity in Israel. Thus, in the following sections 
of this ethnographic account, I present a pendulum movement between affirming and 
negating social structures, cultural norms, and ethnic hierarchies, as these are presented 
 116 
 
by participants online and offline. These, in turn, lead to constant movement between 
belonging and estrangement within and between Iran and Israel. 
In the context of migration, many participants share their own memory of leaving 
Iran, focusing on leaving a homeland, rather than returning to one. Eve, one of the 
administrators of the Facebook group “It means you are Persian” emphasizes a feeling of 
displacement in one of her interviews, providing the first example of many of the trauma 
formed by migration. Moving to Israel as teenager, just as the Iranian revolution 
commenced, Eve felt like the ground was vanishing under her feet. She refers to 
migrating as the biggest distress of her life, and describes her lack of commitment or 
connection to Israel at the time: “I heard maybe once that I have a grandmother and a 
grandfather in Israel, but it did not mean anything to me back then, I did not even know 
what Israel means or where it was. Moving to this place, back then, was not a wish or a 
dream I had.” Migrating to Israel, for her, was tied with feelings of displacement and 
losing a sense of self.  
Eve grew up in western Iran, in a highly diverse society, and went to a secular 
Iranian school rather than a Jewish one. Most of her friends were not Jewish, and her 
main identity marker, as she recalls it, was being Persian. In Israel, Eve was not able to 
maintain this ethnicity as her main marker of identification. She expands in one of her 
interviews about what I interpret as the unrealistic expectations the Israeli society had 
towards immigrants in this context: 
Alongside the trauma of losing your home, your friends, 
everything you knew, I was also asked to change my name. When we 
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arrived at Israel the migration officer did not like the sound of my name, 
arguing that it is too foreign sounding, that people in Israel will find it 
hard to pronounce, and insisted on changing it to a Hebrew name. That 
was the final straw for me. My parents moved me from Iran to Israel, I had 
to leave everything behind – but taking my name away from me was 
taking who I am, taking my identity from me. I did not let them change it, 
I was not ready to give up who I am. 
Changing migrants’ “foreign sounding” first and last names into Hebrew names was not 
unique to Eve’s migration story. Others participants in this project have run into the 
same situation, which signals the larger transformation immigrants from Iran, but from 
other places of origin as well, were asked to go under. Stahl (1994) argues that this 
process is found to be severely resented amongst immigrants to Israel, viewed as a 
cultural and ethnic intolerance on the Israeli assimilating society’s part. Participants in 
this study share that these expectations for personal transformation often led to feelings 
of alienations, and negate the experience of “coming back” to a Homeland, in which you 
are supposed to feel welcomed. “Even many years after migrating to Israel I did not feel 
at home,” Eve adds. 
We were very happy and wealthy in Iran, we did not feel 
persecuted, we were not strangers, we lived in peace with all neighbors, 
and that was our home. There are many old sayings in Farsi that mean 
‘your home is your hold on reality.’ When we left our home… I felt out of 
place. It took me a while to learn the [Hebrew] language in Israel. I tried 
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too hard to preserve all that I brought with me from Iran in terms of values 
and beliefs… which made me uncomfortable in Israel. At the end, I had to 
fit in. I changed and became somewhat a part of the society. 
Anna, an administrator of the Facebook group focused on Farsi language 
expands on the topic, sharing similar feelings of post-migration displacement:  
I was in my formative years, a teenager who wanted to feel a part of 
something bigger, just like anyone else. When my father told us we were 
leaving Iran, in 1988, I felt like someone tore my roots, ripped me from 
my ground, from everything I knew and loved, from my habitat. Once I 
got to Israel, all I knew was how to continue ripping these roots even 
farther. Do not get me wrong – I had a very strong Jewish identity even in 
Iran. But, my homeland was Iran, not Israel. When we arrived at Israel, I 
learned that I had to discard any memory of me being Iranian, or of me 
being Persian. I stopped speaking Farsi, I ignored my past, I tried to be as 
similar as possible to a Sabar, including my looks, my friends, my culture, 
the whole thing. Only years after, through Facebook and the interest I 
found on it in the Farsi language, I started healing these roots, growing 
them back again, bringing back my Persian identity into my life. 
 Other participants describe the migration process as a disheartening event that 
shook the ground beneath them, taking away everything they had, or taking them from 
an advanced country with everything they needed (Iran), to a backwards place with no 
technology, culture, or any of the lifestyle they had (Israel). Migration itself and the 
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early period of assimilation in Israel (for some several months for some even a few 
years) are mostly portrayed for what the state and the migrants themselves lacked.  
The complexity of achieving a sense of belonging unfolds in the life story of 
Shelly, who describes her search of identity through anecdotes about migration. In this 
section I bring her story almost as a whole, with the hopes of showing the convoluted 
process of not only building an identity, but also coming to peace with this identity’s 
multiple, often conflicting, layers. “My early childhood memories” Shelly opens the 
interview “take me back to the word longing.” While all other immigrants participating 
in this project have migrated once, from Iran to Israel, Shelly’s story of migration 
contains of multi-directional movement between Iran, Israel, and the U.S., ending up in 
Israel.  
“I remember a pen inscribing on white rice papers, while my mother’s tears 
smudge off the ink as she writes letters to her sisters, brothers, and other family members 
back in Iran.” And just like the ink on the letters could not adhere, blurred by the tears of 
her mother, Shelly’s sense of identity was always unclear.  
When we came to Israel [1960s], my father was ecstatic. He joined Mapai 
[Ashkenazi-dominated Labor Party, hegemonic force at the time in terms 
of culture and politics] and traveled the country coast-to-coast, side-to-
side, coming back home with heroic stories about the IDF [Israeli Defense 
Force], about planting Orange trees along unpaved roads, and about our 
young country, and I eagerly absorbed it all, captivated by his stories. I 
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was learning how to be a Zionist alongside the constant yearning, longing, 
and sadness of leaving Iran. 
[…] we lived next to other migrating families, and there was a 
stubborn sense of poverty in the air. It was not necessarily economic 
poverty, but rather a cultural one. I had a warm and caring family, but we 
never fully felt like a part [of the Israeli culture]. Family members visiting 
from Iran brought familiar scents and scenes in the image of gifts, festive 
attire, expensive pistachios, and other foods; filling our humble home with 
our past. These made me confused; a feeling that over the years evolved 
and changed into a great sense of guilt and of missing out… these visits 
undermined and disrupted our acclimation process in Israel. The joy of 
seeing my family was enormous, and so was the pain of saying goodbye 
time and time again. 
“When I was 12, my parents decided to move back to Iran, what I saw at first as 
leaving the Israeli-Zionist reality in favor of Teheran.” However, the reality Shelly 
describes was not as simple as just moving back home. First of all, Shelly’s parents and 
siblings gave up their Iranian passports when they migrated to Israel, as many other 
migrants did, and had to wait for the Iranian government to approve their relocation in 
1973. Other than that, there were emotional and ideological components to being in 
Israel, despite the hardship. The family did not just leave Israel behind and never looked 
back, rather, migrated with a strong Zionist identification that was coupled with the 
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longing for the Iranian homeland. Shelly describes this moment of migration as identity 
crises:  
I remember some one hundred friends and family members waiting for us 
in Teheran’s airport, hugging and kissing us, welcoming us back home. It 
was a true bliss, the good life – reloaded. But, we came back as Israelis, 
not as Iranians, an identity that revealed itself on a day-to-day basis, 
further confusing me as a child. In those years [1970s] the Israeli 
community in Iran numbered around two thousand people: diplomats, 
security personal, delegates, business men and women, and so on. Hence, 
an Israeli school was built in Teheran, named after David Ben-Gurion [the 
first Israeli Prime Minister]. My parents registered us [Shelly and her 
siblings] to the Israeli school, and we continued our formal education 
under the Israeli ministry of education – in Teheran.   
We continued our beloved Israeli routine in the heart of bustling 
Teheran, not fully in the east, not fully in the west, somewhere in-between.  
In the mornings, I was an Israeli in a jeans and a plain T-shirt, and in the 
afternoon, I had to transform, changing my colors, wearing haute-couture 
dresses, allowing myself to fit with the Persian and Iranian community in 
galas and banquets, not really knowing who I am and what I am. 
[…] a few years before the revolution, while living in Los Angeles 
for school [UCLA], I met a young Israeli delegate who worked in 
Teheran. He became my husband and we experienced the revolution 
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together in Iran. We had to leave to Israel without my family who stayed 
in Teheran at the time. During those years in Israel, I had to set my Persian 
identity–which at times I loved and at times I ridiculed–aside. Being 
Persian became a memory, crumbs of my past that occasionally 
resurfaced. That is, until I found Facebook.  
Shelly goes on and describes her new home – the Facebook group “It Means you are 
Persian,” a narrative that will be further explored later in the chapter.  
As shown, Shelly’s story challenges the linear Zionist migration story on several 
levels. Shelly’s story reveals that a homeland is not just an ethos, rather a deeper sense of 
belonging that is not dictated by ideology. It reveals the simultaneous sense of belonging 
and estrangement leading families to wander the world in a journey to construct a 
comprehended identity. The hardship she and her family felt manifested itself in varying 
ways, leading Shelly to adopt a dual identity, one that does not sit with the Jewish-Israeli 
image of the Sabar. This, in turn, led her to further feelings of confusion and rupture.    
It was not only leaving Iran that was hard for the Persian community members. 
Assimilation in Israel was more than often difficult as well. Lara looks back at the first 
months in Israel after immigrating. She arrived at Israel as a 15 years old teenager, right 
as the revolution happened. In contrary to some of the stories shared by now, Lara grew 
up as a Zionist, visited Israel many times prior to the revolution, and was in fact highly 
excited to migrate to Israel. However, upon arrival, the situation in Israel was different 
than she expected. “Many of us kids immigrated without our parents, or with only one 
parent, which made boarding school necessary. It was not because our parents could not 
 123 
 
take care of us,” Lara stresses, “we were loved and cared for, but in order for our parents 
to situate the family in Israel they needed help with accommodating us first.” So, Lara 
was sent to an Israeli boarding school, where she met other Persian youth who recently 
immigrated to Israel. She also met many Israeli youth, born and raised in Israel. The 
difference between the two groups was, according to her, fundamental. The native Israeli 
youth at the place were forced out of their homes due to lack of parental care and the 
lack of familial supervision. Many of them were troubled individuals, and interaction 
with them was very problematic. 
“First we were completely separated from the Israelis. Looking back at those 
years I see it as a problem. The institution forced us to be separated and did not let us 
assimilate easily,” Lara sees that as the first obstacle in her assimilation process. Other 
than having different social values and norms, she remembers how she and her Persian 
friends were “abused by the Israeli group. It was only verbal abuse but still, it was very 
hard for me as a young girl. I had to grow up very quickly, to develop a thick skin.” The 
assimilating Israeli group in the boarding school used to call the Persian migrants 
“Farsi-Miduni” (in Farsi: “you know Farsi,” a theme that has surfaced in each and every 
interview conducted for this project, and will be further discussed soon), or “Khomeini” 
as an insult. Khomeini was the leader of the Iranian revolution of 1979, a Shia Muslim 
Ayatollah, inscribed in the Israeli collective memory as the ultimate enemy. Using his 
name as a nickname of migrants from Iran made the assimilating group’s position clear 
to the immigrating youth. The assimilating group went as far as equalizing the Iranian 
immigrants to enemies, othering them from the Israeli society. Other participants shared 
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similar stories of ostracism, where even educators in later years have addressed the 
alleged hostile characters of the Persian community immigrated from Iran.   
Orly, who also immigrated to Israel from Iran shortly after the revolution, shares 
her perspective on assimilation in a blog post (Noy, 2013) she published about the 
Facebook group “It means you are Persian:” 
 In my childhood, as an immigrant from Iran, I was the ultimate 
‘Persian,’ always uttered mockingly. I am not sure I understood why 
pointing out my ethnic origin was supposed to embarrass me, but it sure 
got the job done: I was ashamed to be called Persian; I was ashamed to be 
Persian. When they [Israelis, members of the assimilating group] really 
wanted to get under my skin, they would call me Farsi-Miduni, as a curse. 
“Farsi-Miduni” literally means [in Farsi], “you know Farsi.” Or as a 
question, “Do you know Farsi?;” and I did. I spoke Farsi at home. When I 
was sad, my parents consoled me in Farsi. At the dinner table they made 
me laugh in Farsi and when I misbehaved, they scolded at me in Farsi. 
Yes, I know Farsi.  
It did not take me much time to shed my “Persianness.” I worked 
hard to shed the remnants of my accent and perfect my Hebrew, to the 
point that within two years I was the best student in Hebrew class. 
Consciously or unconsciously I began to put my Farsi into a box, so that 
as much as possible, it wouldn’t leave the house: I was Persian at home, 
and a “human” on the street... I became Israeli, “transparent.” My parents 
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cooperated with me in my assimilation project as best as they could (I 
never dared to find out how much anguish it caused them). They refrained 
from playing Persian music when I had friends over and from speaking 
Farsi in public. Farsi went away and was locked up in the confines of my 
home. The language of my culture, on which I was raised, turned into a 
language that was intimate, familial, and practically secret. 
The described wish of shedding any Persian identity marker was not the 
possession of only migrating individuals. Nir, the son of two Iranian immigrants (his 
father migrated from Shiraz and his mother migrated from Teheran) describes how the 
shame of holding on to ethnic identity markers has also passed on to second generation 
of Iranian migrants in Israel. “When I was a child and a teenager,” says Nir, “being 
Persian was wrong. Being a migrant was wrong, holding ethnic identity that was not of a 
native-Israeli Sabar was wrong. But I felt that being Persian was the ultimate way to be 
wrong.” He expands on the experience and what he felt as the turmoil of being a son of 
Persian parents in the Israeli society during the 1980s and 1990s: 
Every time my parents played Farsi music at home, I used to go 
around the house and close all of the doors and windows so that no one 
outside would know what we are listening to. I also did not let my father 
turn on the car radio if a friend of mine was riding along. I knew that once 
he turns it on, Farsi music would play, and I did not want my friends to 
know. I completely denied this identity. I was even ashamed of it. A 
Persian person was a laughingstock, the subject of so many jokes, the 
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ridiculed character in Israeli movies… so when I was asked about my 
background I often lied. I would say I am Ashkenazi, Moroccan, Iraqi, 
anything but Persian.  
Thus, being Persian in Israel became a burden for many of the community members, 
making them look for creative ways to hide this identity and shed any ethnic 
identification. This does not mean that other groups were not stigmatized or stereotyped 
in ways similar to the Persian community. However, being Persians, participants in this 
study attest to their own experiences, which they might perceive as more intensified than 
other minority groups’ similar experience in Israel.  
At the same time, many members share similar stories of hardship as they 
describe their life in Iran. Numerous times the topic of anti-Semitism comes up in group 
discussions on Facebook, and the overall fear that followed the community’s life both 
before and after the revolution became a recurring theme as well. In terms of 
estrangement and liminality, being a religious minority in Iran is presented by 
community members as similar to being an ethnic minority in Israel. These feelings of 
dual estrangement were slowly simmering for the past few decades, fostering a state of 
marginalization in both societies, but more critically, it created a sense of ostracism in 
Israel, the hegemonically perceived homeland of the Jewish Persian community.  
 It is important to understand these narratives of alienation early in the chapter, to 
further stress the prominence of online platforms in the process of Persian identity 
construction in Israel. Here, I aim at showing that online environments allow members 
of the Persian community in Israel to negotiate the understanding of being Iranian and 
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Israeli, Persian and Jewish, all at once. This is not to say that these environments enable 
users with unlimited degrees of social and cultural freedom. As I show throughout this 
analysis chapter and the two that follow, many members affirm and re-create negative 
and oppressive social structures through these platforms. However, by contrasting the 
lack of ethnic and cultural freedom community members have experienced before 
getting to know and use online environments as tools of identity construction, and the 
sense of belonging and community they experienced after, I discuss the important role 
these outlets play in their lives.  
 To engage this discussion, I focus in the remainder of this chapter on the ethnic 
aspect of participants’ identity. This is done by following the use of online media to 
create and maintain a sense of ethnic identity, and the movement of cultural forms 
between online and offline environments. It is important to also point out that alongside 
this ethnic identity marker, participants formulate additional layers of identity such as 
national, religious, and global identity. Given that many times these layers are 
imbricated, the distinction between the ethnic layer and other layers is analytical, aims at 
highlighting practices of formulating both belonging an estrangement, pointing out both 
inclusion and exclusion within and between different circles of identification. 
The Persian identity formulated by community members in Israel becomes, in a 
way, an enclave within and between four larger communities. First, it is an ethnic 
identification within the larger Jewish national group in Israel. This means that 
community members use online environments to stress the uniqueness of this post-
migration community within the context of living in a national society in Israel, a theme 
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that will be discussed in-depth in the following chapter. Second, this identity is also an 
ethnic tradition within the larger religious Jewish community in Israel. Here, members 
stress specific religious traditions and customs identified only with the Persian ethnicity.  
Thirdly, an additional community of reference is that of the metaethnic group, 
the Mizrahi group in Israel. Members of the Persian community act to include 
themselves under the larger Mizrahi group in Israel, but at the same time clearly distinct 
themselves from other “inferior” sub-groups in this cultural category. Thus, in the Israeli 
context, members work to formulate their unique identity both on national, religious, and 
meta-ethnic levels. Forth and finally, being Persian, as expressed by community 
members online and offline, is also a religious-ethnic stream/trend within the global 
Persian community. Members of the Persian community in Israel highlight the distinct 
Jewish characteristics experienced within the larger Persian context in Iran, but also in 
the Persian diaspora outside of Iran nowadays. Here participants also address the exiled 
Jewish Iranian community worldwide (outside of Iran or Israel) as part of the group. By 
addressing these four circles, community members in Israel create themselves a home, 
which is context dependent. The circles are often coupled and only randomly 
acknowledged, but exist and define the identity formulated by the community. In the 
following paragraphs, I unpack this convoluted assessment through examples shared in 
interviews, meetings, and in online spaces.    
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Along Came Facebook: Social Media as a Home 
 
After years of rejecting their ethnic identity, an outcome of the Israeli melting pot, 
participants attest that they were finally able to reclaim their ethnic heritage, all through 
online environments. This is true for both members who immigrated themselves and for 
second and third generation Persians who were born in Israel. “The group fulfills my 
need to feel a sense of belonging,” says Leon, a participant that was born in northern 
Israel during the 1960s, a son of Iranian immigrants. Today, an educator in a high 
school, Leon find the group as an important resource in his life. In the process of 
documenting his parents’ immigration story, Leon came across the Facebook group “It 
means you are Persian” and found it as a place for information gathering and affirming. 
“I needed help with translations from Farsi to Hebrew… help filling up gaps in stories I 
heard as a child from my parents about the life of the community in Iran, I needed more 
information about locations in Iran, all which I found in the group.” In the Facebook 
group, Leon also found long lost family members also living in Israel, with which his 
family lost contact after migrating. “There was a cultural need waiting to be met, a need 
to feel a part of a community” that this group provides him with. 
The anecdote shared by Shelly earlier in this chapter ended with the sentence 
“that is, until I found Facebook.” Shelly then goes on and recounts the revelation of 
other members of the Persian community online:  
Facebook is THE invention of our lifetime. As I was clicking the ‘like’ 
button on a video a friend shared on Facebook her profile, I slowly read 
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the words on the post – “I-t m-e-a-n-s y-o-u… are? What? Persian!” 
Intrigued, without knowing what the future holds for me, I peek at the 
posts shared in the group, and… WOW!... someone get me unplugged!!!!! 
At once, without any stages or processing, I was sucked into what I can 
only call a home. A home that is so familiar and so tinged with mixed-
memories, unvisited for so many years.  
[…] Voices of laughter heard from the computer room pulled the 
rest of the family into this big celebration. Unexpectedly, my children, my 
Israeli children, call me in strange times of day, telling me jokes in Farsi, 
report to each other on another post someone uploaded to the group. They 
are suddenly interested; ask questions about my past, and even go as far as 
learning old Persian poems by heart, playing songs by Moein [famous 
Iranian singer and songwriter] on their guitar… joy and excitement in 
Shushan!!!  
Selly’s reference to Shushan, or in English Susa, is not accidental or random. 
Shushan was the capital of the first Persian Empire, during the Jewish Babylonian 
captivity of the 6th century BCE. Shushan, mainly in the Hebrew Bible scroll of Esther, 
is the place in which Esther, a member of the Jewish community in Persia, became a 
queen, married King Ahasueurus (Xerxes), and saved the Jewish people from genocide. 
This event is celebrated every year during Purim by Jewish people, commemorating the 
saving of the Jewish people, but also remembering the long-standing history of the 
Jewish people in Persia, also known as – Iran. Through this reference, Shelly points out 
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one of the most important component of the process of the Persian ethnic identification 
and identity formation – collective memory. Whether memory of the near past (one’s 
own home in Iran) or the very far past (6th century BCE), members of the Persian 
community emphasize their shared history as a central element in the process of 
formulating a shared sense of ethnic identity. 
 
Ethnic Identity and Collective Memory 
 
Collective memory is the way in which a group remembers its past, a social performance 
that has political and cultural implications (Zelizer, 1995). Collective memory “distorts 
the past for the sake of affect… the means for holding onto and reaffirming identities 
which had been badly bruised by the turmoil of the times,” filling a central function in 
creating the self-image of communities (Parry‐Giles & Parry‐Giles, 2000, p. 421; 
Kraidy, 2005). And so, through shared memories, members of the Persian community 
reinstituted a sense of home online, publicly discussing what was thus far confined to the 
privacy of their physical home, re-formulating an identity that was for years dismissed.   
 “When I first logged-in to the Facebook group,” says Anna “all the jokes, the 
songs, other members’ stories, and pieces of memories immediately took me back 
home.” The past that slowly receded into the background of her life, was now brought 
back online. “I got my identity back,” Anna says. “First online, and then also offline. I 
started speaking Farsi with friends I met there, reading books and poetry in Farsi, 
singing songs in Farsi. You have to understand, these are things I never did outside of 
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my home before.”  For Anna, the Facebook group “It means you are Persian” was a first 
connection to her roots, to her home, one that she left behind and started piecing together 
in Israel many years after migrating.  
 Ronen, another administrator of the language group shares this analogy: “If 
Facebook is a street, then our Persian Facebook group is a home.” He calls it a home 
because it became a space in which members talk about everything they brought from 
home. “You allow yourself to not only talk about being Persian, but to actually be one,” 
he adds, an important acknowledgment considering the narratives members shared about 
the shame of identifying as Persians in the past. Members of the Facebook groups 
exemplify this approach in their posts and comments. One member shared a video clip 
from a 1974 Iranian movie, asking the group to help her find the full movie. A comment 
following the post stated “you took me 45 years back to my childhood memories.” 
Others comment on similar posts states “we used to watch this at home” or “my parents 
used to watch these movies back in Iran.” It appears that remembering becomes a central 
activity in the process or re-building a home and re-constructing an identity. 
Just like movies, music becomes a mean for demonstrating nostalgia and 
memories in the group. One of the members addressed the group, looking for an old 
Persian song she used to listen to as a child in Iran. The conversation around this request 
unfolds a walk down memory lane for many of the group members, recalling their father 
listening to the song in the evening, or mother singing along with the singer in their 
childhood home, or when she puts them to bed at night. Another member shared a song 
of the Persian singer Googoosh (Faegheh Atashin) to express her longing to her 
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deceased mother, and a posted song of the singer Ahdieh received several comments 
stating “this is just like home” or “this bring back memories.”   
The narrative of sentimentality and nostalgia is noticeable in many other posts 
and comments, where members of the group share songs in Farsi and nostalgic Iranian 
playlists from YouTube, as well as photos of CDs and old vinyl records of Persian music 
they own. Holding on to these memories, but also to physical artifacts such as vinyl 
records, home décor, serving dishes, old coins, and above all – an Iranian passport, 
become an asset in the context of the group. Those who brought these items with them 
from Iran have more to show than those who were born in Israel. The physical artifacts 
that were brought from Iran to Israel play the role of valuable cultural capital in the 
process of remembering and building the Persian identity in Israel. This is an interesting 
approach to online-offline spheres relations, as it was the online sphere that enabled 
members of the community to come together, yet offline monuments that represent past 
memories still play a significant role in determining the authenticity of one’s identity.  
In this context, Davidson (2011) asks: “what is a homeland without access to the 
materiality of the land?” (p. 43). Focusing on the virtual experiences of migrating 
communities, Davidson suggests that actualization of a homeland is necessarily carried 
through the “residue that gathers” (p. 43), that is, monuments, artifacts, photos, videos, 
and the like. In the online context, the materiality of the land itself and the artifacts 
migrated online might be lost, but the importance of them is not. The images of personal 
belongings brought from Iran become the blueprints of the Persian identity in Israel, of 
memory, and of nostalgia. Following Davidson’s argument, the images of material 
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artifacts become the actualization of a space members work to articulate online. This is 
done through the meditation of a place they call home.        
It is not only nostalgic music and artists from the past that community members 
refer to. Many of the posts are concerned with about current Persian musicians, both 
from Iran and from the larger Persian diaspora around the world. While cultural 
recollection is integral and prominent in the process of identity construction, it is not a 
static nor only past-related identity. Current cultural influences are important component 
of the Persian identity, and online media play a central role in consuming and circulating 
it.  
 
Identity and Hybrid Media Texts 
 
Other than music shared through online music services (e.g. YouTube and Vimeo), 
members share and discuss media text that reflect processes of constructing the Persian 
identity. Members mention the Iranian TV series, Shahrzad, produced and screened in 
Iran since 2015. The plot follows the 1953 Iranian coup d'état of the Iranian Prime 
Minister Mosaddiq, and brings pre-revolution Iranian scenes back to life. Additionally, 
members discuss contemporary movies that follow the post-revolutionary migration 
stories of Iranian families. These include the recent French drama-comedy ‘All Three of 
Us’ and the Israeli drama ‘Baba June’ (which was awarded the Israeli Academy Award 
for best film). Both depict, in different ways, the journey that many community members 
went through themselves, leaving Iran and re-building themselves abroad. Through these 
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media texts, members surface shared concerns about longing, changing cultures, and 
assimilation.   
To these media texts, members add Persian-Israeli YouTube channels producing 
Farsi content and Persian-American streaming sources broadcasting mostly in Los 
Angeles, that allow them additional contemporary, up-to-date, sources of cultural texts 
to draw on. Some even go as far as producing these hybrid media texts themselves. 
Facebook group members create translated videos of famous old and contemporary Farsi 
songs, uploading them to YouTube so that members who do not know Farsi can listen to 
but also understand the meaning.  
Others, such as Nir, create new songs, mixing Hebrew and Farsi, about the 
community’s life in Israel. Nir is the same group member who told me how years ago he 
would not let his friends know he was Persian. Today, he uses Facebook and YouTube 
to circulate these hybrid Persian-Israeli media texts, becoming an attractive performer in 
weddings and other celebrations of the community. “Online media helped me connect 
with my roots” he shares with me. “We listened to Persian music at home before, but it 
was only when I uploaded the song I wrote, Iranian Bride, to YouTube that I have 
learned about all of those people who hold the same feelings as mine.”  
Those feelings, as Nir describes them, are the longing and nostalgia coupled with 
the wish to feel a sense of belonging in Israel. ‘Iranian Bride’ is a song that address the 
many desirable characteristics of the Iranian wife, which is the reason his family 
members arrange him a marriage with one. Nir’s songs are hits within the community, in 
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which he became a celebrity, and is known as “Nir the Persian.” His hybrid media texts 
spreading online are, in a way, his mea culpa.   
Contemporary hybrid media texts, more than reflecting cultural plurality, reflect 
the need of the Persian community in Israel for cultural materials and forms that pertain 
to them and their culture. Other scholars focused on media consumption and migration 
(such as Kraidy (2005) and Naficy (1993; 2001)) point out the global moment in the 
consumption of such texts. Globalization enabled migration of not only people but also 
media texts. While it is hard to argue that Israel was closed to, or disconnected from, 
global media penetration, these kinds of texts, hybrid or originally from Iran, were rarely 
available if available at all. Some offline media was produced locally in Israel, but never 
received large distribution even within the community. These hybrid media texts, 
produced by both users and media companies, and circulated by online media users, 
present different identity narratives than the ones offered by mainstream Israeli media. 
For that, these media texts become central in the conversations of community members, 
and prominent sources of association. Online, these processes of identifications become 
even clearer than offline, as users actively seek out and share these texts. The texts-pool 
becomes much larger and enables users to articulate their sense of belonging and sense 
of self through and by media content outside the Israeli mainstream mediascape. 
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Ethnic Identity and the Yearly Calendar       
 
Going back to the community’s collective memory and the identity constructed through 
it, ongoing annual rituals are signaled as other important ethnic events. Highly valuable 
sources of identification for group members are rituals brought from the life of the 
community in Iran to the life of the community in Israel. Drawing on the Persian 
calendar, members of the community mention and celebrate Persian holidays and 
practice ethnic rituals related to them. Thus, the yearly calendar becomes a central piece 
of collective memory. Members share multiple examples of these celebrations online. 
The Noowruz (زورون, Persian/Iranian new years’ eve) celebration and the related 
Chaharshanbe Suri (  هبنشراهچیروس , Persian festival of fire) events are two occasions 
extensively discussed and celebrated by community members. Many upload photos of 
their holiday table (Figure 4 for example), including seven items starting with the Farsi 
letter Sin (for example, Sabzeh, green sprouts symbolizing renewal and rebirth; Seer, 
garlic, which symbolizes health, or Seeb, an apple, symbolizing beauty) proudly re-
creating Persian symbolic rituals in Israel. Alongside these items, celebrants place on the 
table copies of Persian poetry books, honoring the rich ancient Persian culture. Many 
community members also meet for birthday celebrations, sharing photos of these same 
seven items used in birthday events to celebrate a member’s new year of life. 
An even more interesting event celebrated by the Persian community in Israel is 
the Rooze Bagh (  غاب زور) a holiday associated with the 13th and last day of the New Year 
celebrations. During that day, families go out to nature to celebrate renewal and rebirth. 
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This day usually coincides with the last day of the Jewish Passover holiday, in which 
Jewish religious law allows eating Chametz (leavened foods), which are restricted during 
the holiday. The two celebrations were folded into one back in Iran, and were brought 
with Iranian immigrants to Israel. Thus, in Israel, the community started celebrating the 
event in large gatherings in a national park in Ramat Gan (a city in central Israel), 
playing and dancing to Persian music, eating Persian foods, and coming together with 
friends and family members. In light of the large number of Persian community 
members attending the event, the day became also known as the best day for 
matchmaking within the community. The role of matchmaking was transferred online. 
Members use the different Facebook groups to seek a match couples from within the 
community for themselves or friends and family members. The offline event itself also 
found its way online, celebrated through photos, memes, and videos (of Persian content 
but also of the gathering itself), marking the hybrid Persian identity formulated in Israel.  
 
Figure 4, Festive Persian table arrangement, reprint from It means you are 
Persian Facebook group, 2015 
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More than the cultural artifacts displayed in these celebrations, the Persian 
calendar itself becomes a powerful cultural tool. As Schudson (1989) points out, the 
calendar is a prominent storage space for cultural symbols. Its efficacy becomes even 
greater when it is presented as part of other key cultural storage institutions: educational 
textbooks, literary or musical canons, and the like. Thus, “[t]he calendar, as an instance, 
is certainly one of the most important knowledge-fixing (and knowledge-activating) 
mechanisms ever invented” (p. 163). Benjamin (1968/2007) also highlight the 
importance of time in the social context. History, he claims, is a strong socialization tool. 
Constructing time through yearly calendars becomes a task of empowerment and of 
demonstrating social power. Calendars, rather tank measure time as clocks, “are 
monuments of a historical consciousness” (p. 261). 
Yet, the Persian calendar was never an integral part of any Israeli canon, 
educational instruments, or cultural mainstream. In fact, mainstream voices worked hard, 
in the Israeli context, to mute, suppress, and exclude ethnic identification from the 
cultural Jewish-Israeli repertoire. The calendar, important as it may be as a cultural tool, 
needs a cultural storage institution to support it and spread it within a community for it 
to have meaning. Thus, social media as a whole, and Facebook in particular, become 
these cultural vehicles, or cultural repositories, allowing the Persian community 
members to re-activate through culture, symbols, and canons, the suppressed Persian 
identity. 
These events point out the fluid movement between online and offline spheres in 
terms of culture and identity. Many of the participants highlight the “real-world” 
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implications these online groups had in their lives. They refer to the sudden dominance 
of their Persian identification in their lives. Their circle of friends has fundamentally 
changed, including more and more members of the community. Their day-to-day lives 
are now filled with events related to the Persian community. When they meet with these 
new-old friends, the meetings focus on Persian culture and memories. They sing Persian 
songs, eat Persian food, and speak Farsi. “An outsider would not understand what it 
means for many of us,” says Rona, a member of the community who was born in Israel 
only a few months after her parents migrated from Iran in the 1950s. “It goes back into 
our most private moments with our parents, in our home, the only place in which we 
were truly Persian.” Rona also mentions the great happiness of returning to the culture 
she received from her parents. “Now I know I am not the only one who felt it, who 
needed it, who was filed with emotions every time I logged into Facebook.” Moving the 
online to the offline, Rona was able to start cooking Persian food, take part in the 
community’s events, share her childhood stories growing up in a Persian household in 
Israel, and once again – communicate in Farsi.  
 
The Farsi Language 
 
The Farsi language plays a germane role in rebuilding the Persian identity in Israel. 
Many members share Persian songs, internet memes, and photos with attached 
translation in order to demonstrate proficiency in Farsi, and in order to help the ones that 
do not know how to read and write in Farsi. The language is presented in different 
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constellations, in which members playfully mix Hebrew, English, and Farsi. Thus, funny 
discussions are often shared, explained in Hebrew later by the users sharing them. In the 
same way, words’ pronunciation is often explained using English, where Hebrew 
explanation makes less sense. In other cases, members simply translate Farsi to Hebrew. 
One of the members commented on such a post, warning members who are not 
proficient in Farsi – “this group gradually learns to read and write Farsi, and hopefully in 
one year the Farsi language will dominate at least 90% of the group’s posts while 
Hebrew will become a marginal Language.” Sharing aphorisms, proverbs, and sayings in 
Farsi become regular means of poetically communicating the community’s identity in 
the past and present. These have great cultural value, building the place of the Israeli-
Jewish Persian community within the larger Persian society, while admiring a language 
considered ancient and unique in of its own. It is also an important example of the ways 
in which members articulate the unique localized Persian culture created in Israel, 
drawing on multiple sources to establish itself online. 
In addition, the Farsi language becomes a sign of acceptance for many of the 
participants. The revival of the language amongst the young generation born in Israel 
signals for parents born in Iran that their native-Israeli children are not experiencing the 
same levels of shame and ethnic repression they used to experience. “While I was visiting 
friends for Shabbat dinner, one of their daughters, also a member in the [Facebook] group, 
asked her grandmother to teach her Farsi in weekly meetings,” says Noa, an active member 
of both Facebook groups. “In my generation people were embarrassed of their Farsi 
speaking grandparents.” Eve adds in the same regard “my children, that were born in 
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Israel, call me on the phone to tell me jokes in Farsi they read on the Facebook group, or 
ask me to translate songs for them… something that I never dreamt could happen in 
Israel.”  
Thus, by using the Farsi language, the community moves between two social ends 
– belonging and estrangement – within and between the Israeli society and the worldwide 
Persian community. In a similar way to the calendar, language helps the community to 
resurface the depth and copiousness of the ancient Persian culture, highlighting their 
ethnic identity component within the Israeli society. At the same time, the acceptance of 
the language in Israel by the younger generation, points out to higher levels of plurality 
experienced in the Israeli society. This plurality might not be experienced by all groups of 
the Israeli society on all social and cultural levels. However, in comparison to past 
experiences of the Persian community, these new forms of acceptance by younger 
generation points at possible cultural changes. 
 
The Persian Cuisine  
 
The usage of Farsi language is accompanied by long discussions, many photos, shared 
recipes, and countless questions about the Persian kitchen. Community members upload 
documentation of their weekend family meals that include traditional Persian items 
cooked by family members. These become in a way a stamp of approval for one’s 
authentic Persian self. Additionally, by pointing out culinary traditions, members further 
distinct themselves from other members of the Jewish community in Israel. For example, 
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members of the community upload videos during the Passover holiday of family 
members singing the song Dayenu (literally means: it would have been enough for us). 
This thousand years old Hebrew song, traditionally sang during Passover reading of the 
Hagada, expresses the gratefulness of the Jewish people to God for freeing them out of 
slavery in Egypt, and giving them the Torah and the Shabbat. The unique Persian 
tradition includes the act of playfully whipping one another with green onions during the 
song’s chorus in remembrance of the Jewish people beaten by whips as slaves in 
Pharaoh’s Egypt. Such esoteric tradition becomes a central theme when discussing the 
unique habits of this community, pointing out the unique food-related Persian habits not 
held by other sub-Jewish Edot (ethnicities).  
Yet, food holds a much greater role than just symbolizing ethnicity for the 
community members. Through discussions about cooking Persian cuisine, members of 
the Persian community signal their unique feature and the separation of Jewish Persians 
from other Persians. The use of Farsi revealed how members of the community present 
their ethnic heritage to separate themselves from other ethnicities in the Israeli society 
and include themselves in the Persian/Iranian one. The use of food, in contrast, allows 
community members to signal the uniqueness of the Jewish community within the 
Persian ethnicity worldwide. Again, we see how members distinct themselves through 
their Persian identity, creating estrangement within a community they also work hard to 
include themselves in.  
In the context of Persian cuisine, many members talk about Gondi dumplings, a 
specialty dish served on Shabbat dinner in Jewish-Persian families’ homes. They upload 
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photos of it, create memes related to it, and share jokes illuminating the importance of 
this small symbol to the community. Some have even went as far as replacing the 
symbolic sun and lion of the pre-revolutionary Iranian flag with a photo of a Gondi 
dumpling (Figure 5). The flag became integral component in offline meetings, where 
community members proudly flagged it. The flag, that was first introduced online, found 
its way offline, and then back online through photos and videos of community gathering 
posted by members of the Facebook group. The example of the Gondi dumpling, but 
other dishes, baked goods, and holiday cuisine, allow members of the Persian 
community to become a distinct community both in Israel, Iran, and in the larger Persian 
diaspora around the world.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5, Gondi dumpling Iranian flag, reprint from It means you are 
Persian Facebook group, 2016 
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Culinary, family customs, religious traditions, music, movies, the calendar, and 
language, all become cultural forms of both the past and the present, cultural pieces and 
memories that allow members of the community to re-build their post-migration image. 
Against negative narratives of migration and assimilation in Israel, members of the 
Persian community use social media to create a shared sense of belonging. The sphere 
they create together becomes a home, allowing them to relocate their culture from the 
privacy of the home, from the living room and the kitchen, to the public eye. Granted, 
this “public eye” is neither mainstream Israeli media, nor a mainstream discussion of 
ethnicity in the Israeli society. Yet, it is a sphere that in comparison to the past is integral 
to community members’ day-to-day lives, and allows the community to become visible 
to its members on a daily basis.  
Both scholarly literature on the subject and participants in this study agree that 
ethnic identification in the Israeli society was a matter of liminal time and space, on 
weekends gathering and events, distinct from daily routines. Otherwise, this identity was 
not acknowledged outside of the privacy of home. I argue that by using Facebook, by 
sharing songs, and by discussing memories and the Farsi language, members of the 
Persian community in Israel made ethnicity an every-day practice and perspective. 
“Before these digital times, most of the ethnic identification was kept inside the privacy 
of the home,” argues Ronen, the administrator of the language group. According to him, 
ethnicity was manifested by using the Farsi language with parents, listening to Persian 
music, practicing Jewish religious rituals with a Persian flavor in the synagogue, but it 
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was all in the privacy of the members’ homes, only with their immediate family. Ronen 
adds to that:  
The rare times in which we took our Persian identity out to the public were 
in holidays or special days, out of the regular routine of our regular lives. I 
think it would be accurate to say, and that others will agree with me, that 
with Facebook, social media, YouTube, and all of those platforms we 
made it [the Persian identity] a day-to-day thing, something we talk about 
and practice regularly rather than just in the synagogue, just with our 
parents in their home, or just on special occasions.    
With the embeddedness of online media in our day-to-day lives, the ethnic 
identification became a matter of routine rather than liminality, bringing the Persian 
identity back into the lives of the community members. In the Israeli context, with the 
Israeli melting pot in mind, these findings beg further consideration of the ways in which 
such acts question Israeli ethnic hierarchies and social structures. 
 
Pushing Back Against a Cultural Melting Pot; Reaffirming Ethnic Hierarchies  
 
As reviewed earlier in this dissertation, the “melting pot” was a prominent declared 
purpose of the Zionist leadership in Israel as large immigration waves arrived in the 
1950s (Ya’ar, 2005). In this context, different theories ask to question the melting pot 
metaphor, and replace it with references to the different ingredients making the “pot,” 
that is, the different ethnic groups gathered under a national state. The melting pot 
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approach focuses on dominant narratives that exemplify the preferred national identity in 
different contexts. Multicultural theories, in contrast, criticize “cultural harmony that 
attempt to forge equality and national unity out of diversity” (Gabriel, 2005, n.d.), 
emphasizing the problematic aspects of flattening social differences and varied cultural 
backgrounds into an alleged one coherent cultural standard (i.e. national identity). Thus, 
terms such as “salad bowl” and “cultural mosaic” are used in order to stress social and 
cultural tolerance and diversity. These theories, while prominent even today, date back 
to the 1960s and are extremely relevant to any study focused on immigrants’ societies 
(Smokowski & Bacallao, 2011). Albite existing criticism, tensions between social 
structures and particular ethnic forms keep on characterizing social experiences of 
minority groups even today. Marginalization and misrepresentation are still central 
themes in many cultural debates acknowledging racial, ethnic, and national clashes in 
contemporary western societies. In the context of this dissertation, it was found that 
many of the participants still experience the outcomes of the Israeli melting pot agenda, 
and work to overcome the cultural and ethnic amnesia fostered by it. 
So far, in this chapter, I have highlighted the tensions between the Israeli 
“melting pot” and the wish for an ethnic identification as they are reflected in 
participants’ experiences of being Persian in Israel. I now turn to discuss the tension 
between pushing back against the cultural melting pot and perpetuation of discriminatory 
social structures within the Israeli society. Based on participant’s stories, I address 
online environments as spaces for facilitation of discourse that challenges the Israeli 
melting pot project vis-à-vis preserves social hierarchies and cultural discrimination.  
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When asked about the motivations for opening the Facebook group, the creator 
of the “It means you are Persian” points out a larger inclination of ethnic identification 
online. “A trend of ‘it means you are…’ groups just started on Facebook a few years 
ago, and everyone in Israel had a group – you know you are 
Russian/Yemenite/Moroccan/Ethiopian and so on. But we [him and a friend who opened 
the group together] noticed that there is no group for Persians, so we decided to open 
one.” The creator of the group is an 18 years old high school pupil, a son of two Iranian 
immigrants. He opened the group when he was 15, pointing at a larger cultural moment 
(as he argues) in the Israeli society, in which online media, in contrast to older 
generations of offline mainstream Israeli media, allow users to formulate and present 
cultural and ethnic images of themselves, rather than only consuming them. This is not 
to say that niche media catering to minority groups in Israel did not exist. Nevertheless, 
we still see a movement towards a self-proclaimed and self-circulated identification that 
is built by community members in much more “easy to use” platforms. Thus, a discourse 
that was mostly open to media professionals, politicians, and media companies, is now 
much more accessible to the individual user and minority groups. As I showed above, 
circulating self-constructed images, as well as comment on mainstream media texts, 
extend the ability of the different ethnic Israeli groups to gain a sense of belonging. 
Moreover, I argue that these spheres and self-built images also enable users to push back 
against ethnic oppressions. 
 In this context, Orly, a member of the “It means you are Persian” Facebook 
group elaborates on the issue in a blog post (Noy, 2013): 
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The impressive and constant growth of the group’s [It means you are 
Persian] members and the truly astronomical number of posts they 
publish, speak of an entire generation’s need for that safe environment. 
After years of feeling uncomfortable when our friends laughed at the sight 
of cucumbers in the fruit-bowls on our living room tables, we can proudly 
upload gorgeous pictures of those bowls and take pride in them, for they 
hold pieces of our identity. We need that safe place where we don’t need 
to hide being “Farsi-Miduni,” but rather where we can be happy and 
excited to share that with friends who, like us, know how to express anger, 
happiness, excitement, disappointment, humor, appreciation and 
friendship in Farsi, creating a brotherhood that only immigrants and their 
children can comprehend. The group does not define itself as a protest 
group, and I think that most of the members do not see it as such. Yet, it is 
hard to ignore the truly subversive dimension it gains from the essence of 
its role in opposing cultural whitewashing: the Iranian element of these 
young people’s identity is not superfluous, but rather is well known, loved 
and integral, gaining its legitimacy to the chagrin of the destructive 
hegemony and its belligerent attempts to erase, mock and ridicule. 
 The attempts to push back against cultural oppression, pointed out in the 
quoted blog post, are expressed in variety of ways, related to all cultural forms 
mentioned above – food, music, language, and so on. In most of these attempts, 
members use the online sphere to call out cultural appropriations by the 
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Ashkenazi group, and resent years of oppression. According to this blogger, these 
are not necessarily conscious acts of protest, but they certainly serve a similar 
purpose -- pushing back against the Israeli cultural and ethnic homogenizing 
project.  
As part of this attempt, a journalistic piece featured in Ynet, the website of the 
newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, one of the most widely circulated daily newspapers 
published in Israel, was posted in the group. This piece presented four Persian recipes 
for the readers to try. Group members point out that the author of the piece (a prestigious 
Israeli chef, Erez Komarovsky) is Ashkenazi and not a “real” Persian, fearing that within 
a few decades “Polish women” will announce it is a Polish dish. The reference to Polish 
women is a Synecdoche, the use of one sub-group of European background to point out 
the cultural appropriation performed by the larger Ashkenazi group. This case, however, 
is interesting as it reflects a cultural anxiety of a different kind. If thus far participants 
shared the hardship of discarding their ethnic identity, here an additional fear surfaces 
Participants resent both the cultural flattening of their own identities and cultural 
appropriation diluting their traditions. Thus, the alleged inclusion of the Persian culture 
in mainstream media is perceived by the community as appropriation rather than as a 
sensitive multicultural acknowledgment of the culture.   
Another post originally published in Yedioth Ahronoth and shared by group 
members, deals with the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy. The article covers the issue of 
economic inequality in Israel; stating “Mizrahim still make lower income.” A group 
member follows this article with a question: “So, do you think it is better to be born 
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Ashkenazi?” Group members acknowledged and complained about the stated inequality, 
yet many of them stated “there is nothing to be jealous about, be proud of who you are,” 
“we have thousands of years of culture, they [the Ashkenazim] have nothing,” and “the 
Persians make more money than the Askenazim.” In this example, group members 
profess an opposition to the established hierarchical structure of the Israeli society. They 
try to represent themselves in a positive way and to negotiate this Israeli ethnic 
hierarchy. That is, the image of the Mizrahi group presented in the journalistic article is 
re-articulated by group members, to formulate a more positive image of the Persian 
community, which they conceive as part of the larger Mizrahi group in Israel.  
In their comments following the post, group members identify themselves as 
Mizrahi. Through this identification, the Persian community creates a sense of belonging 
within the Israeli Mizrahi group, but at the same time further creates a sense of 
estrangement from the larger Israeli society. On the one hand, this identification creates 
solidarity with a larger disadvantaged group, pushing against years of oppression. 
Members of the Persian community view themselves as a part of a larger community, 
forming a sense of belonging. On the other hand, by utilizing an us-versus-them rhetoric, 
the discussion accentuates the existing social clash or dichotomy. Going back to the 
movement between belonging and estrangement mentioned earlier in the chapter, these 
two examples clearly mark an act of criticism that simultaneously positions the Persian 
community within the Mizrahi group, but at the same time also positions them as 
antagonists to hegemonic groups in Israel. 
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Community members’ criticism of cultural oppression enacted by European-
originated groups and subversive identification as ethnic minorities in Israel can be 
considered as a postcolonial apparatus. Members are using online media to negate the 
image formulated for them by hegemonic groups, re-constructing a sense of identity that 
was previously rejected by them in light of a cultural colonizing practices of the Israeli 
melting pot. They are now re-living a cultural past that was pushed outside of their day-
to-day lives in favor of an alleged harmony between all Jewish-Israeli members in Israel. 
Thus, they construct a notional space that allows them to build a sense of belonging 
while re-constructing an identity pushed aside by mainstream discourse.  
Yet, these media texts and this identity are not produced or consumed in a void. 
The Israeli context–that is, the hegemonic structures, assimilating society, and cultural 
colonization–did not only create a fertile ground for the Persian community members to 
subvert. This context also provides them with other oppressive cultural structures 
directed at other minority groups in Israel to consider. Thus, members of the Facebook 
groups simultaneously re-articulate their place in the Israeli society through positive 
representations of themselves, but at the same time perpetuate the oppression of other 
minority groups in Israel. Members of the Persian community position themselves as a 
part of the Mizrahi group, criticizing oppressive cultural and economic structures within 
the Israeli society, while concurrently re-creating these same structures, negatively 
positioning and portraying other groups of Mizrahi Jews.  
This oppressive practice is specifically expressed towards Jewish Yemenites. 
Other ethnic and cultural groups are also criticized (Romanian, Moroccan, and Russians 
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for example), but the most consistent and direct “onslaught” is expressed in the group is 
towards Jewish Yemenites, another migrating community living in Israel. In the groups’ 
posts, videos, memes, photos, and discussions, Yemenites are constantly ridiculed, 
presented in extremely negative manner, becoming a running joke in group discussions. 
They are depicted as schnorrers, cheap in their way of living, a group with low or no 
education, unclean people that do not belong within the Israeli society. In one of the 
posts, a group member asks the rest of the group: “Do you know what the Persians’ 
favorite food is? – Watermelon. It can be food, a drink… even a bowl and a helmet” 
ridiculing the long-standing Israeli stigma of the Persian “economic” way of thinking. 
This post was followed by comments that criticize the writer, and address this quality to 
the Yemeni group. “This is funny, but it is actually the Yemenites favorite food, not 
ours” or “why do you mention the Yemenites, it makes me sick” were just two of the 
references that depict the negative features the group members attribute to another ethnic 
group in Israel.  
Other posts present the same attitudes towards Yemenites. When discussing the 
richness of the Persian kitchen and cuisine, members contrast the Yemeni way of 
cooking with it – “there is nothing but flour and water.” Many other videos related to 
unfortunate accidents (home videos that become viral for example) are instantly 
associated with Yemenites, ridiculing their inability to perform basic acts such as 
showering, riding a bicycle, walking, and so on. Examples of unclean, uneducated, 
backward, unhealthy, subnormal, or plain weird situations are framed as related to that 
group. More than anything else, through depictions of Yemenites, members of the 
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Persian community confront the stereotype of stinginess highly associated with the 
Persian group in Israel.  
By shedding the stereotype of being cheap and consistently transferring it to 
another ethnic group within the Israeli society, members of the community create a 
space in which they are not stigmatized and where the negative association related to this 
undesirable social quality is not identified with them. However, by creating this positive 
space for themselves, group members perpetuate the exact social structures they fight 
against when it comes to their own image. Group members produce a narrative that at 
the same time confronts and criticizes the Israeli melting pot and ethnic oppression, but 
also recreate the exact same oppression towards the Yemenite group.   
This finding becomes even more important when situated within the context of 
the early years of the institutionalized Israeli melting pot. In previous research, I have 
found that Israeli newspapers, backed by hegemonic political-cultural power, utilized the 
image of the Jewish Yemenites immigrants to signal undesirable social and cultural traits 
within the Israeli society (Yadlin-Segal and Meyers, 2015). Through negative depiction 
and constant comparison to the Palestinian ‘other,’ 1950s Israeli media represented the 
Yemenite Jew as the ultimate ‘other,’ farthest from the Sabar in terms of religion, 
character, and abilities. Thus, the Yemenite that was portrayed as the symbol of the 
immigrating other has maintained its status even in media spheres that are not produced 
by mainstream hegemonic groups in the Israeli society. This shows that the oppressive 
Israeli context, even if acknowledged and criticized, has deeper influence on the social 
perception of minority ethnic groups themselves. When situating the subversive 
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dimensions of the self-identified Persian community within the larger context of ethnic 
oppression in Israel, we can see that this group utilize similar tools and similar rhetoric 
to the one used by hegemonic groups.    
 Online, members of the Persian community share positive representations of their 
ethnicity. They work to create a sense of belonging and a space they can call a home 
through sharing and negotiating existing culture in Israel and Iran. However, these 
discussions and positive depictions are sometimes juxtaposed against, and even at the 
expense of, other ethnic groups in Israel. Hence, online spheres are only liberating to 
some extent. Group members were able to share positive representation of the Persian 
culture and identity, creating favorable self-identification. At the same time, they have 
preserved the acceptable ethnic understanding of inferiority regarding other ethnic 
groups within the Israeli society. 
 
Concluding Remarks: Online Environments and Lived Ethnicity 
 
In this chapter, I have focused on the ethnic facet of the Persian identity in Israel. I have 
showed that members of the community find online environments as a liberating sphere, 
allowing them to negate and negotiate ethnic colonization and social hierarchies 
established in the Israeli society. This process of negotiation is formed through different 
layers of identifications, where members both include and exclude themselves in and 
from four different circles: the national Jewish community in Israel, the religious Jewish 
community in Israel, the Mizrahi ethnic metagroup in Israel, and the global Persian 
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community In Iran and in diaspora, that included Jewish-Iranian global diaspora within 
it. All of these are addressed through the ethnic perspective, that is, through 
consideration of the ethnic identity marker as the primary identification factor. It seems 
that by acknowledging each of these social categories, members of the Persian 
community create a complex sphere, forming a much-needed inclusion at times, and at 
times missing that aim.  
The ethnic identity formulated through this process is context related, and is in 
constant change. It is constructed against and within cultural shifts, embedded in 
processes that cross space and times, articulated in relations to a specific Israeli setting 
that might not be relevant to other members of the Persian community globally, or even 
to Jewish Persians elsewhere (Los Angeles for example). In the national context, 
community members create a discourse that pushes back against historical ethnic 
oppressions backed by the Zionist movement in Israel. Members formulate positive 
identification as ethnically Persian by sharing the community’s collective memory and 
unique culture, creating and circulating hybrid Persian media texts, to re-build their 
identity and sense of belonging via online environments. Here participants move 
between the wish to push back against the Israeli ethnic melting pot and the wish to form 
a sense of belonging. Thus, by emphasizing the belonging to an ethnic group, members 
further accentuate their estrangement within the hegemonic national community and 
culture in Israel.  
This point is important for understanding the changing nature of the Zionist 
grand narratives of migration, and is re-visited in the next chapter. However, probing 
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identity formation between ethnicity and nationality is not unique to my study. As Hall 
(1987) points out, these two sources of identification (nationality and ethnicity) stand in 
somewhat of a conflict. Hall argues: “some people now… begin to reach for a new 
conception of ethnicity as a kind of counter to the old discourses of nationalism or 
national identity” (pp. 45-46). We see in this chapter that indeed, in light of cultural 
hegemonic oppression, these are articulated as conflicting ends of the Persian 
community’s cultural belonging. However, as I dig deeper into this conflict in the next 
chapter, I argue that just positioning the two as conflicting is not thorough enough when 
discussing the complexity of forming either ethnic or national identity within the Israeli 
society. Through discussions of essentialism and constructivism, of homelands and 
migration, and of places and spaces, I extend the conversation between ethnicity and 
nationality in the following chapter. 
In the religious context, community members stress their Persian uniqueness 
through presenting Jewish-religious practices distinct to the Persian ethnicity. Again, 
building internal cohesion while estranging themselves, to some extent, from the rest of 
the Jewish society. Contrary to this, when community members discuss the larger 
Persian community worldwide, they seem to stress their Jewish identity characteristics, 
underlining their unique place within the global Persian society. This demonstrates a 
mix-and-match form of identification that is context and place related, enabled by online 
environments. Members highlight a favorable identification in different situation to 
highlight the community’s unique features, while also creating sense of belonging in 
other groups (national, religious, and global). 
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Online, users are able to simultaneously draw on multiple sources of 
identification to construct their identity and community (Rheingold, 1993). As Graham 
(2004) describes this process in the Jewish European context, users “pick’n’mix” 
religious practices that fit with their personal and communal definitions of Judaism to 
make sense of their identity and community. The ability to pick’n’mix pieces of online 
and offline religious materials stem from an overall postmodern mix and match 
tendencies (Masso & Abrams, 2015). In the Persian context, we see how users mix-and-
match traditions, identity markers, media texts, and community affiliations to create a 
sense of belonging post-migration. These affiliations, according to Rheingold (1993), 
might be loose and ephemeral at times, but also meaningful in becoming a community. 
This process becomes even more important in light of Brasher’s (2001) argument, 
suggesting that online identity and community construction can make “a unique 
contribution to global fellowship… lessening potential interreligious hatred” (p. 6) and 
hopefully also ethnic tensions within the Israeli community as well as diplomatic 
tensions between Iran and Israel.   
The practice of mixing and matching becomes even more evident in the Israeli 
ethnic setting. In the context of the Mizrahi group, the Persian Israeli community 
practices a dual act. On the one hand, pushing against cultural whitewashing, members 
include themselves within the Mizrahi group, preforming solidarity with other migrants 
from Muslim countries against the Ashkenazi cultural hegemony. On the other hand, 
members of the community perpetuate hegemonic structures when discussing the image 
of the Jewish Yemenite community, using it as a scapegoat on which they throw the 
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stigmatic stereotypes associated with the Persian community in Israel. This, as argued, is 
consistent with dominant Zionist practices of cultural oppression established over 70 
years ago. In this case, we see again the movement between belonging and 
estrangement, somewhat in, somewhat out of the Mizrahi group.  
Based on these findings, I offer conclusions that relate to two main fields. First, I 
contextualize these findings within the framework of new media studies. Here I show 
how the Persian case reminds us of the need to study internet usage against a concrete 
social setting to fully understand the factors shaping identities, communities, and 
cultures negotiated and constructed online. Second, I discuss conclusions that contribute 
to the field of ethnic identity studies, particularly in the Israeli context. Drawing on 
media and religion studies, I attempt at defining the term ‘lived ethnicity’ as an 
identification process enabled by online media. 
 Going back to the quote opening this chapter, I focus on the contextualized and 
localized usage of online media. According to Miller and Slater (2000), “the internet is 
not a monolithic or placeless ‘cyberspace’; rather, it is numerous new technologies, used 
by diverse people, in diverse real-world locations” (p. 1). Based on this notion, they 
suggest that scholars should address internet-based media as continuous and embedded 
within other social spaces and relations. Thus, when “members of a specific culture 
attempt to make themselves a(t) home in a transforming communicative environment” 
(p. 1), they are not working within a self-enclosed apartness. Online media users might 
actively change and address their sense of belonging and their perceived identity, yet 
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they do this in relation to a specific locality characterized by specific social and cultural 
trends and structures.  
 In contrast, Castells (1996/2000) argues that the networking logic of internet-
based media “induces a social determination of a higher level than that of the specific 
social interest expressed through the networks: the power of flows takes precedence over 
the flow of power” (p. 500). Referring to the infrastructure of the internet, Castells 
prioritizes the global over the local, the structure of the net over the structure of social 
contexts. While online media and spaces do allow members of the Persian community in 
Israel to draw on global networks of information and content, much of their 
identification is, as I argue above, context and place related. Members of the Persian 
community draw on their ethnic affiliation to build a home and a sense of identity 
online. This finding points at the importance of places within online media consumption.  
While the internet transcends the coupling of time and space as it connects 
geographically non-contiguous spaces and places, the use of online media is still be 
grounded in local context, as place-based settings still play an important role in online 
media production and consumption. Scholars focusing on identity formation online 
should acknowledge the geographically transcending nature of both the net itself and the 
content share on it, but still highlight the local characteristics that inform these identity 
formation processes, as these are not ahistorical or untouched by local circumstances. 
While the Persian identity formulated in Israel is not unique in this case, it does add 
another example of the need for a contextualized online media analysis.     
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 Another central conclusion emerging from the findings relates to the nature of 
ethnic identity in online culture. Participants shared in interviews and online that their 
ethnic identity became a central issue in their lives after joining the Facebook groups. 
They have moved it from the privacy of their homes to the open sphere of the internet, as 
well as from the liminality of holidays and cultural occasions to the routine of day-to-
day lives. The language they were hiding, the material memories they brought with 
them, their religious traditions, and ethnic practices are now publicly performed, shared 
routinely with the community. Being Persian in Israel, to some extent, became a 
perspective through which members started creating and interpreting media texts. They 
did not only share text that directly relates to being Persian, but also decoded non-ethnic 
texts using the ethnic perspective. At the same time, these same texts became a source 
for articulating and learning about the Persian identity. Thus, ethnicity both informed 
and was informed by the Persian community’s wish to formulate identity and a sense of 
belonging in a specific national, religious, and global context.  
Similar practices have been conceptualized as “Lived Religion” in the religious 
context. Lived religion is a dual process in which individuals draw on religious sources 
to make sense of their world, and the experience of the sacred in everyday practices 
(Maynard, Moschella Clark & Hummel, 2010; McGuire, 2008; Ammerman, 2006). It is 
the ongoing, semiautonomous, and dynamic relations of religion with everyday life, 
which traditional institutions have very little official hold upon (Orsi, 1997; Hervieu-
Leger, 1997). Campbell (2010) argues that we should address lived religion through 
media usage, as individuals’ religion frames and is framed by media consumption and 
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production. In the same vein, I have shown (Yadlin-Segal, 2015) in the context of 
internet memes creation and circulation, that new media as a whole, and the internet in 
particular, provide their users with content to reformat and transmit utilizing their own 
personal perspective based on their own identity. Through media texts, consumed and 
produced by internet users, individuals both learn about and articulate their identity.  
Focusing on the complex relationship between nationality and ethnicity, Clark 
(2005) shows how material remains and historic documents reflect the “lived” aspects of 
identity construction processes. Through an archaeological investigation of Hispanic 
ethnicity in the Unites States, Clark emphasizes the need to look at practices that might 
come across as mundane and esoteric, such as food and cuisine preparation or trash 
disposal patterns, to understand larger colonizing practices. While Clark’s goal was not 
“to engage in arguments about whether or not subalterns can speak” (p. 449), my goal is 
exactly that. Thus, I borrow Clark’s focus on the “lived” ethnic experience to learn of the 
ways online media play in the creation of “lived ethnicity” for the Persian community, a 
marginalized group in the Israeli context. 
 To do that, I couple the term lived religion with the concept “ethnicity in 
motion.” Moreno (2015) has addressed ethnic identities as changing and context 
dependent, as shifted and negotiated against the background of specific places in specific 
times, leading him to discuss “ethnicity in motion.” Conducting a comparative analysis 
of Jewish-Moroccan ethnic identity formation through offline social networks in Israel 
and Venezuela, Moreno argues:  
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Rather than asking, in a variety of ways, who chose aliyah [in Hebrew, 
migration to Israel] over other sorts of migration, or who maintained 
ethnicity after migration in reaction to political change, a new analytical 
concept [ethnicity in motion] took us into the realms of how, when and 
where those experiences took shape. The question how may enable us to 
trace practices of ethnicity formation among Jews, both migrants and 
potential migrants, who influenced each other throughout the course of 
historical change. The questions when and where may lead to an 
exploration of ethnicity as embedded in unique places and moments. 
Together, the two questions promote a diachronic view of cultural shifts, 
embedded in people’s changing identities over time, as they moved across 
space and time, from one social context to another, throughout their lives 
(p. 307). 
When participants in this study attest that they are not only learning about their 
identity online, but also utilizing this identity to decode media messages, to decide what 
to share online, and to articulate who they are through group discussions, they exemplify 
the lived aspects of this ethnic identity. However, this identity is not only lived because 
it becomes a central locus of interest and interpretation in participants’ lives. It is lived 
because, as Moreno argued, it is shifting, and negotiated, and dependent upon migrating 
to a specific context in a specific time. The process of building a sense of belonging as 
Persians in Israel requires the movement between the local and the global, as well as 
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within different local circles. Thus, the identity receives its essence from the 
circumstances in which it is being formulated.  
Through the process of constructing an ethnic identity, members of the Persian 
community express the influence of time – being able to push back against hegemonic 
constructions established many years ago – yet working within specific cultural 
pressures, ones that drive them to formulate this identity against and within existing 
social orders. That is why the Yemenite community in Israel, for example, becomes 
relevant to the process of construction. In the same vein, this is why an Israeli Oscar 
winning Farsi-speaking movie that depicts a Persian family’s life in Israel receives a 
large echo by members online. This lived ethnic identity, which originated in the 
physical movement of the migrating community, keeps on changing and evolving, 
feeding and being fed by users online. Looking at practices of “lived ethnicity” within 
different minority groups can allow us a comparative perspective, discussing similarities 
and differences within specific societies in different times, or between different societies 
at the same time. 
The two main conclusions I suggest are focused on identity and online media 
usage as contextualized phenomena that must be studied and situated against social 
structures and cultural understanding. This, in turn, might shed light not only on the 
specific use and on the specific studied identity, but also on the unique situation that 
enables them. The context I am focused on to develop this analysis is national. However, 
investigating religious, economic, gendered, generational, and other identity markers 
might benefit the understanding of lived ethnicities formulated via online environments.  
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CHAPTER V 
NARRATIVES OF NATIONALITY AND PATRIOTISM: CONSTRUCTING A 
CULTURAL IDENTITY, BUILDING A DUAL HOMELAND 
 
“But almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of 
striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or “sub-oppressors.” The 
very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the 
concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but 
for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This 
phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their 
existential experience, adopt an attitude of “adhesion” to the oppressor. Under these 
circumstances they cannot “consider” him sufficiently clearly to objectivize him — to 
discover him “outside” themselves. This does not necessarily mean that the oppressed 
are unaware that they are downtrodden. But their perception of themselves as oppressed 
is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression” (Freire, 1970/2000, p. 45). 
 
The previous chapter of this dissertation focused on contextualizing the Persian 
identity in the Israeli context. I have discussed the ways in which members of the 
Persian community construct their ethnic identity and sense of belonging, re-creating a 
home that was somewhat lost in the process of migration to and assimilation in Israel. In 
this chapter, I move to study how this sense of home is articulated within the national 
context, adding the sense of a homeland to the familial sense of a home. Here I focus on 
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the construction of a Jewish national identity by members of the Persian community as it 
relates to the Persian ethnic identity. To do so, I highlight the complex relationship 
between nationality and ethnicity, showing that while members of the Persian 
community work to formulate a space that includes and respects their ethnic 
identification, they also include some mainstream notions of Jewish nationality in it. I 
endeavor to theorize this coupling of conflicting narratives (i.e. resistance and 
embracement) through coining the term “affirmative opposition,” describing how 
members of the Persian community reaffirm existing social structures within the Israeli 
society through acts of opposition.  
This line of thought follows extensive academic work on the relationship 
between ethnicity, nationality, and culture. I argue that while it is often seemed, 
specifically in the Israeli case, that dominant national voices oppress ethnic 
identification, ethnic identification can, but does not have to, work against these 
oppressions. As Braman (2006/2009) points out, “Though the nation has long been 
bureaucratized by the state, the political power of national cultural identity became a 
locus of political agitation… national identity today continues to provide a powerful and 
effective organizational lure that… has widely replaced class identity (p.32).” I use the 
case of the Persian community in Israel to understand how ethnic minorities negotiate 
and address this national lure, building a cultural space that integrates the ethnic and the 
national.  
 The chapter opens with a discussion of the current diplomatic relations between 
Israel and Iran as members of the Persian community in Israel experience them. I then 
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turn to discuss the ways in which community members build their belonging to Iran and 
Israel, drawing on essentialist and constructivist approaches to the study of nationality. 
Following this, I discuss the importance of online media for virtually visiting Iran, a 
central component helping community members to identify as Iranians. The next section 
of the chapter analyzes the articulation of the Persian place in the Israeli civil religion by 
focusing on Holocaust commemoration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
online media as a third space that facilitates affirmative opposition. 
 
A Dual Homeland between Iran and Israel 
 
In the previous chapter, I have shown how participants re-create a sense of community 
and belonging through Persian-centered online media. By discussing their background, 
shared experiences, nostalgia, and sense of longing, members of the Persian community 
in Israel are able to re-connect to identity markers that were relatively oppressed for 
many years. I have shown how a post-migration community gains a sense of home away 
from home, in the midst of a diplomatic crisis between their homeland and host land.  
Moving the discussion to the national layer of identification, I highlight in the following 
sections members’ understanding of their place within and between what they address as 
two homelands. That is, through analysis of interviews, observations, and posts shared 
online, I show that participants question the Zionist narrative of Israel being the only 
homeland of worldwide Jewry, placing themselves as part of two national groups.  
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Migration and Israel Iran Relations 
 
To engage the process of constructing a dual belonging to Iran and Israel, we first need 
to understand the current diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel as participants in 
this study describe them. This topic came up often when I asked about the use of 
different online media to maintain communication with family members and friends still 
living in Iran. Anna, the administrator of one of the Facebook groups explains: “We 
communicate according to people’s different degree of fear using Viber, Facebook, cell 
phone, each in his own way. We also communicate by land-line phone and email, again, 
if you are not afraid to use it.” Anna stresses that on both sides – Israel and Iran – there 
is a fear to expose communication with family and friends. 
“Most of the media I mentioned are used illegally in Iran,” Anna adds. “Take 
Facebook, for example, it has filters on it in Iran, everything is blocked. They [family 
members and friends] install anti-filters and create online aliases, because they are afraid 
and prefer not to have direct contact with anyone from Israel. But, in terms of 
technology, Iranians are not behind us.” By pointing out the technological abilities of 
citizens in Iran, Anna differentiate between the government that lead a partial religious 
withdrawal from media technologies and internet use, and citizens, who are savvy users 
of internet-based media.  To stress that Anna adds: “They introduced me to mobile 
applications such as Viber and WhatsApp, they taught me how to use Skype, and 
communication is regular and frequent. Yes, we often use codes and hints in case we are 
surveilled, but there is constant communication.” 
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The extensive reliance on media to maintain these connections stems, according 
to participants, from the lack of possibilities to travel between the two states. Participants 
share that up until 5-6 years ago, Iranians were visiting Israel and Israelis were visiting 
Iran. Anna explains the manner in which traveling between the two states worked:  
They [visitors from Iran] would travel through Turkey, and get the visa for 
Israel only once in Turkey. The same worked for the Israeli side. The 
Iranian leadership is not stupid; they know all of these people are not 
really in Turkey. But, it does not really matter if you were actually visiting 
Israel or not. If they want to catch you and punish you, they will do so 
regardless of what really happened. On the Israeli side, visitors would say 
that they are Iranians who want to go on a trip to follow their roots and 
usually the Iranian embassy will be okay with that. Or at least – they used 
to be okay with that. Israelis traveling to Iran actually ran into problems on 
the Israeli side and not on the Iranian side. When they returned to Israel, 
custom security used to interrogate them about their visit, what they did in 
Iran, who they were in touch with, what they brought with them, and so 
on. They would give them real hard time coming back to Israel. Those 
who have nothing to hide can prove it and then there are no problems.  
When arriving to Turkey, Jewish Iranians used to go to the Israeli embassy 
in Turkey, then a representative from the embassy called us [family 
members in Israel] to ask if we know the people who ask to enter Israel – 
since they are Jewish they can enter Israel fairly easily, or at least, they 
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used to. The embassy just wants to make sure that they have family 
relatives in Israel, and once they affirmed that, visitors got a temporary 
travel visa to Israel... I used to get regular calls from the Israeli 
ambassador in Turkey, asking me if I know this or that person who gave 
my name and phone number as a contact person. That was usually my 
uncle, my mother's brother, and I would always say absolutely, he is 
coming to visit. There used to be no problem with these visits.  
This, however, is no longer the case. “Since Ahmadinejad, things have changed a 
lot,” Anna shares. “This line [of traveling between Iran and Israel] was completely shut 
down, and there is not actual physical visitors’ movement between the two states.” 
Anna’s Iranian family members used to visit Israel every summer, but that has changed 
since the Ahmadinejad era. “Now we are all afraid. The last time I met my family from 
Iran we all had to travel to Turkey because they were afraid to enter Israel, and we just 
cannot enter Iran. It used to be an open line of transit even after the revolution, now 
everyone is too afraid and we do not travel between the states.”  
Anna’s understanding of the diplomatic relations is not surprising. It is well 
known and established that the current diplomatic Israel-Iran relations are heated. The 
conflict between the states emerged after the Iranian revolution of 1979. Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, made anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism 
central to Iran’s Islamic ideology (Litvak, 2006). The possible nuclear abilities Iran 
holds, as well as the close political and military ties with Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and 
Hamas also intensified this conflict (Hendel, 2012). Iran’s sixth president, Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad, added Holocaust denial as another aspect of this conflict (Ahouie, 2009). 
The memory of the Holocaust became a central interpretive framework of contemporary 
relations between Iran and Israel.  
On the Iranian side, Ahmadinejad linked what he viewed as the memory of the 
“alleged” Holocaust with a call for Israel’s citizens to relocate to Europe, strongly 
connecting the building of the Israeli state with the occurrence of the Holocaust. On the 
Israeli side, Prime Minister Netanyahu utilized a narrative that equates Iran with Nazi 
Germany in multiple situations. I have showed in another study (Yadlin-Segal, 
forthcoming) that the Holocaust is constantly used in Israel as a cultural and political 
point of reference to post-revolutionary Iran in popular culture. Other writers looking at 
Israeli news sources also pointed out the use of such references (Ben-Zaken, 2013). 
These social narratives of a conflict and the inability to physically visit Iran, lead 
members of the Persian community to use other means for establishing their connection 
and belonging to the Iranian community, while maintaining a sense of belonging in the 
Israeli society.  
Participants have shared a sense of duality in term of belonging while conversing 
about their national identification. In online discussions and interviews, they signal the 
dual belonging to two national communities – the Jewish Israeli one and the Iranian one. 
The interesting aspect is that these two national groups are, to some extent, imagined and 
idealized rather than concrete. By means of invention, members construct several 
narratives that allow a dual belonging to two conflicting societies, both not completely 
faithful to the dominant narratives of either society. On the Iranian side, members 
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reminisce and construct a sense of a homeland that draws heavily on pre-revolutionary 
notions of national identity. These relate to the Pahlavi monarchy and members’ own 
personal life pre-migration. The strong emphasis on ethnic identity markers, as shown in 
the prior chapter, complements this idea. However, as part of this national identification 
members also remember persecution and hatred towards the Jewish community in Iran. 
On the Israeli side, members continue to push back against dominant narratives of 
national belongings, but at times also utilize these same narratives to imagine an ideal 
and desirable position of the Persian community in the Israeli society. 
 
Building a Homeland through National Belonging 
 
The imagined belonging presented above couples Iran and Israel as the homelands of the 
Persian community in Israel. Most participants do not challenge the notion of being 
Israelis or belonging to the Jewish national community. Rather, they creatively find 
ways to acknowledge this belonging while also building a strong connection to Iran. 
Shelly points at this narrative in an interview, explaining why Persian Facebook groups 
became attractive for members of the community: “We become one family, and realize 
that most of us grew up, laughed, cried, and got educated at the same home–only the 
address was different. Thirsty for more and more posts, we sit in front of a computer 
screen day and night and reminisce, sharing beloved songs, photos, and experiences… 
fantasizing about Terminal 3 Flight 007, all wearing white T-shirts holding a double-
sided flag–Iran-Israel –waiting for our trip to our ancestral homeland.” 
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When writing about this topic in one of the Facebook groups, Shelly received 
warm reactions from other members. “In my dreams, we are all in the airport, wearing a 
T-shirt with the logo “It means you are Persian.” Our large group is in terminal no. 3, 
waiting for the next flight to Teheran. The speaker goes off, an announcement is heard: 
‘flight 222 to Teheran is now boarding, passengers are welcome to arrive to the gate.’” 
The excitement of even thinking about traveling to Iran is big. Members share their 
longing to their homeland, even though some of them were in fact born in Israel.  
A member commented on Shelly’s post: “This post perfectly captures our 
feelings and longing to our past and all that we have unwillingly left behind. And to 
think that out of all places, only the gates of Iran are closed for us is so disheartening… 
Here is for hoping that one day these gates will open up, and we will be able to be there 
once again.” In posts like this one, members highlight the unique case of the Persian 
community, a group of migrants that is unable to even visit Iran. “This is a great idea” 
points out one of the other members, “but just so you’ll know, I arrived at Israel over 30 
years ago for a two-week vacation, and until today I cannot go back. But please, sign me 
in, and put me at the top of the list.” This member also mentioned that she came to visit 
Israel after the revolution, leaving many friends behind with no chance to say goodbye. 
“I watch videos on YouTube to somehow go back to Iran’s beautiful views and gorgeous 
cities... dreaming that a day would come and I can visit and complete a full circle… I 
still hold on to the flight ticket back.”  
June, an active member of the two studied Facebook groups, shared a similar 
story in one of our conversations: 
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I arrived at Israel in the summer of 1980 to visit my family. It was right 
after the revolution, we planned to stay for a month and go back home. 
However, while I was in Israel, the Iran-Iraq war started, and my parents 
were not able to bring me back to Iran. 
June stayed in Israel, with the one suitcase of clothing she brought with her for a month, 
and never visited Iran ever since. Going back to Iran, according to her, was not an 
option. With no intentions to migrate, she found herself living out of her homeland for 
over 35 years now. 
The rest of my brothers and sisters joined us [her and her father] in Israel 
eventually, but during the time I was in Israel and could not go back to 
Iran, my mother passed away, and I never got to see her again. We could 
not immigrate to Israel easily back then. After the revolution, the 
authorities in Iran did not want us to leave, and we could not justify selling 
all of our possessions and property in any other way, so it was 
complicated. We were wealthy, and my father had a hard time just giving 
it all up and moving away with nothing. So actually, for me, staying in 
Israel, or migrating to Israel, was never a choice. I still have my passport 
ready for when I can go back, even if just for a visit. 
A short period after realizing she could not go back home, June started 
acclimating in Israel. She received support from different Jewish agencies in Israel, 
alongside some help from family members already living in Israel. Yet, through her 
interviews for this research, and in many of her Facebook posts, June expresses the 
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difficulties of missing home and building a new one in Israel. In this context, 
participants share the feeling of being in a state of limbo. Such portrayals highlight 
migration to Israel as a lack of choice (running away from Iran due to fear of anti-
Semitism or due to the revolution) rather than an ideological choice. These posts 
exemplify how migrants negate the mainstream Zionist narrative of the Jewish 
homeland. While living in Israel, members of the Persian community share their 
personal experience of formulating a dual belonging. For some of them, this belonging 
was not chosen, but rather forced. For others, migrating to Israel was an ideological 
journey, yet the Iranian identification remained central. 
Nowadays, June sees herself first and foremost as an Israeli. Her emotional 
connection to Iran as her homeland does not overshadow her national belonging to 
Israel. Similarly, other members of the Persian community felt a need to protect their 
ethnic identity, as a reaction to cultural oppression. On the national level of 
identification, we find a different approach. Members work to create a space in which 
they can be both Jewish-Israelis and Iranian-Persians. Living in Israel, and being unable 
to visit Iran, the use of online media to maintain communication and connection 
becomes necessary. 
 
Online Journeys to Iran and Back 
 
Visiting the homeland, that is, traveling to Iran, becomes a virtual endeavor for the 
members of the Persian community. Helland (2007) points at this process, analyzing 
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online usage of diaspora communities in religious contexts. According to Helland, 
“Within a number of diaspora traditions, the Internet and Web are being used by people 
not just to travel in virtual reality to sacred sites, but also to connect tangibly with their 
sacred homeland (p. 970).” In light of the Jewish narrative deeming Israel as the 
homeland of worldwide Jewry, internet-based media became a religious tool for visiting 
and staying connected with the religious homeland. The Israeli-Persian case becomes 
interesting considering Helland’s argument. In the Persian context, members of the 
Jewish community living in Israel use the internet in similar ways, to visit what they 
view as their homeland. The narrative of Israel being their homeland is coupled with the 
view of Iran as their homeland. While in Israel, the Persian community flips the 
migration narrative of the Jewish people returning to the homeland. To some extent, they 
construct their position as the position of a diaspora community longing to connect with 
a homeland. Members transform from being Jewish diaspora in Iran to being Persian 
diaspora in Israel.   
This is seen through posts and discussions in the Facebook groups. Members 
share videos and photos of different locations in Iran. They combine photos from family 
albums and childhood trips with YouTube videos and images found in other websites, 
Facebook groups, blogs, and the like. The mix of images and videos let members stroll 
down their childhood neighborhoods, high schools, or favorite parks. It brings 
contemporary Iran and past Iran into conversation, allowing members to visit their 
homeland through online platforms. Helland (2007) reminds us of the limitations of this 
virtual traveling. “In many ways, this form of online activity lacks a tangible connection 
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between the avatar, or the virtual traveler, and the real-world site” (p. 968). While this is 
true, the lack of ability to physically visit Iran is a given in the case of the Persian 
community in Israel, and their only way to visit these venues is through online media. 
However, not being physically present in the places documented in shared images and 
videos does not mean that members feel less of an emotional connection. 
June shared this sense of connection in one of our interviews as well as in 
multiple Facebook posts. Through one of the Facebook groups she follows, June 
developed an online friendship with a user that currently lives in Iran. While that person 
is not originally from Iran, he currently lives in Teheran. After a long period of 
conversations, June found the courage to ask her online friend to look for her childhood 
home in Teheran and send her photos of it. The friend responded positively and sent 
June photos of her childhood home. “The house looks exactly the same” June shared 
when telling me about this interaction. “More than 30 years after I left, I was suddenly 
washed with nostalgia. I could smell the scent of my home, feel as if I am back there, 
just by looking at the photo.” While the physical visiting is prohibited, the sensual 
memories are very much alive in the bodies of the community members. Other members 
mention specific smells of family dinners, specific noises of their childhood 
neighborhood, the breeze next to the sea, and other physical experiences that can now be 
provoked by online media. 
Anna expands this narrative by imagining a visit to Iran:  
It is a dream to go back to Iran, returning to all of my secret 
childhood spots. I truly miss Iran, certain scenery, the streets I 
 178 
 
grew up in, it is all engraved in who I am. In northern Iran there 
are resorts we used to visit, I would love seeing them again, go to 
the Caspian Sea, back to the spectacular views around it… I am 
sure many of these places have changed, Iran today is not the same 
place, but just thinking about Isfahan, the bazaar in it, where my 
father used to buy bronze antiques, the sounds, the smells, I will be 
on the first plain back to these… This is 70% nostalgia and 30% 
curiosity to see what happened, all the changes Iran went through 
since I left. Yes, the memories and the wish to be in Iran tie to my 
grandmother’s house, to the curiosity about the school I went to. I 
have friends there, family members that stayed in Iran, people I 
really miss and want to see. I know it is not the place I have left, 
but so much of me still exist there.     
The narrative built by users is that visiting Iran, even if not in person, is still 
meaningful for them. The ability to reminisce is one thing, but the ability to visit the places 
members did not see for decades is a profound experience. These sensations are inscribed 
into their sensory memories and the online experience evokes and intensifies them. While 
it is “only” through online spaces that they get to experience a sense of belonging to an 
idealized home, the physical memories come alive through them. Through non-corporal 
journeying, members position Iran as their homeland, in contrast with the mainstream 
Israeli-Zionist narrative of the “true” homeland.  
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Essentialism and Construction in the Persian Identity 
 
Participants build a narrative that positions Iran as their homeland, and their life in 
Israel, to some extent, as a forced waiting period away from it. The sense of “returning” 
to a homeland is somewhat overlooked in these stories, and the anticipation to go back to 
Iran, even if just for a visit, is well declared. At the same time, participants reiterate the 
notion of Israel being their homeland and safe heaven, allowing many of them to escape 
persecution in Iran. I asked about this notion of limbo in interviews, trying to further 
understand how the community works to settle the sense of duality and clash between 
Israel and Iran. “Iran is my homeland. It is where I was born,” says Rani, a radio 
producer and broadcaster, explaining his cultural work within the Persian community. In 
seeking a way to explain the complex flow of culture and people between Israel and 
Iran, Rani first establishes the sense of commitment to both:  
Israel is also a homeland. I see Iran as my mother and Israel as my father. 
Sometimes mom and dad get a divorce, it does not mean that their children 
stop loving them, right? Maybe, the kids can actually make mom and dad 
make-up. What I am trying to say is, just as I have two eyes, a left one and 
a right one, I have two homelands. 
Rani’s experience of belonging and nationality is equated to the functioning of body 
organs. He also explains the belonging to the two nations as the belongings of family 
members to a familial unit. This approach tends towards an essentialist sense of 
nationality, as a force of nature or history, as an inevitability. The belonging to a national 
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community is deemed a biological fact, that is, you are born into a nation, and 
intrinsically belong to it. In the scholarly literature, such primordial approach to 
nationality portrays the rise of national identity as an organic process. The tern ‘nation’ 
finds its origins in the Latin word nasci, which means “to be born” (Heywood, 2000, p. 
251), and therefore advocates of this line of thought argue that national identification is 
mostly derived from past symbols and shared ethnicity. Members of the Persian 
community build their identity and sense of belonging drawing on essentialist reasoning. 
This is done in spaces of contention, between nation states and within each of them, 
where multiple layers of identification are at play. At the same time, it appears that 
members instrumentally use these essentialist-ethnic markers to take part in a highly 
constructivist process. In it, they merge their national identity of origin with identity 
markers of their post-migration national society, creating a dual homeland.   
The matter of being born into a community, or as members view it, a family, is 
only one of those essential approaches. As shown before, some participants deem the 
national identity as growing roots that were cut-off with migration. Other members refer 
to the human body to symbolize the national belonging. A member shared a song by 
Arash Atila, a known Persian Singer, in one of the Facebook groups. The member added 
Hebrew and English translation to the post, so that members who only speak Hebrew, or 
hold a partial commend of Farsi can also understand the lyrics. The song details the 
shared longing for pre-revolutionary Iran – “Iran my homeland. This home is nice but its 
[sic] not my home. This land is beautiful but its [sic] not my land. That girl with blue 
eyes and blond hair is not like my amazing love with black eyes.” Just like Rani’s 
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comparison of the two homelands to two eyes, this member uses the symbol of the eyes 
to explain Iranian nationality as an inherent feature. The blue eyes represent the host 
lands to which many of the Iranian diaspora members immigrated. These eyes are not 
the eyes of who participants view as the “Iranian native,” or the alleged inherent features 
associated with the Middle Eastern Iranian look, as members articulate them. Here I do 
not assume that these essentialist features actually exist, but rather, that members 
articulate their national belonging through essentialist markers such nativity, eye color, 
and the like.  
I found these themes in personal online discussions with members of the 
community as well. By interviewing Joseph, I learned that the sense of Iran being 
a homeland goes beyond the identification of migrants themselves. Joseph is a 
middle-class Jewish-Israeli man in his late 20s, member of multiple Persian and 
Iranian Facebook groups. He is an avid consumer of online Farsi media, and 
always seeks for ways to be more immersed in the culture. “I was born in Israel, 
but my homeland is Iran,” he argues. I am a Persian and an Iranian. This is where 
my family is from and this is where my heart is,” Joseph asserts. Many times, 
Joseph ties his identity to historical narratives, legitimizing his perspective on 
being an Israeli-Iranian Jewish Persian. “The Iranian Shah himself said we are 
family because Esther [discussed earlier in the dissertation] was Jewish and she is 
his ancestral mother. Jewish communities have a very long history in Iran” Joseph 
argues, highlighting the ancestral nature of his identity. 
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In one of our personal online conversations, Joseph shared an image that 
reiterate the theme of the eyes (Figure 6). However, unlike the abovementioned 
use of the eyes as an essential aspect of one’s national identity, Joseph points at 
the place of change and construction within the national community. Joseph has 
never been to Iran. He did not immigrate to Israel, and never held an Iranian 
nationality. Still, he feels as an Iranian based on his ethnic heritage. He is an Israeli 
Jewish person that chooses to prioritize his ethnic belonging and borrowed 
nationality over his physical place of birth. And yet, the two national belongings 
are not conflicting in Joseph’s narrative. Neither do the national and ethnic 
belongings. Joseph, and many members like him, seeks to bring the two nations 
into conversation rather than into a conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a similar way, members use and create hybrid ethnic media texts drawing on 
national text to assert and represent what they see as a dual belonging. The fact the Joseph 
Figure 6, Israeli and Iranian flags, shared by Joseph via Facebook chat, 2015 
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did not immigrate to Israel led me to assume that there is a difference between the ways 
immigrants in the community and non-immigrants approach the duality of the homeland 
belonging. As I show through examples in this chapter and in the following chapter, this 
assumption was in fact disproved. Members of the community, both those born in Israel 
and those born in Iran, work together to create this dual shared homeland.  
Juxtaposing the two national flags as a representation of one’s identity 
and belonging became a central practice in offline group meetings, as well as in 
fixed locations such as the Persian radio stations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7, Taken by author during participant observation, Radio Ran, 
broadcasters Rani Amrani and Shahnaz Tehrani, 2015 
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As shown in the Figure 7 and Figure 8, members of the Farsi radio stations in Israel 
portray the community’s identity through national, ethnic, and religious symbols. The 
design of the studio becomes important since the shows broadcasted online offer the 
audience a live video stream of the radio station. The visuals, alongside the verbal 
portion, are shared with the community. In figure 8, we see the pre-revolutionary Iranian 
flag as it is positioned next to a “Shema Yisrael Adonai Eloheinu Adonai Echad” sign (In 
English: listen people of Israel: the lord is our God, the lord is one). “Shema Yisrael” 
refers to the religious commandment of daily Jewish prayers. Drawing on religious 
sources for national Jewish identification is not new or unique to the case of this 
community. In fact, this has been an established practice of the Zionist movement, in 
which contemporary reading was applied to ancient religious symbols of Judaism (Dahan 
& Wasserman, 2006).  
Figure 8, Taken by author during participant observation, Radio 
Asal, Farah Peri, 2015 
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In figure 7, the Israeli national flag is positioned next to a version of the 
post-revolutionary Iranian flag, containing the Faravahar icon. The Faravahar is 
a religious-cultural symbol of the Zoroastrianism, adopted by the Pahlavi reign to 
represent the Iranian nation. This symbol, while still used today in Iran, is 
considered more secular and ethnic rather than Muslim. By bringing the symbols 
of the two nations together, members create a sense of harmony rather than 
conflict. However, this harmony is often constructed with pre-revolutionary 
notions of the republic rather than with current Iranian society or leadership. The 
memory of the pre-revolutionary past is a highly dominant point of reference, and 
most of the identity markers presented by members go back to these times rather 
than to contemporary Iran. Thus, the process of creating a dual sense of 
homeland, or a dual belonging to the two nations, is a highly imagined one.  
This national duality is portrayed in another image (Figure 9) Joseph shared 
with me in a personal online conversation:  
 
 
 186 
 
 
 
 
In the image, the Israeli and post-revolutionary Iranian flags are positioned above 
a Star of David, a pronounced Jewish symbol. The written text states “Shabbat 
Shalom” in Hebrew (in English: Good, or Peaceful Sabbath), while the diacritics 
added to the Hebrew letters are taken from the respective letters of the Farsi 
language. The two images point at the blend of the two cultures and identity 
markers rather than a separation.  
 What is even more interesting in the case of the image Joseph shared with 
me is the extent to which the ethnic and the national are intermingled in the 
Israeli and in the Iranian case. The symbolism on the pre-revolutionary Iranian 
flag draws on ethnic Persian heritage, and the Israeli flag draws on the Jewish 
ethnic-religious history. Positioning the two flags together fuses multiple layers 
of identification into one cultural identity. This identity transcends each of the 
Figure 9, Israeli and Iranian flags with a Star of David, shared by Joseph 
via Facebook chat, 2015 
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cultures on its own, and creates a new space for the Persian identity in Israel. 
Alongside the flags, the use of the two languages is also highly important for the 
understanding of this hybrid identity. 
 
Language and the Building of a Dual Homeland 
 
In the research field of nationality, spoken and written languages are highlighted 
as primary instruments of identity construction. Language plays a dual role - it 
serves as a symbol that reflects the belonging and strength of a society, but at the 
same time, it is the tool that produces the same unity (Golden, 2001). With the 
national awakening in the 19th century, European countries pushed towards 
adopting singular national languages, pushing out local sub-dialects that harmed, 
in their view, the unity of the nation. Eliav-Feldon (2000) argues that forcing out 
local dialects and encouraging the use of national languages created a sense of 
social belonging to the nation state, setting the first European boundaries of 
national community as early as the 15th century. The significant role of language 
plays in establishing a national community stands out in the case of the Jewish 
national awakening. In the 19th century, the Jewish diaspora did not hold a 
territory or a concrete shared history, living in a host of locations worldwide. The 
Hebrew language was one of the few common characteristics the Jewish diaspora 
community held, and thus it turned into one of the driving forces of the Jewish 
nationality (Safran, 2005). 
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The shared Jewish language contributed to creating the narrative of the 
“new Jew.” The Jewish leadership in Israel supported the abandoning of diaspora 
languages brought to Israel with the immigrating communities. Living as 
diaspora, these communities, as well as the languages they brought to Israel with 
them, marked the passive dwelling in exile. Leaving these languages behind 
while making the spoken Hebrew language the official Israeli language marked 
the new, active and independent features of the Jewish community in Israel 
(Amira, 2009). The linguistic dimension did not lose its centrality after the 
establishment of Israel, where teaching the Hebrew language to immigrants was 
considered a prime aspect of the cultural assimilation. This was particularly 
evident in the name given to the primary educational language institution for 
immigrants—“Ulpan”—(can be translated as “studio”) derived from the Hebrew 
linguistic root of taming (Golden, 2002). Hence, the Hebrew language, alongside 
its day-to-day functionality in the Israeli context, has an additional strong 
nationalistic weight.  
The Farsi language holds similar significance in the Persian culture and 
Iranian nationality. Reza Khan (1925-1941) aimed at re-build Iran’s nationality 
drawing on ethnic pre-Islamic heritage. As the Shah of Iran, he stressed the 
importance of purifying the Farsi language and its ancient roots in the region. 
Focused on the building of a united nation, Reza Khan established the 
Farhangestan (academy of Farsi language and literature) in the early 1930s 
pushing back against Arabic and French influences in the state. Similarly to the 
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Israeli case, the ethnic origin of the Farsi language and its usage in the national 
context became a source of pride and esteem. By bringing the two languages, 
Hebrew and Farsi, together participants simultaneously subvert the importance of 
the language, opening them to a cross-cultural discussion instead of separation. 
At the same time, the two languages become a tool for participants, allowing 
them to mark their identification with the two ethnic heritages, nations, and 
cultures. This finding takes us back to one of the main themes in the last chapter 
– the Farsi language. Proficiency in the Farsi language might become a stamp of 
approval over one’s genuine Persian identity. However, the cross-lingual use of 
Farsi and Hebrew becomes a way to represent the national duality and inclusion 
rather than an ethnic pushback.  
However, it is important to discuss additional perspectives presented by 
participants alongside the great longing to their homeland. Members share memories of 
Iran as a place of persecution, fear, and anti-Semitism. Members’ remember how 
aggressive physical and verbal behaviors towards their parents became a key moment in 
the decision to immigrate to Israel. Others stress how only by immigrating to Israel they 
stopped feeling persecuted. One of the more active group members, who is also a radio 
broadcaster in one of the Persian radio stations, shared her story of oppression. As a 
young girl in Tehran, she and her siblings attended a secular school. Around the time of 
the revolution, the Muslim school principal asked pupils in his classroom to condemn 
Judaism and Israel in their morning prayers. Jewish pupils in the class were asked to 
ignore their religiosity, and support the principal’s perspective. The group member 
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recollects how she and her friends did not comply. When she tried to stand up against the 
principle, she slapped the young girl and threw her at the floor. The group member tells 
in her post on Facebook:  
I do not know where I got the strength, but I did not cry. I got up, and the 
principal said that she hopes some sense got into my head through that 
experience. She ordered me to go back and do what I was ordered to do 
[condemning Israel and Judaism] or else she will call the authorities and 
my verdict as a Zionist will be doomed to death… My parents bagged me 
to apologize and to do what the principle asked me to do, but I refused 
and was expelled from school. I had to live in hiding for a short period 
while my parents arranged a way for me to leave Iran. My father bribed 
the right people so I can be smuggled out of Iran… When I landed in 
Israel I kissed the holy land and cried.”  
This story and many similar to it that were shared by participants online, reveal a 
complex attitude towards Iran, but towards Israel as well. On the one hand, Iran is 
portrayed as the homeland of the Persian community. Even the member who shared the 
story about the abusive school principle works hard to create bridges between Iran and 
Israel, a narrative I turn to study in the next chapter. On the other hand, as shown in the 
last quote, participants often go back to the Zionist narrative that positions Israel as the 
homeland and the safe haven of persecuted Jewish people worldwide.  
The two conflicting narratives position both Iran and Israel as the homelands of 
the Persian community. In some cases, Iran is the homeland to which participants want 
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to go back, but cannot. Therefore, Israel becomes the host land in which they reminisce 
together. In other cases, Iran was a host land, in which persecution based on religious 
affiliation is experienced, leading participants to migrant to Israel, their national safe 
heaven as Jewish people. The distinction between these two concepts is blurred.  As I 
have argued in the literature review section, the case of Jewish migration to Israel begs a 
special attention to the notion of a homeland. Jewish people outside of Israel are deemed 
in the Zionist narrative a part of the Jewish diaspora, living in a host land. Yet, the 
experience of migrants “returning” home (to Israel) attests differently. Migrants and 
their families stress that homelands and host lands are not static in definition and 
perception. They provide a somewhat different view on what constitutes a homeland in 
the Jewish thought. These narratives are revealed in interviews and posts shared by 
participants online. 
Moreover, the reality of the conflict between the two nations is 
experienced with contemporary Iran and its leadership. “You have to understand, 
there are good people there [in Iran]” argues Rani. “Yes, there are extremists, 
there is and was Anti-Semitism. But, that is just a small percentage of the 
population.” By pointing at the continuity of extremist thought in Iran, Ori 
addresses the fact that members of the community need to make sense of who 
they are between Iran and Israel today, but also within each state’s history. Thus, 
we can imagine the movement of identities, as articulated by participants, is on a 
quadrant system that requires diachronic and geographic considerations. Tensions 
are experienced between Iran and Israel on the political-geographic axis, but the 
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task of building a sense of identity moves between past and present of each nation 
on a diachronic axis. This multi-leveled negotiation is experienced in the Israeli 
society as well. This is important to understand since the community, while highly 
connected to Iran, actually lives in Israel. 
So far, I have discussed the different ways members negotiate and 
establish a national belonging to Iran. In the following section, I move to 
analyzing the ways such belonging is constructed in Israel. Since the memory of 
the Holocaust became an important issue within Israel-Iran relations I have 
decided to use it as a locus for understanding the efforts of the Persian community 
to become an integral part of the Jewish national community in Israel. In the 
following section I expand this discussion to further exemplify the construction of 
the dual homeland belonging. 
 
Partaking in a National Discourse – Articulating the Persian Place in the 
Israeli Civil Religion 
 
A central concept in the study of Jewish nationality in Israel is that of the Civil Religion. 
Bellah (1967) defined the contemporary meaning of the term to explain the universal and 
transcendent religious reality of the nation state. Drawing on Rousseau's The Social 
Contract, Bellah used the term to highlight the religious components that exist in the 
national context –“God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of 
vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance” (p. 5)–as means of nation building. The 
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term puts forward the communalities between the state–in general a non-religious 
apparatus—and religion itself. Thus, as Don-Yihya (1980) explains: 
The common between “traditional” and “civil” religion is the sacred 
dimension, expressed as a sense of awe and commitment to the sacred 
objects. These two types of religion also ask to mold the character and 
give meaning to the existence of the individual and society, and fulfill the 
roles of unity, legitimacy, and political mobilization for its social and 
political systems. The difference between the two is that… civil religion 
does not necessarily need an empirical entity as a source of absolute 
validity and sanctity of values and patterns of behavior (n.d.). 
It is important to open the discussion on civil religion with a clarification about 
the Israeli context. With the establishment of the state, the Zionist movement asked to 
construct a secular society that was clearly distinguished from religious Jewish 
communities populating prior to the Zionist national awakening, as well as from the 
diasporic image of the Jew (Ohana & Wistrich, 1996; Meyers, 2005). Thus, drawing on 
the Jewish calendar and tradition, the Zionist movement relied on a “contemporary 
reading of ancient symbols, as well as on an actual millennia-old history and existing 
affinity to a common territory” (Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2015, p. 159). The body of 
research focused on civil religion in Israel looks into the secular rituals and symbols that 
create the Jewish nationality rather than the Jewish religion. Based on that, my own 
focus in this dissertation, and specifically while using the term civil religion, is on the 
secular readings and rituals enacted by the Jewish national society in Israel. 
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The proximity of nationality and religion in the Israeli-Jewish context turned the 
concept convenient for analysis of national identity, symbolism, and coherence. In fact, 
the term is associated in Israeli sociology with the massive migration waves of the 1950s 
and 1960s. According to Liebman and Don-Yihya (1983), to build immigrants’ 
identification with the state, a system of symbols that transcends religion, and in 
particular religious differences within Judaism, was required. The Jewish-national civil 
religion drew on multiple sources to legitimize the Jewish state. Scholars point out 
different components of this civil religion such as military, agriculture, diaspora, and the 
Jewish religion. Central component highlighted by scholars in this context is the yearly 
calendar. Alongside religious holidays such as Passover, the Jewish civil religion 
constructed civil holidays and days of observance to build the aforementioned unity, 
legitimacy, and political mobilization. Chief among them are the Israeli Independence 
Day, Remembrance Day (the Israeli Memorial Day), and Holocaust Remembrance Day, 
which became key components in the building of contemporary national Jewish identity 
in Israel. 
Here, Jewish Hebrew-speaking Israeli media play a significant role in creating 
and maintaining the rituals associated with these days and with the civil religion. Print, 
in particular printed newspaper supplements, was found to be central in fulfilling this 
function. Published in accordance with the Jewish yearly calendar, newspaper 
supplements highlighted the sacred, liminal times of the secular civil religion in Israel. 
They simultaneously constructed and affirmed the central characters, places, and myths 
of the Jewish national narrative in religious holidays, and established the secular 
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holidays as equal in importance to religious ones (Meyers. 2002; Neiger, 2003). Through 
newspapers, the Israeli society built civil rituals, glorifying its heroic members (alive and 
dead) through worship and mystification.  
The main narrative of this Israeli-Jewish civil religion revolved around a 
voluntary key, privileging acts of heroism and self-sacrifice carried by members of the 
national Jewish community. The religious commitment here is not to God, but to the 
land, establishing “a covenant of blood with the homeland which created an eternal 
bond” (Liebman & Don-Yihya, 1983, p. 40). The dedication to the land is, however, not 
an all-encompassing one, but rather an ethnocentric one. The sacred land is the Jewish-
Israeli land, not Arab or Palestinian. This is a partial commitment, or a “handicapped 
patriotism” as coined by Yiftachel and Roded (2003).   
These aforementioned issues should be assessed when studying Jewish national 
identity construction. The civil religious symbols become even more interesting on the 
backdrop of the findings presented in the prior and current analysis chapters. In the case 
of the Persian community, I have found that members question and push back against 
oppressive ethnic narratives, looking to re-establish their ethnic identity in Israel. The 
case of the national identity is a bit different. Members ask to maintain a sense of 
national belonging in Iran, but at the same time to position themselves as integral to the 
Jewish Israeli society. As I show in the following sections, members of the Persian 
community use dominant narratives of the national Israeli story, to place themselves as 
main players in the Jewish-national community. Here, members create what I define as 
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an “affirmative opposition,” a cultural act that simultaneously opposes and reaffirms 
existing social structures. 
  In this context, members of the Persian community affirm the national narrative 
by addressing the same yearly rituals of the civil society as systems of social meanings, 
affirming their sacred position within the national narrative. However, members also 
oppose the marginality of the Persian community by placing themselves, their family 
members, other Persians, and the Iranian Jewish community as a whole, as integral and 
important within these plots. In the following paragraphs, I unpack this “affirmative 
opposition” with examples related to one of the Jewish-national civil society’s prime 
observance days—the Holocaust Remembrance Day—that became central to the Israel-
Iran diplomatic relations. 
As argued by scholars in the field of Israeli studies, ethnic identities play an 
important role in the discussion about the Holocaust in Israel. A contemporary scholarly 
interest is focused on the exclusion of the Mizrahi voices from Holocaust related 
historical narratives as well as Holocaust commemoration in Israel. Interested in the 
relationship between the national and ethnic identity markers of the Persian community, 
I wish to focus on this specific day that brings the two into conversation. Hence, in the 
following section I provide an in-depth review of Holocaust-discourse related research 
as well as a contextualizing analysis of the ways in which members of the Persian 
community in Israel perceive and address the topic through the ethnic prism.  
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Holocaust Remembrance Day 
 
The complex issue of commemorating the Holocaust in Israel can provide content to a 
long series of thick books, and cannot be thoroughly covered in few single paragraphs. 
Nevertheless, it is important to review the central narratives that constructed the 
Holocaust remembrance discourse in Israel. As mentioned before, throughout the first 
few decades following the establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist leadership 
attempted to construct the image of the new Jew, or the new Israeli, a strong and robust, 
heroic figure opposed to the passive diaspora Jew (Almog, 2000). As a part of that 
discourse, the Zionist movement constructed a collective memory of the Holocaust that 
emphasized acts of Jewish rebellion during those years rather than the heroic act of 
merely surviving those horrors, marginalizing or even muting the voices of the survivors 
and their personal stories (Zertal, 2005; Yadlin-Segal & Meyers, 2014). Such a narrative 
was also evident in designating a “Memorial Day for The Holocaust and the Heroism.” 
Inaugurated in the early 1950s, this day did not only represent the centrality of heroism 
to the commemoration of the Holocaust, but also represented the centrality of the 
Holocaust to the identity of the young Israeli state. The Memorial Day was distinguished 
from the “Tenth of Tevet,” a religious Remembrance Day designated by the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel as a "general Kaddish day" (Yom Hakaddish Ha'klalli) and other 
days of Jewish-religious mourning.  
These marked the Holocaust as a dominant symbol and ritual of the civil 
religion in Israel (Meyers, Zandberg & Niger, 2009). Whether by design or not, 
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the three days were built in a manner that evokes the narrative of destruction and 
revival of the Jewish people. The Holocaust Remembrance Day falls seven days 
prior to the Independence Day. “This period of seven days corresponds to the 
traditional period of Jewish mourning following death, the Shiva (literally: 
‘seven’)” (Handelman & Katz, 1995, p. 82). Thus, the three together hold an 
important symbolic meaning to the construction of the national identity in Israel. 
In this context, I analyze the ways in which members of the Persian community 
address their national identity on the Israeli Remembrance Day and Independence 
Day. 
During the early years of the State of Israel, Holocaust survivors immigrating to 
Israel were often perceived as passive victims, lacking ideological drive who were “sent 
like sheep to the [Nazi] slaughter” (Hilberg, 1985; Segev, 2000). Alongside such 
depiction, many of the survivors were often blamed in mainstream discourse for “not 
doing more” or for not openly fighting their persecutors. One of the harshest social 
questions the survivors had to face during these years was the painful question: “How 
did you survive?” (Klar, Schori-Eyal & Klar, 2013). This discourse mainly focused on 
European Jewry. According to Ben-Amos and Bet-El (1999) the heroic social consensus 
built around Holocaust remembrance began to change in the early 1960s as an outcome 
of the Adolf Eichmann trial in the spring and summer of 1961. During the trial, private 
voices of Holocaust survivors living in Israel were shared publicly, often for the first 
time. New voices were now part of the national discourse about the Holocaust and its 
memory.  
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Other important markers in the changing nature of the Israeli Holocaust memory 
relate to the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War. In 1967, before and during the Six-Day 
War, the Israeli political and social discourse focused on the shared national fear of 
annihilation. The sense of helplessness, thus far identified only with the Holocaust and 
diaspora life, was viewed as a possibility in the free Jewish state as well (Shapira, 1998). 
The Yom Kippur War (1973) had profound effect on the social remembrance of the 
Holocaust. During the war, footage of Israelis taken prisoners was screened on TV, 
symbolizing weakness and degradation of the Israeli soldier. These, according to Shapira 
(1998), were considered characteristic of the diaspora Jew and distorted the heroic self-
image of the new Israeli. They introduced more and more of the Holocaust discourse to 
the Israeli day-to-day lives. Thus, the “Holocaust memory has become more privatized 
due to the shift from official memory agents to individual ones” (Meyers, Zandberg & 
Niger, 2009, p. 460). 
The 1980s further exemplify the move to an individual experience and 
remembrance of the Holocaust. New critical voices discussing the Holocaust entered the 
Israeli discourse through literature, theater, dance, cinema, and the visual arts of 
survivors’ offspring. Nowadays, scholars view the Israeli memory of the Holocaust as a 
mosaic, built not only upon national and individual Israeli memories, but also on global 
discourse. The Holocaust memory is seen today as discourse evolving “from the 
encounter of global interpretations and local sensibilities... These cosmopolitanized 
memories refer to concrete social spaces that are characterized by a high degree of 
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reflexivity and the ongoing encounter with different cultures” (Levy & Sznaider, 2002, 
p. 92). 
Throughout these years, the Mizrahi discourse remained relatively muted, albeit 
reviewed changes, with hardly any efforts given to documenting the experiences of 
Jewish communities outside of Europe (in Greece, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, 
Lebanon, and the Balkans, for example, Ben-Michael, 2010; Kozlovsky-Golan, 2014; 
Krosnar, 2003). These communities, while acknowledged in the overall discourse of 
remembrance, were often referred to as a “side note, as they were not present at the 
center of events--the heart of the catastrophe in Europe” (Barnovsky, 2013, n.d.). Media 
representations of Holocaust occurrences in Mizrahi communities are also lacking. 
Described as a “site of amnesia,” paucity of visual references to the experience of 
Mizrahi Jewry during the Holocaust was evident in cinema and art. It appears that over 
the years, “the European calamity dwarfed the experiences of subjugation and horror in 
North Africa [and other non-European communities] to the point of misperception” 
(Kozlovsky-Golan, 2014, p. 156). 
Within this discourse, I analyze the ways in which members of the Persian 
community address the Holocaust as a mean of national identity construction. While 
Persian community is included as part of the Mizrahi group in Israel, and while suffering 
anti-Sematic attitudes in Iran (as expressed in many Facebook posts and in some of the 
interviews), Nazi policies did not, in fact, reach Iran during World War II. Online, 
members of the Persian community address the Holocaust, mainly on Holocaust 
Remembrance Day, through mainstream narratives. Most posts shared by community 
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members align with the mainstream narrative of remembrance in Israel. Some posts, 
however, add places and characters to that narrative, ones that are not included in the 
European centered story. 
Most posts in the two Facebook groups present narratives of annihilation and 
revival, viewing the existence of the state of Israel as both outcome of and a pushback 
against the Holocaust. In this context, members do not steer away from the usual Israeli-
Jewish remembrance rhetoric, highlighting acts of resistance and heroism related to the 
establishment of the state. Alongside these references, members also produce unique 
narratives positioning the Persian community as integral to the revival story. These kinds 
of narratives are not often (or not at all) shared in Israeli mainstream media. 
The “Persian angle” of Holocaust commemoration includes references to event in 
which Iranians (Jewish and non-Jewish) saved Jewish people from Nazi persecution 
during World War II. These references included a historical view on stories that are not 
usually highlighted in Holocaust remembrance discourse. For example, a member posted 
on “It means you are Persian” a link to the story of Abdol-Hossein Sardari, Iran’s consul 
in Nazi occupied Paris. The member shared the link, stating “Information you should 
have, a Persian Muslim who saved Persian Jews throughout the Holocaust.” The link 
included in the post leads to the story of Parisian-Iranian Jewry during the 1930s and 
1940s, sharing newly revealed information about the era: 
But how did Iranian Jews escape Nazi harassment in France without 
fleeing back to their own country? Sardari sought to use the Nazis’ own 
racialist ideology against them, wholeheartedly embracing the Aryan-race 
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identity for Iranians to staunchly argue that Iranian Jews were not “Jews 
by blood,” but rather Aryan Iranians who followed the “Mosaique 
religion” (ie [sic], the religion of Moses). Thus, he maintained, Iranian 
Jews were not members of the “European Jewish” race and should not be 
subject to Nazi Jewish policies. 
While still focused on Europe, this story places both Iranian Jewish people and Iranian 
government officials of that era as part of the historical narrative of the Holocaust. By 
highlighting the Iranian identity of both the Jewish community and Sardari, members 
adopt the hegemonic narrative of surviving the Holocaust, but do not lose their own 
ethnic identification within it.   
 Members of the two Facebook groups addressed another issue related to the 
Holocaust several times. The story of “Teheran Children” was brought up around the 
time of the Holocaust Remembrance Day, positioning the Persian Jewish community as 
central to the story of the Jewish revival in Israel. Teheran children are, according to 
members of the Facebook group, about 1,000 Jewish-Polish children, most of them 
orphans, who fled Nazi occupied Europe, and arrived in Tehran after several months of 
hiding in Russia. The group of survivors arrived in Israel in February 1943, five years 
before the establishment of the state. In discussions about this story, members highlight 
that Tehran children were the first and biggest organized group of Holocaust survivors 
that immigrated to Israel during the war from Nazi occupied Europe. While dates and 
numbers related to this event vary between sources, official state archives and some 
online news sources do confirm this story. 
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Members of the Persian community comment on the story online, stressing the 
involvement of the Jewish Iranian community in the efforts of saving the kids. “Tehran's 
Jewish community has supported and helped the group by caring for those orphans who 
came from Europe… to Tehran. They stayed there for a long period and were treated 
remarkably [by the Jewish community]. It is not a coincidence that this group of 
hundreds of children of Holocaust survivors is called “Tehran Children.”” Members also 
state that since this group was one of the first to arrive at pre-state Israel, the members of 
the Jewish community in Israel did not understand the extent of the horror experienced 
in Europe. By saying that, members suggest that the Iranian Jewish community, in fact, 
had a better hold over the situation than the community in Israel. By doing so, members 
do not only include the Iranian Jewish community in the remembrance narrative, but 
also position themselves as central and essential to it.  
The Jewish community in Iran worked hard to support the survivors in a period 
of financial pressing and scarcity. In addition, they were in charge of the saving of the 
first group of survivors to arrive at Israel, which is an important benchmark in history. In 
a way, by positioning the Persian community as integral to the story of heroic conduct 
throughout the Holocaust and the revival of Israel, the Persian community in Israel gains 
symbolic civil capital. Considering the place of the Holocaust in the Jewish-national 
identity and the Israeli-Jewish civil religion, the Persian community situate itself as 
integral to the civil religion.  
Drawing on images of the Holocaust, members also connect persecution in Iran 
with the larger narrative of the revival of the Jewish people in the Jewish homeland. As 
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seen in Figure 10, the post draws on the iconic visual of European memory of the 
Holocaust and the Yellow Star of David, while the typed text refers to persecution in 
Iran: “Antisemitism always existed, even in Iran, on account of hating the other and 
different!!! only not much have been told about it!!!! We will not forget… with Zionism 
in their hearts… and longing to the holy land on which they were brought up [sic]… 
they migrated to Israel and built beautiful families with Iranian heritage.” 
 
 
 
 
 
The posts described above pertain to the past, that is, the acts and occurrences of 
the Persian community in Iran and abroad throughout World War II and after. Alongside 
these stories, community members also highlight their active involvement in Holocaust 
commemoration and supporting survivors in Israel during present times. Members share 
stories, photos, and videos of themselves and family members meeting with Holocaust 
Figure 10, Memories of persecution in Iran, reprinted from Lovers of the 
Persian Language Facebook group, 2016 
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survivors in Israel, stressing the support they offer them in day-to-day needs, 
arrangements, giving a hand and a listening ear. Members highlight in these posts the 
national narrative, suggesting that “We have no other country and only together 
supporting a generation who almost disappeared [i.e. Holocaust survivors] just because 
of their religion. We must do it for future generations” or “Try to be good to each other, 
be united, be together, because the whole world is against us… do not let the Holocaust 
be forgotten.” The “us” members refer to here is not the Persian us, rather the Jewish-
Israel us, the national community.  
An important takeaway emerges from these examples of Holocaust related posts. 
Holocaust commemoration constructed by members of the Persian community online 
challenges, to some extent, the hegemonic accounts of Holocaust discourse in Israel. By 
referring to Iranian involvement in World War II, members of the Persian community 
expand the mainstream discourse to include non-European communities in the historical 
narrative. As Kozlovsky-Golan (2014) argues, the exclusive portrayal of the European 
survivor was never affixed to survivors of the Holocaust in Arab, and Muslim in our case, 
countries. In fact, “Every attempt to correct the imbalance by means of documentary films 
made by Mizrahi Jews met with relative failure and lack of public interest” (p. 156). 
Online, members of the Persian community help recovering the social amnesia of the 
stories related to Mizrahi Jewish communities during the Holocaust.  
An emerging field focused on web-based remembrance and memorializing, looks 
at the ways collective memory constructed both by individuals and by institutions vie 
digital and internet-media. This type of digital collective memory “collapses the 
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assumed distinction between modern “archival” memory and traditional “lived” memory 
by combining the function of storage and ordering on the one hand, and of presence and 
interactivity on the other” (Haskins, 2007, p. 401). Scholars studying manifestations of 
digital memory have tried to distinguish individual acts of commemoration online from 
more formal, official, institutional, and official acts, using the terminology of the 
vernacular memory vs. the official memory for that task.  
Conceptualized by Bodnar as anti-hegemonic in nature, conveying “non-
hierarchical, sometimes subversive symbolism and stress egalitarian interaction and 
participation” (Haskins, 2007, p. 403), the vernacular memory is seen in online memory 
studies somewhat differently. It is conceptualized as local, ephemeral, indigenous, 
informal or unplanned, every-day based commemoration, manifested more immediately 
after an event rather than via a retroactive commemorative perspective (Muzaini & 
Yeoh, 2014; Hess, 2007; Foot, Warnick & Schneider, 2006). However, scholars have 
found that online vernacular web based commemoration and memorials are frequently 
regulated “not only formally by webmasters, but also in accordance to rules agreed by 
members” (Muzaini & Yeoh, 2014, p. 8). Public, institutionalized, or hegemonic 
memorializing practices too often find place on individually produced online 
commemorative sites, and vernacular memorializing practices appear on official sites.  
Thus, as suggested by Foot, Warnick & Schneider (2006) “the distinction 
between public and vernacular memorializing that has been useful in scholarship of 
offline memorials is harder to sustain, and perhaps less useful, in studies of Web-based 
memorializing” (p. 92). The interesting part in this context, is that members of the 
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Persian community do not push back against mainstream commemoration narratives of 
heroism or destruction and revival, but rather utilize them to place the Iranian and 
Persian community as important part of the plot. Remembering the Persian community 
in this context becomes an important social act, as it allows this community to become, 
at least in their own mind, a part of the national ethos and the civil religion. It shows us 
the far-reaching impact of dominant commemoration narratives, and the role they play 
for minority groups seeking to become integral to hegemonic national narratives.  
As Hall (1987) points out, these two sources of identification stand in somewhat 
of a conflict. Hall argues: “some people now… begin to reach for a new conception of 
ethnicity as a kind of counter to the old discourses of nationalism or national identity” 
(pp. 45-46). We see in this chapter that indeed, in light of cultural hegemonic 
oppression, these are articulated as conflicting ends of the Persian community’s cultural 
belonging. However, as I continue analyzing posts and interviews related to the national 
context, I argue that just positioning the two as conflicting is not thorough enough when 
discussing the complexity of forming either ethnic or national identity within the Israeli 
society. I find that through collaborative construction of identity, positioning the Persian 
community as part of the Iranian and Israeli societies, members create a sense of a dual 
homeland. This duality challenges mainstream Zionist notions of migration. At the same 
time members, to some extent, criticize current Iranian politics by reminiscing and 
creating a link between their own Iranian identity and pre-revolutionary Iran. 
Creating or affirming shared meanings and identities through collaborative 
action is among the most satisfying and affirming of human activities. 
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Being part of a group and reveling in the lived experience of “we-ness” is 
one of the most important ways that individuals come to have a positive 
view of themselves and hold their existential fears at bay (Fleigstein & 
McAdam, 2012, p. 47). 
I argued in the previous chapter that the lived experience of “we-ness,” as described in 
the abovementioned citation, is an ethnic experience. By defining the term “lived 
ethnicity” I have shown that members of the Persian community in Israel work together 
to construct an ethnic identity and consciousness, expanding their ethnic identification 
from liminal and peripheral activities into day-to-day activities. Assessing this lived 
ethnicity in the national context I find a complex process of identification, drawing on 
conflicting sources of identity markers.  
 In the case of the Persian community in Israel, we see a multi-layered “we-ness” 
through which members create a positive view of themselves. First, there is the ethnic 
“we-ness” described in length in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I found two more 
layers of identification that tie into the same sense of “us” or “we:” the Israeli-Jewish 
national “we-ness” and the Iranian national “we-ness.” We can see that the lived ethnic 
experience helps to position groups in the national-Jewish we-ness in Israel, that for 
many years oppressed ethnic identification.  
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Concluding Remarks: Dual Homelands and the Affirmative Opposition 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how members of the Persian community in Israel 
create a dual homeland identification, in which they try to position themselves as 
a part of both Israel and Iran. Earlier in the chapter, I addressed the term 
“affirmative opposition.” I wish to coin this term as a way to explain the cultural 
practices through which marginalized groups oppose oppressive social structures, 
but by means of cultural reproduction end up affirming these oppressions. I have 
found in the Persian contexts that by positioning themselves as central to the 
Jewish national narrative, members utilize existing oppressive structures, 
excluding other groups in society from the national narrative. This finding draws 
on several theoretical lines of thought. First, I draw on Bhabha’s (1994) 
articulation of the third space. As discussed in length in the literature review 
chapter, Bhabha views the third space as a sphere that allows minority groups to 
formulate oppositional hybrid identities. 
In that third space, cultural meanings and symbols have “no primordial 
unity or fixity; that even the same sign can be appropriated, translated, 
rehistoricized, and read anew” (p. 55). The identification processes constructed by 
the Persian community works in a similar logic. Through creating national 
belonging to both Israel and Iran, they change the Jewish perception of the 
national homeland, and open the discussion to multiple national identifications. 
Throughout this process, members create a combination of signifiers that lead to 
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the formulation of multi-layered identity. Thus, online spheres allow a minority 
group to bend different sources of identification, questioning and negating the 
mainstream narratives of those exact sources. However, this is not a completely 
liberating process. Through this process, members draw on oppressive practices to 
become central to the Israeli Jewish national narrative. 
To fully develop this line of thought a brief review of its theoretical 
origins is needed. Postcolonial thought enables this study with a critical 
perspective on culture in Israel, in particular ethnic culture in Israel. Thorough 
this perspective, I am able to talk about deconstruction and reconstruction of 
oppressive cultural practices, addressing online media as an “in-between” third 
space allowing users to re-think and re-articulate their identities, as presented by 
Bhabha. However, additional cultural\critical perspectives are required here to 
further explain the roots of the term “affirmative opposition” as I address it. These 
two theories come from Hall’s (1980) seminal “Encoding-Decoding” model, and 
Williams’ (1973/1991) model of cultural change.  
Hall’s model focuses on the audience member and the process of decoding 
media messages and meaning making in different cultural contexts. Focusing on 
audiences and practices of reception, Hall offers three possible subject positions 
or interpretive moments. The first, the dominant-hegemonic position, refers to 
cases in which the audience member takes the connoted meaning from a media 
text, operating within the dominant cultural code of that given society to extract 
meanings out of texts. A second subject position is defined by Hall as the 
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negotiated position. As its name suggests, viewers engage a process of negotiation 
with both media texts and cultural understandings while extracting meanings out 
of cultural messages. “Decoding within the negotiated version contains a mixture 
of adaptive and oppositional elements” argues Hall (p. 137). Thus, audiences can 
(but not often do) create a situated reading of media messages, accepting parts of 
the message while opposing other parts. The third interpretation option is the 
oppositional position, in which audience members decode messages within an 
alternative framework, critically reading hegemonic message and producing 
oppositional meaning making process towards them. 
The most important take away from Hall’s model for this dissertation is 
the negotiated position, bringing together hegemonic and oppositional points of 
views on media texts and messages. This position, as articulated by Hall, pertains 
to the audience member’s point of view. That is, while audience members are 
conceptualized as active interpreters engaged in a meaning making process (rather 
than passive spectators), they are still just interpreting. The meaning making 
process does not culminate in creating or publicly circulating media texts through 
large scale media outlets such as Facebook. Considering practices of online media 
users, the articulation of the negotiating position has to account for the new 
production possibilities associated with the “produsers” populating online media. 
Thus, I seek to combine Hall’s reception theory with Williams’ production theory.  
In his article “Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory” 
Williams aims at unpacking the hegemonic processes through consideration of the 
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Marxist articulation of the cultural “base” rather than the “superstructure” which 
is usually approached and even over emphasized in cultural studies. Looking at 
cultural production processes, Williams argues for a “selective tradition” in which 
two kinds of cultures meet—residual culture and emergent culture. Residual 
culture includes the experiences, meanings, social and cultural structures, and 
values of previous social formations. These structures are perceived as a given 
lived and practiced code, that cannot be verified or expressed outside of or 
separated from the dominant culture.  
In contrast, emergent culture refers to all of the new cultural practices, 
experiences, meanings, and values growing in opposition or as alternative to the 
residual culture. In line with Gramsci’s hegemony theory, Williams argues that all 
of these new practices meet with attempts to incorporate them into mainstream 
culture. These new and emerging cultural structures are not created ex nihilo, but 
rather act as a reaction to existing structures. Thus, these emerging cultural 
options will always contain some influence of effective or dominant 
contemporary practice. This approach, in comparison to Hall’s option of 
resistance through opposing position, is a bit more pessimistic in terms of agency 
and cultural change. 
How then, can we tie these two approaches—Hall’s and Williams’—to the 
practices of the Persian community in Israel and to the term “affirmative 
opposition”? Bringing the two together, I argue that both production and reception 
practices allow groups and individuals with negotiating spaces. Combining the 
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two, we can now address internet media users, simultaneously producers and 
consumers, as able to both resist and affirm social structures through their 
“emergent negotiating subject position.” Users at once decode and encode 
complex messages, that contain, at once, affirmative and oppositional messages. 
They are not just decoding messages, they also further produce or encode 
messages based on them. These new messages are designed to be publicly 
circulated and disseminated and thus do not stop at the point of meaning making.   
Decoding and encoding acts are thus positioned in a new, different space 
than the one articulated by Hall. Through the term “affirmative opposition” I seek 
to capture this dual position—producing and consuming—that allow users to 
consume, create, mix, and circulate messages that at one affirm and oppose 
existing oppressive cultural structures.   
This notion ties back to the opening quote of the chapter. In it, Freire 
(1970/2000) addresses similar processes. In the context of education and culture, 
Freire shows how the oppressed draws on culture of the oppressors, becoming a 
“sub-oppressors.” Thus, radical liberation might sometimes also reproduce the 
social oppression it fights. I define this process as an “affirmative opposition,” a 
cultural act that simultaneously opposes and reaffirms existing social structures. 
By positioning the Persian community as central to Holocaust 
commemoration, members reaffirm the usage of this heroism as signifier of 
importance in the Israeli commemoration narrative. On the one hand, the usage of 
this narrative allows the Persian community to negate and criticize their 
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marginalization within the Israeli society. However, by using this “normative” 
commemoration practice, members in fact reaffirm the oppression they ask to 
oppose. By formulating their own identity, users recreate the normative 
“belonging” to the Jewish history, only now they are able to position themselves 
on the “correct” end of the spectrum—the European, heroic one. Arguably, while 
online media do allow users to push back against mainstream narratives and 
circulate positive self-representations, these outlets also enable the affirmation of 
existing oppressions.  
By using the term “affirmative opposition,” I stress that while some 
oppositional calls negate negative misconceptions about an oppressed group, they 
can, in fact, repeat and confirm the social narrative that established the very same 
oppression. The term allows us to critically engage with cultural practices as 
complex systems of negotiation, looking at the possible oppositional and 
liberating aspects of oppressive structures, and vice versa, identifying oppressive 
practices embodied in oppositional acts.  
 Through “lived ethnicity” and “affirmative opposition,” members of the 
Persian community position themselves as central to the two cultures, creating a 
distinction between the nation and the state. While they are not an integral part of 
the Iranian state, the do see themselves as part of the historical Iranian nation. 
While not holding central role in the Jewish state, members formulate their place 
within the national narrative. Thus, the Persian identity, a cultural source of 
identification, becomes a bridge between Iran and Israel. The Persian community 
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represents the linkage between these two nations, and work to bring them together 
culturally and diplomatically. This notion is further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
NARRATIVES OF DELIBERATION AND CONNECTION: CONSTRUCTING 
TRANSMEDIA BRIDGES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN 
 
In the two prior chapters, I have discussed the ways in which members of the Persian 
community in Israel utilize online media to position themselves within and between Iran 
and Israel culturally, ethnically, and nationally. This chapter is focused on the ways in 
which members take part in Israeli diplomatic efforts. This self-proclaimed role is 
manifested through members’ Hasbara efforts (literally translates as “explaining,” refers 
to Israeli diplomatic practices as further explained in the chapter) carried online. Thus, 
alongside constructing a cultural identity that bring together multiple conflicting identity 
markers, members also work to construct spheres within which they transcend offline 
cultural and political limitations, creating new online spheres that position the Persian 
community as a central political player within the Israeli-Iranian conflict. 
To understand the meaning of this self-proclaimed role and self-built centrality, I 
open the chapter with a brief review of Hasbara in the Israeli society. I then move to 
explain the main Hasbara efforts of the Persian community through the analysis of 
transmedia content creation. By using social media, mobile phone applications, and 
online radio, members of the Persian community circulate Hasbara across multiple 
media platforms, stressing their essential role in building cultural and political bridges 
between Iran and Israel. I focus on these three platforms, social media, mobile 
applications, and online radio, to show how different online outlets enable the blurring of 
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the national and the private. This transmedia usage allows the Persian community to 
negotiate their marginality within the two societies, building not only bridges, but also 
new online spheres in which they can re-imagine their indispensable role in the two 
nations. 
 
Israeli Hasbara as Public Diplomacy 
 
Broadly defined as Israeli public diplomacy, Hasbara literally translates as “explaining” 
and is concerned with the question of the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its military 
acts (Schleifer, 2003). Monroe Price (2004) defines public diplomacy as state-sponsored 
information that is “directed at a population outside the sponsoring state’s boundaries. It 
is the use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and 
leaders of another. It involved what was once with pride called propaganda” (p. 200). 
Currently coordinated by the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, 
Hasbara efforts are geared toward international states and media outlets and are focused 
on maintaining a positive image of Israel amidst the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(Aouragh, 2016; Dart, 2016). This is achieved through collaborating with other official 
state advocacy institutions, such as the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Spokesman’s Office, the Ministry of 
Tourism and Culture, and the Jewish Agency (Dart, 2016).  
Scholars critically view Hasbara as the synthetic Israeli terminology for 
propaganda, crafted as supporting actions that are designed to help achieving and 
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clarifying Israel’s somewhat aggressive military and political goals (Schleifer, 2003; 
Medzini, 2007). Many of these scholars point to the fact that while official efforts are 
being made to heighten Hasbara around recent military acts in Gaza, the international 
support of these acts continuously decreases. “The basic assumption of the Israeli 
Hasbara” argues Schleifer (2003) “was that the message must reflect the Israeli 
consensus.” However, beyond partially agreeing about the Jewish state, there is not such 
consensus about any topic in Israel. The Israeli society today has no agreement about 
what the desired political, cultural, and economic features of the state means, let alone its 
international image. Thus, Hasbara output became inadequate, unable to maintain a 
positive image of the Israeli state on a global scale (Shoval, 2007). With the lack of 
agreement and lack of appeal towards global media and nations, official Hasbara acts 
started taking place online, via 2.0 platforms, aiming to facilitate direct communication 
with supporters and private individuals abroad. 
 Online, Hasbara officials utilize multiple outlets, producing information in both 
Hebrew and Arabic for local audience, and in English, for wider distribution. Official 
state offices operate websites, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr accounts, asking 
supportive domestic and international audiences to share content produced by them 
(Deos, 2015; Dart, 2016). These range from Facebook posts, counting in real time 
Palestinian missiles lunching, designed to be easily shared by pro-Israel followers, 
through opening a Youtube channel for the Israeli President asking followers to connect 
and talk about peace, all the way to maximizing IDF’s tweets reach by asking re-
tweeters to use global hashtags such as #WorldCup to heighten visibility.  Albeit such 
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efforts, Israeli Hasbara is considered to be unsuccessful, constantly in decline, and 
unable to achieve Israel’s diplomatic needs (Molad, 2012; Shoval, 2007).  
What follows in this chapter focuses on online Hasbara efforts, voluntary 
initiated by members of the Persian community. These pertain to the Iranian-Israeli 
relations, in which members reach out to Iranians worldwide to explain Israeli 
diplomatic goals. I approach these online practices as Hasbara efforts based on the 
vocabulary used by participants. In multiple online posts, participant observations, and 
in interviews, participant took pride in community activities they refer to as Hasbara, 
aimed at “raising awareness about the truth,” and about the “real issues behind the Israel-
Palestinian conflict.” Here, they are focused on Iranian-centered Hasbara, one that will 
“open the eyes of the Iranian community worldwide, lift the veil, and circulate the truth, 
not the lies.” The “truth” and the “lies” mentioned by participants are, of-course, 
subjective political and cultural interpretation of participants in this study, not any 
political agendas that are promoted or articulated by me as a scholar. The arguments 
presented in the following paragraphs draw mostly, but not exclusively, on right-wing 
Israeli narratives. In-line with official Israeli Hasbara practices they legitimize Israeli 
IDF operations and support Israel’s right wing agenda towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, becoming part of the Israeli diplomatic array through voluntary acts.  
The need for such community-based Hasbara stems from what participants call 
“an Iranian anti-Semitic brainwash” led by the Iranian religious leadership, close 
supporters of the Palestinian freedom efforts. To maintain a positive image of Israel, 
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members communicate with Iranian citizens and Iranians in exile, focusing on three 
main online media platforms: mobile phone applications, social media, and online radio.    
 
Mobile Phone Applications and the Intimacy of National Goals 
 
Israel holds extremely high mobile phone adoption rates, second globally only to Italy. 
Cellular communication in Israel emerged in the early 1980s as an answer to military 
transportation needs, mainly for air and sea crafts’ communications. The first Israeli 
public mobile phones service was established in 1986 by the company Pelephone, 
followed by the establishment of Cellcom (1994) and Partner (1998) (Tsuria & Yadlin-
Segal, in press). The diffusion of mobile phones in Israel was quick and massive. As 
early as 2002, more Israeli phone subscribers held mobile phone lines than landlines. 
Merely two years later Israeli mobile phone companies had 95.45 mobile phone 
subscribers for every 100 inhabitants, almost twice more mobile phone subscribers than 
in the United States (Lemish & Cohen, 2005). A decade later, in 2014, ten million 
mobile phones were in use in Israel. This means that the number of mobile phone used in 
Israel exceeded the number of Israeli citizens by two millions. 
The most widely used mobile application in Israel is WhatsApp, an instant 
messaging application that also allows voice conversations over an internet connection. 
WhatsApp was downloaded by 92 percent of smartphone users in 2013. The unique use 
of WhatsApp, and instant messaging application as a whole in Israel, points at the strong 
Israeli family cohesion, in which users attest to have an average of 6 different WhatsApp 
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groups dedicated specifically to instant messaging with multiple family members at once  
(Canetti, 2015).  
Participants in this study point at a similar trend. To maintain close familial 
relations with family members in Iran, or those who immigrated to other countries, 
members use WhatsApp alongside other messaging applications such as Viber, Skype, 
and Telegram, which became highly popular in Iran. These mobile applications help 
them maintain communication and stay in touch on a daily basis and on the go, 
embedded in their daily activities. They send recorded videos, exchange messages, and 
use live videos to take part in family event such as birthdays and holidays. 
Anat, a graduate student in her early 30s, shared more about the use of mobile 
applications in the Persian community. Anat immigrated to Israel well after the 
revolution, in 1999 at the age of 16, with her nuclear family. According to her, she was 
absorbed in the Israeli society quickly. Anat served in the Israeli army and now study in 
one of the large Israeli universities. She has Persian family members both in Iran and in 
Europe, with which she maintains daily connection through internet platforms, chief 
among them instant messaging mobile applications. “With the family in Israel I use 
WhatsApp, with friends and family in Iran Viber and the Facebook messenger. I do not 
really know why, but it seems like WhatsApp is less popular in Iran.”  
When I ask about the communication barriers and the distractions of internet 
connectivity in Iran, Anat answers:  
The state and leadership in Iran are eager to stop young Iranians from 
internet usage. They keep on blocking sites, [mobile phone] applications, 
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and sometimes shut down internet connection completely. But most of the 
younger generation is not threatened by it. They find ways to break and 
hack these blocks and inform one another about the platforms that work 
and the ones that do not. I do think that Facebook and apps are more for 
the younger generations, but my parents and their friends use them… 
mainly to keep updated, to send regards on holidays and special days.  
The strong familial ties that mobile apps help to maintain are important for 
migrating communities, but are not surprising, nor do they add much to the literature on 
migration and digital media usage. The Persian case supports existing understandings of 
personal usage of mobile applications. As shown, instant messaging is generally used to 
maintain a small network of users one already knows, rather than to connect to new 
users outside one’s network (Kim, Kim, Park & Rice, 2007). Reflecting on this through 
the lens of migration studies, media as a whole, and as the case of the Persian 
community shows us, instant messaging mobile applications, are used to sustain close 
relations with friends and family members, maintaining an ontological security with the 
place of origin (Eswari, 2014). 
What is interesting and new, is that members of the Persian community in fact do 
more than just maintain these close relations via mobile apps. Aiming to develop far-
reaching Hasbara through instant messages, members of the Persian community 
developed connections with Iranians inside and outside of Iran. “Honestly,” says Joseph, 
“I started communicating about the topics of Israeli agenda because I wanted to practice 
my Farsi writing and did not have many other outlets.” Thus, Joseph joined multiple 
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Facebook groups of Iranian and Persian culture, and started developing connections that 
evolved into daily messaging via mobile apps. “You start by talking about yourself, and 
little by little, you get to explain life in Israel, life in light of the conflict, and you listen 
to their stories as well.” Hasbara, for Joseph, means that you take it upon yourself to 
explain the conflict to people that might support the Palestinian side. “It is much easier 
to talk to Iranians in the US and Europe, because they are not as ignorant or brainwashed 
as the Iranians in Iran,” he argues.  
When I ask for concrete examples, Joseph explains that he mainly talks about the 
high levels of freedom and liberalism in Israel, issues that are often overlooked by 
worldwide media. “I talk about the truth that is not presented by media in Iran,” Joseph 
adds. This truth, of course, is highly subjective, and is mainly associated with right wing 
approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli politics. These efforts usually 
try to normalize life in Israel and emphasize Palestinian attacks on civilian population in 
Israel. This narrative also legitimizes IDF’s operations, framing them as defensive 
practices. Regardless of the accuracy of these narratives, these are the main messages 
shared through what Joseph views as Hasbara. When I tried to assess how widespread 
the phenomenon is within the Persian community, I came across different answers. 
These differences stem from different understanding of what Hasbara means for 
different participants. Joseph argues that while some members are highly invested, the 
group of members taking part in Hasbara is not big. Anna, on the contrary, argues that 
most members of the Facebook groups analyzed for this study in fact take part in 
Hasbara efforts, many of them on mobile phone applications. Nonetheless, they all 
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agree that what they consciously practice is Hasbara. Hasbara is the term they use to 
explain these diplomatic efforts. 
Anna argues that even by only talking about life as Persians in Israel, members 
take part in legitimizing Israel in the minds of other Iranians. “The first question that an 
Iranian will ask you online is ‘do you have Telegram?’ They are desperate for 
connections and communication, each one for a different reason.” Telegram is a cloud-
based mobile phone messenger application. Users can communicate through Telegram 
with their mobile phone-based contacts that also have the application. Telegram’s main 
feature is its internationally-reaching high levels of messages security. According to the 
app developers, messages sent via Telegram “leave no trace on our servers, support self-
destructing messages and don’t allow forwarding.” Such features make the application 
attractive to users who ask to maintain a relative secret communication between Israel 
and Iran. 
Through Telegram, Iranian users can reach information that is considered banned 
or un-accepted in Iran. Anna mentions curiosity about the west and Israel as a leading 
reason for reaching out to Persians in Israel. “Some of them also seek out information 
for the government, thinking they might get pieces of important information by just 
talking with someone on Viber” she adds. Joseph elaborated on this in one of our 
correspondences online. “You will come across many Iranian spies online. The 
government gives them 4-5 Euros a day to find information about Israel on social 
media.”  
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Nevertheless, the conversation can also be genuine, and in many cases, lead to 
friendship. Participant’s origin in Iran is an important component in developing such 
relationships. The shared history and culture make the conversations based on shared 
language, literally in the case of using Farsi, and figuratively, when talking about being 
Persian and Iranian. “The fact that we can talk in Farsi and know what it means to live in 
Iran makes us important players in Hasbara. What the state [Israel] is unable to do, we 
can actually do pretty easily,” argues Anna. “Some people might just be extremists or 
politically hardliners so they do not even listen,” she adds “but other than that, we make 
more connections and explain the situation in Israel better that the official sources.” 
According to participants, through instant messaging, they get to change the political 
perception of Israel in the minds of Iranians. “Some of them still identify with extreme 
Islamic ideas, but others really want to know about Israel,” Joseph adds. Through mobile 
phone messaging, the act of Hasbara becomes integral to daily routines of the 
community, bringing transnational politics into the daily usage of online media. 
Participants that talk about their Hasbara online emphasize how national goals become a 
central conversation topic in messaging.  
Contextualizing this assertion within existing literature, the case of the using 
mobile apps for Hasbara expands our understanding of both mobile phone and mobile 
applications usage. If so far mobile phones where seen as media through which 
individuals maintained relationships with close social and professional circles (Wallis, 
2013), then the Persian community usage expands this notion into transnational efforts 
of online diplomacy through mobile phones and apps. Here, mobile applications 
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transcend the personal-familial standard usage to become what Deutsch (1953) named 
“national equipment.” Users now create new transnational connections via mobile apps 
rather than only maintaining existing immediate ties, advancing national goals and 
agendas rather than discussing familial and personal issues.  
This important finding shows that what is often contextualized as the most 
private and intimate medium–the mobile phone–now takes a form of national-related 
medium. Through the use of this national-centered medium, minority groups, such as the 
Persian community in Israel, are able to take part in a national discourse and position 
themselves as central to it. Becoming central players on a transnational level, the Persian 
community takes the identity that was, for many years, oppressed and silenced, into the 
open, into public discussions. The private, thus, mixes with the public and the national, 
creating not only hybrid identities (as shown in the last two chapters) but also unique 
hybrid media usage.   
 
Hasbara through Social Media 
 
Persian community Hasbara take place through other internet platforms as well. “About 
10 years ago,” Lara remembered in one of our conversations “there was a TV 
commercial for one of the large Israeli internet companies, I cannot remember which 
one.” She went on and described how important this commercial was for her:  
You saw a young man walking in an Iranian bazaar, conversing with 
others, laughing and being friendly, playing Backgammon, sipping on 
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coffee. Suddenly, the young man takes off his long sweatshirt, and you see 
he is wearing an IDF T-shirt. The narrator’s voice-over is heard, saying 
‘the internet connects people.’ And that just what it does, this commercial 
just got it perfectly. Since I first got an internet connection, which is quite 
some time now, I am in touch with many people from Iran, I got closer to 
people there, developed new friendships… I am telling you this so you 
will understand that the Iranians have a huge heart. Most of them are 
peaceful people, only some are anti-Semitic and give a bad name to all the 
rest. 
Lara’s use of the internet to connect and reach out to those who are interested in a 
dialogue was framed by her as “Hasbara.” She started talking with Iranians around the 
world–both inside and outside Iran—around 10 years ago. “It started on Yahoo, in their 
chat rooms,” she remembers. “It did not start with the aim of creating Hasbara, but it 
kind of naturally went there. I went into chat rooms about Iran and Persian culture 
because I wanted to talk in Farsi and about what is interesting for me, which is the 
Persian culture.” Slowly, as the conversations evolved, Lara found herself unpacking the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to explain Israel’s policy and military goals. It was important 
for Lara to mention that she associates herself with the right side of the Israeli political 
map, and takes pride in her efforts to maintain a positive view about Israel in the 
international arena.  
“At the beginning, you just talk about yourself, your family, life back in Iran, life 
in Israel today… and when you get to know someone a little bit better, they start to open 
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up, especially when it comes to politics.” When I try to dig dipper into the reasons led to 
participants’ Hasbara efforts, all of them mention the benefits, in their minds, of the 
internet over mainstream established media in Iran. Their criticism was mainly that the 
media in Iran is biased, and Iranian citizens cannot reach the truth about Israel. “I want 
them [Iranians] to understand the real situation in Israel,” Lara argues. “That we are not 
their enemies, that the state of Israel has no interest to hurt any Iranian, that our army is 
not hostile, and that Israel is always there to help in any given situation.” 
The main assumption that Iranian media is biased and censured is not wrong. 
There are, in fact, many restrictions placed on media consumption and production in 
Iran. That, however, does not mean that the Israeli media provides its consumers a 
greater level of truth, or a less biased view on Israel-Iran relations. This fact is lost 
among many of the participants in this study. For them, the relative higher levels of 
media freedom (at least theoretically) in Israel means greater levels of truth about the 
diplomatic relations. “Even if Iranians do want to look for information,” Lara tries to 
explain:  
they cannot find it because everything they see in Iran is backed by the 
government and skewed. What I try to do online is to make sure that they 
also get another perspective, and I can do it in Farsi, we can talk on the 
same level, I get them, I get their culture because it is my culture as well. 
To get in touch in that way you have to speak Farsi, and this is something 
the Persian community in Israel is aware of. We have a role in this 
relationship. 
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According to Lara, her efforts are of the outmost importance because Iranian 
media outlets circulate false information and lies about Israel. This is, according to her, 
true both about offline and online media. “Let me give you an example,” Lara offered.  
There is this YouTube video of a well-known Israeli Rabbi who is 
preaching about positive thinking. Someone took the video and added 
translation in Farsi. The translation says that the Rabbi call Israelis to kill 
all the Muslim people, all around the world. And of-course, that was not 
true. That was not what he said. It really drove me crazy, so I took the 
video and translated it to Farsi, actually telling the truth about what the 
Rabbi said. Of-course, they were surprised.  
Thus, online spheres allow participants to “right the wrongs” they come across 
online, and circulate information that fits with their views. Joseph supports Lara’s view 
and practices in another interview. “The ignorance of Iranians in Iran and their anti-
Semitism are at heights that I did not imagine,” he argues. He looks back at communal 
Hasbara efforts carried around Operation Protective Edge (2014). “With everything that 
happened in Gaza, we were able to lower the waves of hate through online Hasbara. 
Then I got to understand how 35 years old ignorance and brainwash of radical Islam 
looks like.” When I ask what was exactly done I get different variations of examples of 
online participation. For some Hasbara was mainly about presenting the “facts.” This 
means gathering information about Palestinians’ attacks on Israel from Gaza and around 
the West Bank, and terror attacks within Israel.  
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 For others Hasbara meant sharing information on a plain level field. “Iran was a 
paradise before the Islamic Revolution, but many [in Israel] do not know about it. In the 
same way, they [Iranians] know nothing about us.” Joseph points out the scarcity of 
information about Israel in Farsi. That led him, and other community members, to 
explain complicated ideas about Israel. These efforts, as mentioned before, are mainly 
“after the thought” efforts, trying to rationalize and explain military measures. “It is hard 
to find many supporters of Israel in Iran. Even if someone is a supporter, they would not 
be vocal about it online, it is too dangerous for them.” That is why Joseph and others 
choose to conduct one-on-one conversations, which allow them direct and, in their mind, 
honest connections. 
The Facebook language group, “Lovers of the Persian language,” is another 
example of reaching out and creating a dialogue. While the group is not designed 
specifically for Israeli Hasbara, both administrators share in interviews that they do try 
to create a place for conversations that go beyond the conflict. These conversations stem 
from shared interest and love of Farsi. “We try to avoid politics and actually take off all 
posts that directly talk about the topic,” mentioned Anna, one of the administrators. 
According to her, the group was opened to talk about language from a place of 
communal love, not from a place of hate. Promoting the share interest in Farsi of 
Iranians around the world emphasize the common place rather than the differences, and 
call out for a dialogue rather than a clash.  
One complex issue in this context was the administrative-technological aspect of 
opening a Facebook group. “At the beginning, we could not decide whether or not to 
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keep the group open or closed.” The main consideration here was whether or not 
Facebook users who are not registered to the group can see posts shared by members of 
the group. “This became important because many in Iran cannot maintain connection 
with Israelis. They really wanted to be a part of the group, share stories, poetry, and 
learn about how we use Farsi in Israel.” These Iranian users sent private messages to the 
administrators, asking them to change the settings of the group and make it close, so they 
can freely join the conversation. Anna, alongside Ronen the other group administrator, 
decided to keep the group open. They acknowledged that this might harm the ability of 
Iranians living in Iran to take part, but it kept the conversation open so that everyone 
outside of Iran can see and take part.  
 Noa, an active member of both studied Facebook groups, also takes an active part 
in creating and circulating Hasbara. She, as most of the participants in this study, 
supports Israel’s military acts towards Palestinians, and presents herself as a proud right-
wing supporter. “On the Iranian side, it is harder to speak the truth online. Bloggers are 
being arrested for defying the government, and it becomes a risk to share information 
freely, let alone true information.” She expands on this notion:  
They think we are cruel to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. They 
think we kill kids, and being aggressive. I try to explain that what they see 
in the news and online might not always be accurate. Some of them are 
hardliners that will just start cursing and insulting, especially when they 
find out I am from Israel. But, others, less harsh, actually want to talk and 
learn, and the conversations are insightful. There is an interest, and I share 
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information about what is really going on in Israel, and we end up being 
friends and understand each other.  
In her Hasbara efforts, Noa tries to reach a common ground with Iranians inside 
and outside Iran. Her efforts, however, are turned mainly towards Iranians in Iran, as 
their government is one of the main supporters of the Palestinians. “For Iranian from 
Iran it does not really matter if you are from Australia of Israel, if you are Iranian you 
are Iranian,” Noa argues. “And I was born in Iran. It surprises them that I live in Israel, 
they love to hear about our Persian life in Israel. We actually have more freedom to 
celebrate traditional Zoroastrian holidays than people in Iran today. It speaks to them, I 
guess because tradition is stronger than religion.”   
According to Noa, Iranians that talk with her online realize that the enemy is not 
what they thought it would be. “There were a few weird cases,” Noa mentions, “that 
made me think that I should not be talking with them.” An Iranian Facebook user 
contacted Noa and after a while told her, that he holds secret intelligence information 
about Iran, and he wanted to share this information with her. “I really did not know what 
to do. I called the Israeli police and gave them his contact information, but I never 
followed up on it, I have no idea how it ended up.” Even with these kinds of interactions 
in their arsenal, participants in this study all agree that social media became a crucial 
tool in establishing direct relations with Iranian individuals and share a different 
perspective on Israel.  
“Since I started using the internet I made it a habit to read about Iran. I saw how 
more and more websites and bloggers from within Iran disappear” Noa explains. 
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Reflecting upon this, Noa points out the important role social media play in maintaining 
some alternative voices within the Iranian media sphere. According to her “social media 
brought critical conversations back.” These “critical” conversations, in her mind are pro-
Israeli, and anti-current Iranian regime ones. To support her argument, Noa mentions the 
Green Movement in Iran, and the centrality of social media to it. “The younger 
generation tried to create a revolution, and they used social media, Twitter more than 
other platforms, to create it.” Noa is aware of the fact that this revolution did not 
accomplish most of its goals, but points at the Green Movement as an event that sheds 
light on additional Hasbara efforts associated with the Israeli-Iran relations. 
Focused on the usage of media during the Green Movement, Noa’s comment 
takes us to the third central online media platform—online radio—used in Israel to 
create and circulate Hasbara. Online radio stations became important players within 
Israel-Iran relations during the Green Movement, as I further discuss in the following 
section of the chapter. Here I am focused on Persian, Farsi speaking online radio 
produced and broadcast online from Israel. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, I 
have included in this ethnographic account three online Persian radio stations, operated 
voluntarily by members of the Persian community in Israel. These are RadisIn, Radio 
Asal, and Radio Ran. Online and offline interviews were conducted with producers and 
broadcasters of these three station. I visited two of the station—Radio Asal and Radio 
Ran, and even broadcasted live in Radio Asal, sharing my research project live with 
listeners. The broadcasters encouraged me to ask them questions about their own 
migration story on air, sharing their migration stories with the listeners. This experience 
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expanded the breadth of this project and allowed me a deeper understanding and gather 
information about the place of media in forming the Persian identity in Israel. While 
writing the dissertation RadisIn was closed due to financial difficulties; but interviews 
with members of the production team are included in this final account.   
 
Online Radio and Imagined Political Roles 
 
Surprisingly enough, during the Green Movement in Iran, Israeli online radio outlets 
became a venue for Iranian citizens seeking ways to share information and criticism 
banned and censured by the Iranian government. In this section of the chapter, I focus on 
this Israeli involvement in the Iranian public life, and further examine participants’ online 
Hasbara. I open with a brief review of the Green Movement, followed by additional cross-
cultural acts performed by the radio stations. 
In the Green Movement, millions of Iranians protested against possible 
manipulation of election votes that led to the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the 
president of Iran. The Green Movement protesters demanded a more reasonable and 
democratic spread of power within Iran’s leadership (Tabaar, 2010). Farhi (2012) 
suggests that the Green Movement is the most important event since the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic. “With the exception of the revolution itself”, Farhi argues, “no other 
event… has been as politically significant” (p. 3). The movement was an opposition 
organized by supporters of Mir-Hossein Moussavi, a reformist, revolutionary himself, 
which ran as a presidential candidate (alongside two other candidates) against Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad. The revolution borrowed Moussavi’s campaign color (green), and criticized 
what was viewed as yet another illegitimate, anti-reformist, tyrannical government in Iran.  
During the movement’s demonstrations, western media outlets framed it as related 
to (if not solely facilitated by) online social platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube (Honari, 2014). Twitter, more than any other online platform, was regarded as 
the medium of choice for the green activists, bringing about the use of the #iranelection 
hashtag that framed the movement as the “Twitter revolution” (Bruns, Highfield & 
Burgess, 2013; Gaffney, 2010). “Whether technology was actually driving the protests 
remains a big unknown,” says Morozov (2009, p. 10), arguing that the role of Twitter, and 
social media as a whole, was not as dominant as attributed to during the Green Movement. 
“To ascribe such great importance to Twitter is to disregard the fact that it is very poorly 
suited to planning protests in a repressive environment like Iran’s” Morozov continues. 
“The protests that engulfed the streets of Tehran were not spontaneous nor were they 
‘flashmobs;’ they were carefully planned and executed by the Moussavi camp” (p. 12). 
Nevertheless, social media are still viewed as important facilitators and catalysts of the 
movement and allowing a highly important sphere through which the offline acts of 
movement were organized (Honari, 2014).  
  “While the response of the Iranian authorities to the protests was initially one of 
direct confrontation on the streets,” argues Lanzillo (2011), “by the end of 2009 the 
government had begun reevaluating its policies and technologies relating to internet 
censorship and enforcing stricter methods to limit access.” These new methods were 
visible through policies and practices developed to deal with, monitor, and document 
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perceived anti-government calls through internet-based media control. Yet, protester still 
looked for outlets to share information, criticize the government, and coalesce. Israeli-
Persian online radio stations became such an outlet.  
 Through switchboards in Germany and the United States, Iranian citizens were 
able to get around the Iranian ban on communication with Israel, and maintained phone 
connection with Farsi speaking online radio stations located in Israel. They have found 
the Israeli online Farsi radio stations as a great way to spread information in Farsi to 
other Iranians, without the fear of being penalized or punished by the government. Being 
an online source, listeners were able to follow live stream of these radio stations through 
the web rather than relying on radio waves that do not reach such far distance. The 
Israeli online radio stations, on the other side of this equation, asked The Associated 
Press not to record the conversations, allowing Iranians to freely share information on air 
(or, online) without the fear of being exposed (Heller, 2012).  
“During the Green Movement, we got daily calls from Iran. One call even from a 
hospital in Teheran” shares Rani, a producer and broadcaster in Radio Ran. “An Iranian 
audience member informed other listeners in Iran about family members who were 
severely beaten by government officials during a protest” he explains. “Other listeners 
called during the protests to accuse the government for underreporting the numbers of 
civilians injured during clashes with the government forces.” Thus, Israeli Persian radio 
stations became important players in facilitating calls for opposition and anti-
government activists during the Green Movement.    
 237 
 
An interesting aspect in this context is whether or not this diplomatic 
involvement of the Israeli Persian community had any impact on the Iranian society. 
That is, did the Israeli Persian community actually had an active role in organizing and 
inducing the movement. While this is an important question, it goes well beyond the 
confines of this dissertation project. The focus here is not the actual impact of Israeli-
Persian media texts on the Iranian society, but rather the imagined roles build and 
enacted by the community online. While the advocacy role the community creates is 
self-appointed, and to some extant self-congratulatory, it has an important role in re-
activating the Persian identity and re-forming the Persian community in Israel. 
 This self-appointed advocacy role is evident in the ways in which radio 
broadcasters view themselves and their cultural work within the community. With over 
40,000 daily listeners, many of them from Iran, Rani sees himself as an Israeli diplomat.  
His diplomatic role within Israel-Iran relations exceeds the case of the Green Movement. 
“We bring people into conversation,” Rani stresses.   
We usually get an audience member calling in from Iran, and an audience 
member calling in from Israel, and we let them talk about a topic of 
interest. They talk with each other live, and we show that an Iranian 
Muslim and an Israeli Jew can actually have a conversation and relate to 
each other. It might be merely symbolic, but it is important in my mind. 
Israelis are looking for peace with Iran, and our radio can be that bridge. It 
is only through culture that we will be able to change the conflict. 
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Radio Ran (ran is the state internet suffix for Iran), is an online radio that has 
been broadcasting in various formats since the year 2000. Ironically enough, the radio 
station is operated from a public bomb-shelter located in Or-Yehuda, a city in central 
Israel. The local municipal authorities allowed Radio Ran to use the shelter with the 
promise that will keep its maintenance and functionality in case the public will need to 
use it during a missiles attack. From this war-centered structure, Rani produces calls for 
peace. “The radio is based on volunteer work,” Rani explains. “No one is getting paid. 
We see it as a mission. We act as a bridge.” The bridge that Rani describes is, in-fact, 
multiple bridges that are built between multiple communities simultaneously.  
First, the radio attempts to build bridges between Iran and Israel. This is seen in 
activities described above such as getting Iranians on air, creating discussions between 
Iranians and Israelis, and also maintaining a Farsi based radio so that listeners in Iran can 
understand and be informed about issues related both to Israel and Iran. Another way to 
build these bridges is through bringing celebrities to be show broadcasters. One of them 
is Shahnaz Tehrani, a famous Iranian film actress, known for her highly successful pre-
revolutionary movies. She became an attractive feature in the radio station for listeners 
around the world.    
Rani further expends on the appeal of the radio to Iranian audience. “The radio 
mostly broadcast music in Farsi, but we also have talk-shows and entertainment”. On 
Friday mornings, Radio Ran broadcasts a show that is recorded in Iran. This is a stand 
up and entertainment show, that some well-known entertainers from Iran produce and 
record for the Israeli radio station. “We cannot reveal their names, but they are Muslim, 
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and they also include jokes about Iran, the culture, and the economic situation. They 
have a statement, a critical view about the government, so we try to keep them 
anonymous and safe.” By including this weekly show, Radio Ran is both able to 
highlight the rich culture of Iran, and to be appealing to listeners both in Israel and Iran.  
Additional bridge is built between old and new members of the Persian 
community in Israel. “We work to socialize new immigrants, explaining what needs to 
be explained about Israel, we create connections for them to the Persian community, 
etc.,” says Rani. By that he means that often, the radio station acts as an interpreter of the 
Israeli society for new comers. Broadcasters explain Israeli politics, culture, and social 
affairs, socializing Persian immigrants through a Persian perspective. Finally, Radio Ran 
members view themselves as a bridge between Persian Jews in Israel and Persian Jews 
in diaspora. They keep Jewish Iranians informed about the community in Israel, and 
maintain their relations with their perceived “homeland.” “At the end of the day” Rani 
asks to stress, “what we do is try to push the conflict [Iran-Israel conflict] into peace.”  
As part of this peace effort, Radio Ran took part in opening an Iranian embassy 
in Jerusalem. This was a cultural collaboration with The Great Flood Collective, known 
in Hebrew as Hamabul Collective.  According to their Facebook page, The Great Flood 
Collective consists of “artists, activists, and intellectuals who seek to change public 
perception of social tensions in Israel.” By using media and art as vehicles for change, 
the collective aims to bring together groups that were once divided and create 
“alternative, constructive dialogue and promote social change that highlights relevant 
current social issues.” 
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One such project was the opening of an Iranian embassy in the heart of Jerusalem 
(Figure 11). Rani explains this act in an interview: 
We tried to show that there could be peace if we can take the situation into 
our own hands. Our governments are not going to change anything, we, 
the people, can. This is an embassy of the people, civic initiative, cultural, 
not political or governmental. This is, in my mind, the only viable option 
for deliberation and dialogue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Iranian Embassy event invitation, reprinted from Hamabul Collective 
Facebook page, 2015 
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As seen in Figure 12, the embassy included both the Iranian and Israeli national 
flags, and exhibited Iranian and Israeli art that relates to the cultures and conflict. The 
station Radio Ran opened in the embassy added an additional layer to this relationship, 
bringing the post-revolutionary Iranian culture into the conversation. As part of the 
event, Rani interviewed an exiled Iranian poet, Payam Feili. His visit to Israel coincided 
with the opening of the embassy, and one of his interviews with Radio Ran was 
conducted in the embassy itself. Another interview was conducted while I visited the 
radio station, in it I had the opportunity to learn about the young poet’s struggle. Feili is 
a Muslim Iranian poet who fled Iran in 2015 because of the persecution he faced over his 
sexuality. He is unable to go back to Iran, like members of the Persian community in 
Figure 12, Iranian Embassy in Jerusalem, reprinted from Hamabul 
Collective Facebook page, 2015 
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Israel. Including an interview with him, with the post-revolutionary flag situated next to 
the Israeli flag (as seen in Figure 13 and Figure 14) adds a critical statement to the event. 
Here we see that the call for peace also calls to restore Iranian social structures 
established prior to the revolution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13, Radio Ran station in the Iranian Embassy in Jerusalem, reprinted 
from Hamabul Collective Facebook page, 2015 
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The problematic relations between Iran and Israel are a topic that further comes 
up in interviews with additional Israeli Persian radio stations. Shaharam, a producer and 
broadcaster in Radio Asal expands on the topic. He also had many Iranians calling his 
radio shows during the Green Movement in Iran. Alongside his emphasis on the 
importance of facilitating such calls, he shares the other side of online activism. “We 
experienced several instances in which our servers were taken down by hackers. The 
proxy of these users came from Asia, but since we had close ties with audience members 
from Iran back then, we knew these were supporters of the hardliners.” Just like Radio 
Ran, Radio Asal had Iranians call in to the station and go on-air with similar social and 
political calls. “They shared their fears, how they are poorly treated by the government, 
Figure 14, Payam Feili (middle) at the Iranian Embassy in Jerusalem, 
reprinted from Hamabul Collective Facebook page, 2015 
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how they were hurt physically by government officials. Letting them share this anti-
government information with other listeners made some hackers take us down.” 
Broadcasting from Holon, a city on the central Israeli Mediterranean coast, Radio Asal 
aims at bringing Iranian-Persian culture into Israel. The station produces events with 
Iranian musicians, and make sure to maintain a lively cultural life within the community.   
Alongside the cultural bridges, all three radio stations stress the issue of 
Hasbara. For them, letting Iranians learn about Israel, and letting Israelis keep in touch 
with Iran, is one of the most important aspects of their cultural-diplomatic work. Shirly, 
a member of RadisIn is a leader in the field of Hasbara according to many community 
members interviewed for this study. I interviewed her and got to learn more about the 
different practices of Hasbara in the community. “I started to work on Hasbara around 
Protective Edge Operation when I saw how weak Israel’s official Hasbara efforts are” 
Shirly explains. She adds: 
Iranians live in an Iranian bubble for over 37 years, and that is the source 
of their hate towards Israel. We do not have a shared border, we have an 
ancient relationship between Iran and the Jewish people that goes back all 
the way to the times of Cyrus. There is no actual reason for us to not hold 
warm relations. 
While the issue of the Israel-Palestinian relations is central to state-led Hasbara efforts, 
participants do not tend to mention it as a possible source of conflict between Israel and 
Iran. It seems like participants do not view it as a reasonable issue for establishing such 
heated relations between the two states.  
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 RadisIN, Shirly’s radio station, was closed as I finalized collecting data for this 
study. Similarly to Radio Asal, it was also operating out of Holon, a city highly 
populated with Iranian migrants. A team of around 40 volunteers worked to stream 
RadisIN over the internet an audience of Farsi speakers. When I ask for a central 
example of how RadisIn maintains Hasbara, Shirly points out an interview she held 
with Reza Pahlavi, the Crown Prince of Iran. Reza Pahlavi is the last heir of the Pahlavi 
family, currently lives in exile in the United States. He is the son of the late Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. “I wanted to show that the conflict is not between Iran and 
Israel, but between the religious hardliners in Iran and what Israel represents in their 
minds” Shirly explains the motivations to conduct the interview. The Prince cooperated 
and talked about normalizing the relations with Israel. “Our shared problem is the 
religious leadership.” By “our” Shirly means Israeli and the exiled Iranian population. 
 Shirly’s Hasbara efforts stress that Iranian community leaders outside of Iran 
view Israel as a legitimate ally. Her efforts are directed at Iranians within Iran, as well as 
Iranians in exile that might hold anti-Israeli political views. Similar to other stations she 
wants to build bridges between Iran and Israel, and to re-establish the relations that were 
lost with the Islamic Revolution. Again, we can see how participants construct an 
idealized Iranian homeland, ignoring important factors such as Israel’s role in 
maintaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and over emphasizing pre-revolutionary 
Iranian notions of nationality, ethnicity, and culture. To re-create these relations, many 
of the participants minimize the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
far-reaching power of the religious government. Instead, they stress cultural similarities 
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and anti-governmental calls that help imagining Iranian-Israeli relations based on civic 
engagement rather than governmental efforts. Thus, Israeli-Persian radio stations 
become another site for including the Persian community in Israeli politics. They also 
become important facilitators of anti-Iranian government calls from around the world. 
Members of the Persian community use media and Hasbara to position themselves as 
central players within both communities and nations, re-imagining the two communities.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Explaining the Nation  
 
In this chapter, I have endeavored to contextualize the process of Israeli Hasbara within 
the online practices of the Persian community in Israel. I have focused on the ways in 
which Israeli military and diplomatic goals are weaved into the cultural practices of the 
community, creating new spheres of communication in which the private and the public 
are blurred. Through new media usage, participants in this study were able to construct 
and maintain their ethnic and national identity markers, but also to create online spheres 
in which they are positioned as main players within and between Israel and Iran. I found 
this through the analysis of participants’ usage of three online media: mobile phone 
instant messaging mobile applications, social media platforms, and online radio. 
 Focused on Hasbara efforts within the Israeli-Iranian relations, participants in 
this study advance our knowledge about the usage of mobile applications. While the use 
of mobile phone is considered to be one of the most private and intimate media usage 
(Balsamo, 2012), participants in this study show how it is used, in fact, for public 
 247 
 
national efforts. Moreover, instead of only maintaining personal, mostly already existing 
social relations, members of the Persian community use instant messaging mobile 
applications to find new transnational connections with new users. Through these 
relations, members advance national goals, focusing on bettering the image of the Israeli 
society in the eyes of Iranians worldwide. Through mobile phone applications, members 
of the Persian community blur the lines between the private and the public, bringing the 
national into their most intimate media use.  
 Through the usage of social media platforms, mainly Facebook, participants in 
this study also advance our knowledge about Hasbara. While some are focused on 
legitimizing aggressive military practices, other members are focused on dialogue 
through normalizing the Israeli day-to-day life. By stressing the cultural similarities 
between Iranians and Israelis, members of the Persian community try to change the 
public perception of Israel, and build bridges between Iran and Israel. By stressing their 
cultural heritage, and national and ethnic belonging in Iran and Israel, members position 
themselves as leading diplomats, maybe the only ones who can truly create and maintain 
an open conversation between Iran and Israel. Once again, the Persian identity becomes 
germane to both the community’s media usage, but also to their essential role in the two 
societies.   
 Operating Persian radio stations in Israel further advance these findings. Through 
radio stations, members of the Persian society build cultural bridges between Iran and 
Israel. They connect listeners, creating a space in which national differences are pushed 
aside and shared cultural interests become vital. This is also enabled by under-playing 
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the importance and power of the current Iranian religious regime as well as the 
significance of Israel’s part in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, by enabling an 
un-filtered and un-censored media usage, Israeli Persian radio stations become players in 
Iranian politics. This was most evident during the Green Movement, but is still true in 
day-to-day broadcasting of Iranian and Israeli content. The stations draw on Farsi 
content to bring the two groups of listeners together, building a shared sphere that does 
not exist offline. 
Thus, positioned between two nations and two cultures, members expand the 
standard personal use of online environments to move from the margins of the two 
societies into the center, becoming essential players in a self-constructed transnational 
sphere. This transnational sphere is an imagined one, allowing members to take it upon 
themselves to change the problematic aspects, in their minds, of the two societies and 
the perception of their two homelands. On the Israeli side, members work to maintain a 
positive international image of the state, taking upon themselves the task of Hasbara and 
somewhat under-playing the weight of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Members 
normalize culture and politics in Israel to stress similarities between Iran and Israel. On 
the Iranian side, the Persian community in Israel becomes a player in Iranian anti-regime 
calls through transnational radio broadcasting. These newly constructed trans-media 
sphere becomes what I wish to coin as an “online homeland,” further defined and 
contextualized in the following final chapter of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS: BUILDING ONLINE HOMELANDS 
 
Two main assumptions stand at the heart of this dissertation project. The first is that 
online environments allow individuals to re-think their identities and cultures with new 
levels of freedom for creating and circulating media content related to them. As shown 
by other scholars, this assumption is relevant to the context of religion, gender, race, and 
more. The second assumption is that minority groups, as a whole, and migrating 
communities in particular, seek to form cultural enclaves. In them, they can negotiate 
belonging and celebrate self-constructed identities and cultures away from the dominant 
mainstream culture in which they are oppressed. Thus, the focus of this project was 
given to the discursive space built by media users, rather than to the practice of using 
media. I paid less attention to the actual practice of operating a digital radio console, and 
more attention to the transnational discussions and notional space facilitated through it. 
In the same way, I looked at the importance members pay to the usage of mobile 
application, rather than their designed or actual usage. I prioritized a discussion that 
address the sphere enabled by these media and the cultural practices they allow.  
 Bringing the two assumptions mentioned above into conversation, I ask questions 
about the relationship between media usage and the sense of belonging. I look at the 
ways in which users employ different media platforms to communicate ethnic and 
national identities. I show how online media allow post-migration community—the 
Persian community in Israel—to establish a transcultural and transnational media 
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enclave that simultaneously distinct them from mainstream public culture, but at the 
same time create a new public discussion, making the community visible to itself and 
others. In this space, community members draw on multiple sources of affiliation that 
shape the identity of the group.  
These sources, allow the community to experience being Persian through 
conflicting lenses, negotiating acceptance and exclusion through ethnicity, nationality, 
and culture. As I elaborate later in this chapter, I term this enclave space as an “online 
homeland,” to stress the forming of a sense of belonging on ethnic and national levels. 
Through this sphere, members of the Persian community in Israel position themselves as 
central players in the Israel-Iran diplomatic relations. They re-build their Persian identity 
between Iran and Israel through intermedial usage of online platforms. Thus, they form a 
community and a cultural identity that encompass mainstream cultures from Iran and 
Israel, yet still allow them to pick and choose the elements of these cultures that go into 
their self-constructed cultural sphere. Maintaining a positive self-representation, the 
community move from the social and cultural periphery of Iran and Israel to the center 
of their own sphere, becoming dominant players in cultural and political practices.    
The current chapter presents a discussion of the central findings of the multi-sited 
ethnography conducted to explore the above-mentioned identity construction and 
cultural negotiation of the Persian community in Israel. This exploration led to three 
focal points that are further contextualized here: 1) formulating ethnic identity, 2) 
constructing national identity, and 3) building transnational bridges. In this conclusion 
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chapter, I position these three findings within the larger theoretical perspectives 
employed in this dissertation, to discuss the term “online homeland.” 
 
Formulating Ethnicity: The Persian Identity as a Lived Ethnicity 
 
The Persian community in Israel is included under the Mizrahi ethnic category, 
perceived within the context of the Israeli melting pot as inferior to the absorbing Israeli 
society led by the Ashkenazi group. Focused on the ethnic facet of the Persian identity in 
Israel, I argue that members of the Persian community in Israel find online environments 
as a liberating sphere, allowing them to negate and negotiate ethnic social and cultural 
hierarchies established in the Israeli society. Four different circles of identification are 
central to this negotiation process. These are the national Jewish community in Israel, 
the religious Jewish community in Israel, the Mizrahi ethnic metagroup in Israel, and the 
global Persian community In Iran and in diaspora. All of these are brought into 
members’ discussions through their ethnic perspective and identification. I have 
attempted to understand the meaning and structure of this ethnic identity, and the role 
online media play in forming and negotiating it. I have found that the cultural isolation 
members have experienced over the last several decades led to a much-needed self-
expression online. Online, members of the Persian community were able to collectively 
bring their ethnic identification and culture to the front of the stage, drawing on it to re-
create a sense of home, community, and self-definition.  
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Thus, the ethnic perspective becomes a central, yet not singular, point of 
reference and an interpretation frame for community members. By referring to each of 
these social circles, members of the Persian community create a complex process of 
identification that constantly moves between inclusion and exclusion of the Persian 
community and other social communities inside and outside the Israeli society.  
In the national context, I argue that members of the Persian community use 
online media to create a sphere that enables an ethnic-cultural pushback against 
historical ethnic oppressions in the Israel society. Building the national Jewish 
community, Israeli culture asked its members to shed any foreign ethnic identification 
associated with the Jewish dwelling in diaspora. This Israeli melting pot presented any 
ethnic identification as deviant from the “clean” and “favorable” national Zionist 
identity. Online, and in retrospective, members of the Persian community find a place to 
somewhat resist this ethnic-cultural flattening. Drawing on the community’s collective 
memory and unique culture, members create and circulate hybrid Persian media texts, to 
re-build their identity and sense of belonging via online environments.  
Building inter-community cohesion while estranging themselves from the larger 
Jewish community is also true in the religious context. I found that members of the 
Persian community put forward their Persian religious uniqueness through presenting 
Jewish-religious practices distinct to the Persian ethnicity. These were brought with the 
community from Iran. At the same time, religious identity markers help the Israeli 
Jewish Persian community to distinct themselves from the larger Persian community 
worldwide. While in the Israeli context, Persian Jewish practices of religiosity are used 
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to highlight the unique place of the community within the Jewish religion, these same 
markers are also used to religiously distinct Persian Jewish individuals from Muslim or 
any other kind of Persians. Thus, the Persian community seems to stress their Jewish 
identity characteristics, underlining their unique place within the global Persian society. 
The same source of identification—religion—is used to simultaneously include and 
distinct the Persian community in Israel from the larger Persian community worldwide, 
and from the Jewish-religious community in Israel. 
The Persian ethnic identity is also naturally the center of the community’s 
discussions of the Mizrahi group in Israel. Pushing against longstanding cultural 
oppressions, members of the Persian community highlight their sense of belonging to the 
Israeli Mizrahi group, performing solidarity with other migrants from Muslim and or 
Arab countries against the Ashkenazi cultural hegemony. At the same time, I find that 
the community re-produce hegemonic ethnic structures, using the Jewish Yemenite 
community as a scapegoat on which they discuss using the stigmatic stereotypes 
associated with the Persian community in Israel. I argue that this practice is consistent 
with practices of cultural oppression presented since the establishment of the State of 
Israel. Here, yet again, community members create a movement between belonging and 
estrangement, somewhat in, somewhat out of the Mizrahi group.  
Within these contexts, the Persian ethnic identity becomes a central locus of 
interpretation. Community members moved it from the privacy of their homes to the 
open sphere of the internet, as well as from the liminality of holidays and cultural 
occasions to the routine of day-to-day lives. I argue that ethnicity both informs and is 
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informed by the Persian community’s wish to formulate identity and a sense of 
belonging in specific national, religious, and global context. It becomes an interpretive 
framework through which members read day-to-day activities (such as online media 
usage). At the same time, this ethnic identification is being formed and molded by media 
usage. The dynamic relations between ethnicity and everyday life leads me to coin the 
term ‘lived ethnicity.’ Drawing on two existing concepts—lived religion (Ammerman, 
2006) and ethnicity in motion (Moreno, 2015)—I address ethnic identities as fluid and 
context dependent. In the Persian context, the lived ethnic identity, which originated in 
the physical movement of the migrating community, keeps on changing and evolving, 
feeding and being fed by users online. 
 “Lived ethnicity” becomes useful as a concept when we think of and study 
political-cultural identities in spaces of contention. The Persian case in Israel shows us 
that post-migration individuals work within a space of oppression, gaining a sense of 
belonging on the backdrop of cultural, economic, and political marginalization. From a 
place of shame and embracement of mainstream cultural oppressions (that is, shedding 
ethnic identifiers, ignoring one’s own cultural-ethnic heritage), participants moved into a 
cultural space in which they purposefully enact their Persian ethnicity they used to hide. 
Most of them attest that the larger volume of partners experiencing the same process 
allowed them to overcome the shame and self-oppression, and to actively seek ways to 
express their ethnic identity on a daily basis. The online media enclave members created 
for themselves enabled that. Being a part of a Facebook group followed by over 16,000 
like-minded individuals, who shared a similar past, makes the process of constructing 
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the ethnic identity a central practice in the participants’ life. The cultural struggle and 
opposition becomes a shared effort that is now visible to the community.  
 Morano (2015) argues in this context: “postcolonial notions that emphasized a 
Mizrahi struggle over national resources and hegemony obviously reflected a political 
reality, the latter ought to be contextualized in relation to the dynamic networks of 
Mizrahi “strugglers”” (p. 306). To connect the Persian efforts with other Mizrahi efforts, 
we must first contextualize these efforts in broader terms that will fit a cross-cultural 
process. Through defining the term “lived ethnicity” I contribute to our ability to 
understand identity construction processes in concrete terms, but also to our ability to 
compare and contrast the Persian lived ethnicity and ethnic struggle with other Mizrahi 
groups’ lived ethnicity. The term thus allows us a comparative tool to further explore 
ethnic struggles within and outside of Israel.   
    
Constructing Nationality: The Persian Identity as an Affirmative Opposition 
 
Drawing on the case of the Persian community in Israel, I endeavor to understand how 
migrating communities and ethnic minorities negotiate and address national belonging, 
building a space that integrates the ethnic and the national social orders rather than just 
conflicting the two. Through the multi-sited ethnographic account, I have shown how 
members of the Persian community in Israel create a dual homeland identification, in 
which they try to position themselves as a part of both Israel and Iran, embracing and 
rejecting multiple national narratives on both sides. On the one hand, members stress 
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their essentialist belonging to the Iranian nation. Drawing on Persian culture and 
language, they question the Jewish Israeli narrative deeming Israel as the homeland of 
all Jewish diaspora. By stressing that Iran plays the role of a homeland, members, to 
some extent, flip the notions of “homecoming” and returning to a patrimony, 
establishing their time in Israel as a forced outcome rather than and ideologically-driven 
choice.  
 At the same time, participants often go back to the Zionist narrative that positions 
Israel as the homeland and the safe haven of Jewish people worldwide. Remembering 
harassment and percussion experienced in Iran, some members bring the homeland 
hierarchy back to the front of the stage, deeming Israel as their natural homeland. In-line 
with such depictions, members reaffirm existing national narratives, many of them 
oppressive and discriminatory. This practice brings us back to the notion of the “third 
space” offered by Bhabha (1994) as a lens for understanding processes of identity 
construction.  
The third space is a sphere that facilitates minority groups’ construction of and 
dialogue about oppositional hybrid identities. These identities, whether on a local or a 
global level, are characterized with high levels of fluidity, open and ready for 
appropriation, negotiation, de-construction, and re-construction. Forming a notional third 
space becomes crucial for marginalized groups in context of contention, as it allows the 
re-thinking of social and cultural constraints and oppressive structures. The identification 
processes constructed by the Persian community fits with the logic of the third space. 
Performing sentiments of belonging to both Israel and Iran, members of the Persian 
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community in Israel re-think the Jewish perception of the national homeland, opening a 
space for discussion about dual national belonging. This notional process is enabled by 
narratives built through interconnected online media platforms. These platforms, in turn, 
advance users’ ability to steer away from mainstream cultural and social structures and 
negotiate their place in society.  
However, I argue that this is not a process of complete liberation. Negotiating 
their place in society through online environments, members of the Persian community 
draw on oppressive practices to become central to the Israeli Jewish national narrative. I 
describe this process as an “affirmative opposition,” the cultural acts through which 
marginalized groups oppose oppressive social structures, but by means of cultural 
reproduction end up affirming parts of these oppressions. Members reproduce existing 
silencing commemoration practices of the Holocaust, as well as ethnic scapegoating of 
other minority groups (such as the Jewish Yemenite community in Israel). These enable 
members to position themselves as central to the Jewish national narrative. Yet, 
members also exclude other groups from the dominant national narratives.  
The tern “affirmative opposition” follows a long line of postcolonial thinkers 
who focus on the voices of marginalized in society. In one such account, Spivak (1988) 
asks: can the subaltern speak? The answer to this question is – yes, but with certain 
limitations. Spivak argues that unless marginalized groups are validated by dominant 
forms of knowledge and politics, resistance could not be heard or read, that is – 
recognized. Spivak emphasizes that calls of resistance and opposition find voice through 
mainstream, dominant, and hegemonic discourse, or otherwise they will not be 
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acknowledged. To this Bhabha (1994) adds the concept of mimicry, pointing at the act 
of subversion through imitation. Bhabha argues that while reconstructing the identity of 
the colonized, minorities might have to function, in the very least, through the means of 
production of the colonizing group. Together, the two show us that any opposition 
process contains both the cultural and political discourses as well as the actual means of 
production (media outlets for example) of the oppressive.    
Defining affirmative opposition, I draw on this logic, and ask to expand it. First, 
using online media, the Persian community in Israel constructs a space that is, to some 
extent, less subsumed under the Israeli media cultural constraints. This is not to say that 
online media are free of any constraints, but rather that using them to create a shared 
space for the community, allows the community to become visible enough for itself, but 
far away enough from the public Israeli eye. Moreover, instead of only asking how 
minority groups change their identity and self-construct narratives to fit with hegemonic 
colonizing voices, I add another question. In the investigation that led to coining the 
term “affirmative opposition” I ask about the ways in which minority groups change 
hegemonic narratives to position themselves as central to the colonizing process. In line 
with the postcolonial thought, emphasizing such questions allow us to understand how 
marginalized groups both oppose and affirm colonizing practices.   
Thus, through “lived ethnicity” and “affirmative opposition,” members of the 
Persian community use online media as cultural enclaves. They position themselves as 
central to the Israeli and Iranian cultures, creating, to some extent, a distinction between 
the nation and the state. On the one hand, members are not an integral part of the 
 259 
 
contemporary Iranian state, yet they still present themselves as part of the historical 
Iranian nation. Online, users create national narratives that negotiate their ethnic 
belonging to the Iranian nationality. On the other hand, members push against a 
historical narrative that stresses the exclusion of the Persian community from central 
sources of power in the Jewish state. By re-imagining their communal history, members 
are also able to negotiate their place in the national Jewish narrative in Israel.  
 
Creating Transnational Bridges between Iran and Israel 
 
Contextualizing the process of Israeli Hasbara within the online practices of the Persian 
community in Israel, I argue that members blur the private with the public, the personal 
with the national, blending national diplomatic efforts with the most intimate types of 
media usage. These blurring lines facilitate the community’s call for dialogue with 
Iranian citizens.  Through Hasbara online, members normalize the Israeli day-to-day 
life, imagining their own place as central diplomatic players in the relationship between 
Israel and Iran. Stressing their cultural heritage, as well as national and ethnic belonging 
in Iran and Israel, members of the Persian community in Israel position themselves as 
leading diplomats through internet-based media.  
This process is highly visible in the context of Persian radio broadcasting in 
Israel. Online radio stations allow members of the Persian community to build cultural 
bridges between Iran and Israel. The radio stations bring listeners of both nations 
together, creating a space in which national differences are pushed aside and shared 
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cultural interests are highlighted. Israeli Persian radio stations also position themselves 
as players in Iranian politics, voicing anti-government Iranian calls from Iran and Israel. 
This is mostly enabled by under-playing the importance and power of the current Iranian 
religious regime as well as the significance of Israel’s part in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Focusing on citizens rather than governments, the community emphasizes civic 
engagement that calls for the renewal of the diplomatic relations between Israel and Iran. 
At times this refers to contemporary Iran, at times to an imagined, pre-revolutionary 
Iran. The stations draw on Farsi content to bring the two groups of listeners together, 
building a shared sphere that does not exist offline. 
 Focused on Hasbara efforts within the Israeli-Iran relations, participants in this 
study also advance our knowledge about the usage of mobile applications. I argue that 
participants in this study use mobile applications, and particularly instant messaging 
applications, to advance public national efforts. Instead of only maintaining personal, 
mostly already existing intimate social relations, members of the Persian community use 
instant messaging mobile applications to find new transnational connections with new 
users. These relations are formed mostly to explain and advance national diplomatic 
goals, focusing on bettering the image of the Israeli society in the eyes of Iranians 
worldwide. Thus, the usage of mobile phone applications allows members of the Persian 
community to blur the lines between the private and the public, bringing the national into 
their most intimate media use. This brings us back to the notion of the media enclave, in 
which users advance their cultural and political causes through media usage that is 
distinct from the public eye. The “public” becomes a new public, not the Israeli per se or 
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the Iranian per se, but a blend of participants that use media to become publicly visible 
to like-minded users, of similar background, away from the oppressive publics in Israel 
and in Iran. Becoming central players in their imagined ethnic-national sphere, members 
of the Persian community in Israel construct what I term as an “online homeland.” 
 
Building Online Homelands 
 
The above-mentioned findings lead to the conceptualization of the “online homeland.” I 
define this concept as a sphere constructed and enacted within and between online and 
offline spheres by members of migrating communities. In the case of the Jewish Persian 
community in Israel, it is a sphere of meeting for Persians who were born in Iran and 
those who were born in Israel. It is a sphere in which the community expresses longing 
and nostalgia for past memories, but also where members are learning about the Persian 
heritage, culture, and language for the first time. In this sphere the community 
constructs, also for the first time, a reconciling image of itself, after years of cultural and 
social oppression. It is a sphere that takes the perceived good of both nations and 
citizenships (Iranian and Jewish/Israeli), and enables the members to make amends with 
the hardships they have experienced in both locations.  
The online homeland is not a physical place, but it brings together many spheres, 
places, and locations within and between Iran and Israel. This sphere is based on the 
offline characteristics of its members (nationality, ethnicity), flourishes online through 
the usage of various internet-based platforms such as social media, online radio stations, 
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and mobile applications, and trickles back offline to community meetings and the ways 
in which community members acknowledge ethnicity and nationality in their lives. This 
sphere enables the Persian community to create and maintain an idealized identity, 
overcoming the social and cultural limitation experienced in Israel and Iran.   
The online homeland is a manifestation of the complexity embodied in the 
concept of diaspora. It is a sphere that shows that national or ethnic identities cannot be 
neatly divided, questioning the conflation of homeland, religion, and nationality in the 
Jewish Zionist narrative in particular, and in national grand-narratives overall. By 
creating a dual nationality, members create a sphere that brings together their two-
perceived offline, physical homelands, into a space that becomes, in of its own, the 
homeland of this new identity. The multi-layered identity experienced by Persians in 
Israel reveals the importance of such spheres for marginalized groups that want to 
preserve their culture, but also important for younger generations that want to connect 
with their parent’s heritage. Members negotiate, relive, and even imagine their ethnic 
and national identity in an idealized way. They blend existing cultural, ethnic, and 
national forms (through music and memory for example) to create a new understanding 
of being an Iranian Jewish Persian in Israel. 
In the Israeli context, such space is unique to the Persian community as it 
encompasses an emotional attachment to two homelands at once, one that view their 
place of origin as the enemy, and the other that does not allow them to come back, even 
for a visit. Thus, the case of building an online homeland is different from similar acts of 
nostalgia and sentiments carried by Moroccan, Polish, or Brazilian Jewish immigrants in 
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Israel, that can go back and visit their place of origin. The online homeland that Persians 
build allows them to emotionally and intellectually visit a place that they cannot, or are 
afraid to actually enter. In the online homeland, Israeli-Persian community members 
hold an imagined dual citizenship in a community of sentiment that is not forced or 
articulated externally for them, but rather by them. Thus, the term expends our 
conceptual understanding of the concept “diaspora” in the Jewish-Israeli context. As the 
media usage of a post-migration community show, communities living in Israel post-
migration express nostalgia and longing to a home that was left, draw on the collective 
memory of this homeland, and seek to establish its cultural practices in the new locality. 
These practices show that migrating to Israel, for some communities, might not mean 
returning home. Flipping the Zionist narrative, some community members show that 
living as a Jewish person in Israel can in fact still be considered as living in diaspora.  
The concept of online homeland also expends Anderson and Appadurai’s notions 
of the imagined community and the community of sentiment into the online sphere. In 
line with notions of changing spatial arrangement, the online homeland is seen as a space 
rather than a place (Castells, 1996/2000). The community built around the online 
homeland is significant in the lives of its members. It goes well beyond Facebook posts 
and instant messaging, and is acknowledged as such by participants in this study. It is as 
constructed and imagined as the imagined community and the community of sentiment, 
yet with the movement online, users play a much greater role in its formation.    
Why then, do I choose to name it a homeland rather than just a constructed 
online community? The answer lays in both the sentiment given to this sphere by 
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participants and the identity this sphere allows them to build. First, online spheres allow 
participants to construct a reconciling identity, inclusive of both their Iranian and Jewish 
national identities, as well as their Jewish and Persian ethnic identities. According to 
many of the participants, this sort of identification originated online, as no other media 
outlet or social gathering really allowed them to be conveniently situated simultaneously 
within both communities. In the contemporary Israeli society, they are still, to a large 
extent, viewed as “others,” and their place of origin is viewed as the state of the enemy. 
In Iran, they are unwelcomed as Israeli citizens, and are not recognized as a part of the 
ethnic community. Online, users can carve not only their belonging to these two nations, 
but can also become central and dominant in them, embodying a bridge, a place of 
importance for their expertise in the two cultures.  
Thus, the communal Persian identity, originated and maintained online, has a 
very primary essence for the community members. It is not just a memory, just the 
nostalgia, or the longing. It is the lived ethnicity, the lived experience that is constantly 
constructed and enacted by community members, for the first time, like in no other 
media outlet. At the same time, for community members who were not born in Iran, and 
experience ethnicity as it is passed to them from their parents and grandparents, this is 
somewhat a first encounter with a Persian identity that is celebrated publicly, allowing 
identification beyond the political reality in Israel. Some of the participants describe it as 
being “re-born” into their own identity. This view of the online sphere, and the way Iran 
and Israel are intertwined into the Persian identity challenges the primordial notion of a 
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homeland, and help us to unpack the problematic use of the term homeland to describe a 
place of birth.  
An online homeland is not only an imagined community in the way Anderson 
describes it, as it is not about Iran or Israel’s wish to create national sense and build 
national subjects. This is the voluntary discussion of media users, which produce their 
own sense of belonging. I do not argue that social constructions and cultural influences 
lose their role or centrality in this process. I do stress, however, that the starting point of 
the process is not the state or its mainstream tools of production (media, maps, census, 
museums), but rather the online user and online group that promote their dual sense of 
identification. This is also not only a community of sentiment, as users create and share 
media content rather than just consuming content produced for them. It is the expansion 
of the imagined community and the community of sentiment into online spheres. Into a 
new sphere in which media users have simultaneously more control over media content 
creation and consumption, and less obligations to bounded physical places. It is the 
sphere in which form, content, and language are blended to answer the cultural needs of 
a marginalized community caught between two states.    
This online homeland, does not replace offline homelands, but it allows users to 
challenge the mainstream perception of the homeland. In it, members distinct between 
the state (the place, the government, and the social constructions these form) and the 
nation (the culture and the people, as well as the social construction these form and 
experience). In this sphere, users navigate sense of belonging and longing for two places 
and two cultures they view as their homelands. Online, they reconcile a sentiment for 
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both their place of origin (which in the Jewish context considered as a host land) and the 
new locality (Israel – “The” homeland). Both offline states that are brought into this 
online sphere are imagined in the sense that they are based on members’ ability to 
position themselves as central players in both societies. At the same time, they both 
make this online homeland a real and important sphere for members of the community, 
who are enabled with a place to call their own.  
The enclave media usage portrayed in this ethnographic account is performed 
away from the public eye, yet to some extent maintains dominant cultural constructions 
and oppressions. It also invites us to look at a process of civic deliberation between 
minorities and dominant cultures and between Israel and Iran. Media allow citizens to 
create civic discussions and negotiations, drawing on cultural similarities and past 
memories of the relations between the states. These negotiations are able to transcend 
the diplomatic clash between Iran and Israel, as well as between minority groups and 
dominant groups within Israel, giving hope for new social, political, and cultural 
practices and opportunities within Israel and between Israel and Iran.    
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